The transnational religious leader, regime change, and state sovereignty: the unlikely case comparison of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam by Lozano-Bielat, Hope Marie
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2015
The transnational religious leader,
regime change, and state
sovereignty: the unlikely case
comparison of Pope John Paul II and
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/15666
Boston University
	  	  
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
THE TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADER,  
 
REGIME CHANGE, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: 
	  
THE UNLIKELY CASE COMPARISON OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 
	  
AND ABDULLAH YUSUF AZZAM 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
HOPE LOZANO BIELAT 
 
B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2002 
M.P.P., Harvard University, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2015 
	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 by  
HOPE LOZANO BIELAT 
All rights reserved 
	  	  
Approved by 
 
 
 
 
First Reader   ________________________________________________ 
Walter Connor, Ph.D. 
Professor of Political Science, Sociology, and International 
Relations 
 
 
 
 
Second Reader  ________________________________________________  
Monica Duffy Toft, Ph.D. 
Professor of Government and Public Policy 
Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University 
 
 
 
 
Third Reader ________________________________________________ 
Igor Lukes, Ph.D. 
University Professor 
Professor of International Relations and History 
 
 
 
 
Fourth Reader  ________________________________________________ 
Sofia A. Perez, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
	  iv 
Dedicated to my husband, Sean, for years of faith, 
and my daily inspirations, Theodore and Seraphina 
 
 
 
  
	  v 
Acknowledgements 
 This dissertation is the result of years of study and the support and influence of 
many people. I am grateful to my parents, my brothers, and the Bielat family for their 
encouragement along the solitary path of the PhD student. I am thankful for the influence 
of John DiIulio at the University of Pennsylvania, who first inspired my interest in the 
intersection of religion and public policy as an undergraduate, and who, along with the 
Fox Leadership Program, gave me an academic home in my last year of dissertation 
writing. Walt Connor always encouraged me to keep writing, above all else, and without 
him, this product would not have been possible. Monica Toft has been an invaluable 
mentor to me since my days at the Harvard Kennedy School. Igor Lukes and Sofia Perez 
provided critical theoretical direction for this paper, for which I am thankful. In the 
summer of 2003, I participated in a conference with George Weigel from EPPC, who 
opened my eyes to the contribution of Catholicism to good public policy and enabled me 
to appreciate the life of Pope John Paul II in a new way, for which I will always be 
grateful. Finally, my academic path would not be possible without the lifelong influence 
of Father Michael Scanlan, who taught me at a young age that intellectual questioning 
and faith go hand in hand.  
  
 
  
	  vi 
THE TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADER, 
  
REGIME CHANGE, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: 
 
THE UNLIKELY CASE COMPARISON OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 
 
AND ABDULLAH YUSUF AZZAM 
 
HOPE LOZANO BIELAT 
 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Science, 2015 
 
Major Professor: Walter Connor, Professor of Political Science, Sociology, and  
 International Relations 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The role of religion in shaping geopolitics and its associated norms is often 
overlooked by international relations scholars. This influence can be examined through 
the lives of transnational religious leaders (TRLs), particularly those who contribute to 
new definitions of state sovereignty through their involvement in regime change. Two 
seemingly incomparable figures center in this paper’s case studies- Pope John Paul II and 
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. Pope John Paul, through the roles of pastor to a transnational 
community and head of an international organization, lent international legitimacy to the 
Solidarity movement, which contributed to the fall of Communism in Poland. Abdullah 
Yusuf Azzam authored the theological concept of “defensive jihad”, led the transnational 
Afghan Arabs in armed resistance against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan during the 
Soviet Afghan war, and contributed to the creation of a global jihadist movement. 
 Traditionally, Westphalian sovereignty claims that the territorial state holds 
ultimate authority over the affairs within its borders and that it is the primary actor in the 
	  vii 
international system. This dissertation examines how the characteristics of a TRL and the 
characteristics of the associated transnational social movement (TSM) qualify regime 
change as an indicator of challenges to conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty and 
modern state sovereignty. Characteristics of TRL include leadership style, hard versus 
soft power, relationship to secularization, and relationship to modernity. Characteristics 
of TSM include political theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, 
and nature of transnational activism. In both case studies, a transnational leader used soft 
power, based in a transnational religious identity and civil society, to contribute to a 
transnational social movement that helped alter the domestic authority structures in 
Poland and Afghanistan. As individual actors determining the actions of nation states, 
these TRLs ultimately challenged state sovereignty. Pope John Paul II’s theological 
worldview was compatible with the Westphalian system, and he contributed to the birth 
of a stable, democratic Poland with sovereign authority within internationally respected 
borders. Azzam, however, envisioned an alternate world order based on religiously 
defined, pre-Westphalian boundaries. His theological and pragmatic contributions to the 
Afghan Arabs and the modern day jihadist movement further challenged the Westphalian 
system.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One need only to open a newspaper to grasp the profound influence of religion 
upon international affairs - from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, to Al-Qaeda cells in 
Afghanistan and globally, to Kashmir, to the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, to 
warfare in Darfur, to the influence of Evangelic Christianity upon US politics.  At the 
time of writing this paper, the Islamic State (IS), formerly known as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threatens 
American interests in the Middle East and the future of stability in the region. This 
fundamentalist Islamic group uses methods of terror and violence considered extreme 
even by Al Qaeda. By publically beheading American journalists James Foley and Steven 
Sotloff and British aid worker David Haines and by threatening to kill journalists and aid 
workers if US and British involvement in Iraq continues, they prove that a transnational 
religious organization with violent means and a vision of a pre-Westphalian world order 
can threaten one of the most militarily powerful countries in the world. The Islamic State 
seeks to establish a Caliphate, first over the region including Iraq and Syria, and 
eventually on a global scale. This Caliphate, defined as a group of theocratic nation states 
ruled by a single Islamic ruler, would threaten world order and the system of nation-states 
as it exists today. To exemplify this, consider the statement, in the early summer of 2014, 
of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who supports taking over Iraq and Syria: 
Rush O Muslims to your state. It is your state. Syria is not for Syrians 
and Iraq is not for Iraqis. The land is for the Muslims, all Muslims. 
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This is my advice to you. If you hold to it you will conquer Rome & 
own the world, if Allah wills.1 
 
This quote demonstrates this IS leader’s vision for a global Caliphate and the effect of 
religious ideology in recentering collective identity from the nation state to the religious 
community. 
 The actions of the Islamic state provoked public reactions from religious 
communities and leaders internationally. Pope Francis, head of the institutional Roman 
Catholic Church in Rome and the transnational Catholic community worldwide, has 
spoken out about the persecution of the Christian minority in Iraq by IS. In a Sunday 
blessing in August, 2014, the pope said that happenings in Iraq left him in “in dismay and 
disbelief". The pope addressed reports of "thousands of people, including many 
Christians, driven from their homes in a brutal manner; children dying of thirst and 
hunger in their flight; women kidnapped; people massacred; [and] violence of every 
kind”, and responded by saying, “All this gravely offends God and humanity. Hatred is 
not to be carried in the name of God. War is not to be waged in the name of God."2 
 Religious leaders from the Muslim community have responded as well. The 
Grand Mufti Shawqi Allam, one of Egypt’s top religious authorities, has publically stated 
that IS is damaging to Islam. The International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) has 
condemned the forced expulsion of Iraqi Christians from Iraq. Mehmet Gormez, head of 
the Religious Affairs Directorate, the highest religious authority in Turkey, said that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Damien McElroy, “Rome Will Be Conquered Next says Leader of Islamic State,” The 
2 Pope Francis, quoted in David Freddoso, “Many Muslim leaders have denounced the Islamic 
State,” Washington Examiner, August 14, 2014. 
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Muslims should not be hostile towards “people with different views, values, and beliefs, 
and regard them as enemies.”3 As a final example, Iyad Ameen Madani, Secretary 
General for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation denounced the exportation of 
Christians, claiming that IS has “nothing to do with Islam and its principles that call for 
justice, kindness, fairness, freedom of faith and coexistence.”4 
 Though the Islamic State seems to be challenging the system of sovereign states, 
and certainly Iraq and Syria’s sovereignty, it could be argued that is behaving very much 
like a state. It is effectively governing eight million Syrians and Iraqis, with several 
hundred thousand of those governed being in support of the Islamic State. It is headed by 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has assumed the title Caliph. Beneath him, al-Baghdadi has a 
chief advisor on Syria and a chief advisor on Iraq, each of whom lead 5–7 governors. 
There are nine councils, including the Leadership Council, the Shore Council, the 
Military Council, the Legal Council, the Fighters’ Assistance Council, the Financial 
Council, the Intelligence Council, the Security Council, and the Media Council. The 
Islamic State is not just a strong military force, it is also attempting to govern the areas of 
Iraq and Syria it has claimed control over; in some cases it is even providing social 
services. All of this raises the question: can the Islamic state eventually be considered a 
Westphalian state with sovereignty over its borders? 
 President Obama is clear on this. He does not believe that IS is a state. In a special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Rebecca Hamilton, “Updated Muslim Leaders Join the Condemnation of Isis,” Patheos Blog, 
August 13, 2014. 
4 Ibid. 
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public statement on US strategy towards IS on September 10, 2014, he said: 
Now let’s make two things clear: ISIL is not Islamic. No religion 
condones the killing of innocents, and the vast majority of ISIL’s 
victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state. It was 
formerly Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq and has taken advantage of 
sectarian strife and Syria’s civil war to gain territory on both sides of 
the Iraq-Syrian border. It is recognized by no government nor by the 
people it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. 
And it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its 
way.5 
 
Obama does not acknowledge the state-like attributes of IS and deems it a terrorist 
organization, even comparing it to “cancer” later in the speech.6 Yet in terms of the 
establishment of a territorial Caliphate with a bureaucratic infrastructure and ruling 
structure, the Islamic State has already done more state building in its short existence 
than in the many years since Al Qaida was founded. Yet, it has a long road towards 
recognition as a sovereign state with legitimate power by the international community. 
 Though IS is exhibiting state like behavior, there is evidence that the jihadists 
fighting for IS make up a transnational body. In IS’ attempt to take over the city of Ayn 
al-Arab, Syria, on September 25, 2014, there was evidence that the IS fighters were from 
places as disparate as Egypt, Belgium, Turkey, and Italy.7 ISIS recruits come from around 
the world, responding to a religious identity that transcends nation-state boundaries, to 
fight for a new, sovereign state with territory defined by that identity. Even Americans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Barack Obama, quoted in “Transcript: President Obama’s speech outlining strategy to defeat 
the Islamic State,” Washington Post, September 10, 2014.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Piotr Zalewski, “How Islamic State Wages War,” Businessweek, September 26, 2014. 
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have traveled to join IS in Syria. On August 23, 2014, Douglas McAuthur McCain 
became the first American to die in Syria while fighting for IS.8 This provided evidence 
that American IS members are going abroad to fight instead of training to be terrorists at 
home. American IS members in Syria exemplify foreign fighters motivated by a religious 
transnational ideology that super cedes national loyalty. 
Current events such as the rise of the Islamic State fly in the face of common 
wisdom in international relations theory – the notion that after the Peace of Westphalia, 
religion lost political salience in the international system. This legacy has been 
challenged by the prominent role of religious institutions, transnational actors, and 
popular belief systems in global politics since the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. Religious ideas have driven prominent political events in the past few decades, 
such as Israel’s victory in the six-day war of 1967, the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
Iran, and Solidarity in the democratization of Poland. Yet oddly, international relations 
literature is only recently coming to recognize religion as an important force in predicting 
and analyzing world events. 
Though there are many angles through which one could study the role of religion 
in international relations, the question of religion and sovereignty is perhaps particularly 
understudied. Westphalian sovereignty has been challenged in the 21st century by a 
resurgence of religion, particularly as an ideological basis for humanitarian intervention, 
inter and intra-state violence, diplomacy, and social movements. IS challenges traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Michael Schmidt, “American Fighting for ISIS killed in Syria,” NYT, August 26, 2014. 
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Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty in its pre-Westphalian vision of world order, i.e., 
a Caliphate. It envisions the world in terms of a war between Islam and the secular state, 
and particularly between the Islamic world and the US. Even the iterations of its name 
reflect the growing commitment to a goal of universal Islamic rule – from ISIS (Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria) to ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) to IS (Islamic 
State).  A religious community’s understanding of state sovereignty shapes its role in 
world politics and the nature of its transnational activism. The Islamic state poses an 
interesting vision of the sovereign state that is both Westphalian and pre-Westphalian in 
nature. 
An avenue to capture how religion challenges, accepts or modifies sovereignty is 
that of transnational religious leaders and their involvement in transnational social 
movements that shape regime change. A transnational religious leader (TRL) is an 
individual leader of a religious community who, as guided by a religious ideology, acts 
toward political ends, benefiting from both material (people, weapons, capital) and 
immaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world leaders) resources across 
state lines in the achievement of those ends. Transnational religious leaders are able to 
create and mobilize a community of people bound by religious values that exists beyond 
the territorial boundaries of states. By mobilizing an international community based on 
religious principles to challenge the domestic politics of states, transnational religious 
leaders challenge, and perhaps ultimately alter state sovereignty. From this phenomenon 
arises the following research problem: How do transnational religious leaders and their 
7 
	  
	  
transnational social movements’ contributions to regime change impact conceptions of 
state sovereignty?  
This question is important because if transnational religious leaders do indeed 
alter conceptions of state sovereignty, then there is a gap in international relations 
literature that should be remedied. It is also important from a public policy perspective in 
that world leaders should be increasingly informed of the importance of religion in 
predicting and responding to world events. Instead of wearing the blinders of outdated 
secularization theories, they should learn to harness the power of religion for 
peacemaking, democratic nation building, and diplomacy. This question also has broader 
theoretical implications, and may raise the question: did Westphalia ever effectively 
relegate religion to the private sphere? Can religion and the Westphalian system co-exist? 
Does it depend on the religious leader or the religious denomination? If all sovereignty is 
challenged by globalization, what are the specific claims that transnational religious 
organizations and transnational religious leaders are making upon the sovereign state? 
I will hypothesize that the presence of transnational religious leaders, in addition 
to certain characteristics of TRLs and of their transnational social movements (TSMs), 
contributes to regime change, and consequently impacts state sovereignty. The enabling 
characteristics of transnational religious leaders will be analyzed through characteristics 
of the leaders and of their associated TSM. The TRL personal attribute categories 
include: leadership style, hard versus soft power, relationship to secularism, and 
relationship to modernization. The transnational social movement community 
characteristics will be analyzed though the categories: political theology, mobilizing 
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structures, political opportunity structures, and nature of activism. To determine how 
these variables and characteristics impact how TRL influences regime change, and 
ultimately conceptions of state sovereignty, I use two seemingly disparate historical 
cases, accessing the causal pathways through archival research centered on two 
transnational religious actors. In each case I will test the strength of these categories, 
ultimately identifying three categories that best explain the variation in how conceptions 
of sovereignty are impacted in each case and another three categories that access what 
makes transnational religious leaders’ challenges unique from that of other transnational 
actors. 
The first case considers John Paul II, the Solidarity movement, and the 
democratization of Poland. John Paul II, the first Polish pope, was the leader of the 
Roman Catholic Church during the last decade of Communist rule in Poland (1978–
1989). He supported the Solidarity movement, a popular labor movement in Poland, 
through the role of pastor (through pilgrimages to Poland, public homilies and statements, 
and theological writings) and the role of head of the international organization of the 
Roman Catholic Church, something akin to a head of state (through diplomacy, public 
and private communications with world leaders, and public statements on world affairs). 
He wielded primarily soft power through these roles. John Paul II was comfortable with 
the Westphalian system of sovereignty states and understood international diplomacy. He 
had the respect of world leaders, and particularly US leadership, which regularly 
communicated with him on events in Communist Eastern Europe. Although he accepted 
Westphalia, he believed that culture and spirituality were the real drivers of history, not 
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realist military power. Perhaps his greatest triumph was giving the Polish people a vision 
of themselves and of their history that transcended communism. Although he was 
comfortable with the secular state, he did not believe that modernity decreased the role 
for, or importance of, religion in world affairs. John Paul II successfully contributed to 
the fall of Communism in Poland, and Eastern Europe more generally. Through the 
Solidarity movement and other regional movements fashioned after it, Poland, and a 
number of other Eastern European countries, managed to democratize through non-
violent means. 
The second case study considers Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the philosophy of 
defensive jihad, and the Soviet-Afghan war. Azzam was known as “the fighting cleric.” 
Originally from Palestine and educated in Saudi Arabia, he reworked the theological 
framework for “defensive jihad”, to mean that every Muslim, regardless of country, was 
responsible to wage jihad on invaders of Muslim lands. He actualized this concept by 
organizing Afghan Arabs, volunteers from various countries who came to Afghanistan to 
fight the Soviets. One of his pupils was Osama Bin Laden, who ultimately disagreed with 
Azzam on his regional jihadist focus. Azzam wielded soft power through his persuasive 
theological writings, public speeches, and charismatic personality. He wielded hard 
power in the sense that he recruited Afghan Arabs, supplied them with weapons (mostly 
donated secretly by the United States), and determined their military objectives. His long-
term vision of a Caliphate, although he aimed to achieve it one country at a time, made it 
impossible to wholly accept the Westphalian world order. Believing in the establishment 
of theocracies, Azzam rejected the secular state and modernization. Azzam’s success in 
10 
	  
	  
his objective in Afghanistan is mixed. The presence of foreign fighters may have 
contributed to Soviet withdrawal, but the country was left in a state of civil war for years 
afterwards. However his contribution to the philosophy of defensive jihad changed the 
course of the jihadist movement and is used to justify international acts of terror to this 
day. 
Through a comparative historical analysis of these two cases, using archival data, 
I argue that both leaders challenged traditional definitions of Westphalian sovereignty 
and modern definitions of state sovereignty through their role in regime change. Each 
actor primarily executed influence through soft power. John Paul II accepted the 
Westphalian system of secular states, though perhaps not the cultural agenda of 
modernity. Azzam rejected secularism and modernism altogether. They both challenged 
Westphalian sovereignty in the sense that they were individual leaders of transnational 
communities that managed to change the course of nation states. They mobilized people 
across state boundaries towards a political end, verbalized through theological language. 
However, their regime change goals varied in that John Paul II accommodated to basic 
Westphalian world order, and Azzam did not. John Paul II and Azzam Krasner’s four 
definitions of sovereignty (international, domestic, interdependence, Westphalian)9 and 
his later “shared” sovereignty10, in addition to Daniel Philpott’s three faces of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
10 Stephen Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” 
International Security, Vol. 29 No. 2 (Fall, 2004): 85–120. 
11 
	  
	  
sovereignty11 and Stacey’s “relational sovereignty”12, offer new frameworks through 
which to analyze these historical cases. This paper contributes to modern discussions of 
sovereignty by detailing a process of regime change through which sovereignty is 
challenged. This picture also must be tempered by considerations of legitimacy. In other 
words, was the Communist state in Poland or Soviet invasion of Afghanistan legitimate? 
A discussion of the relationship between transnational religious leaders, regime change, 
and sovereignty will follow each case study. The characteristics of the transnational 
religious leader and transnational social movement that challenge conceptions of state 
sovereignty will be isolated and analyzed in each case. 
The dissertation is structured in five parts. First, it reviews literature on 
international religions and religion, transnationalism, hard versus soft power, 
secularization, modernization, social movements, regime change, and sovereignty and 
identifies an appropriate space for its contribution. Second, it lays out research methods 
and hypothesizes a relationship between transnational religious actors, transnational 
social movements, regime change goals, contributions to regime change, and conceptions 
of sovereignty. More specifically, it analyzes how characteristics of transnational 
religious actors and transnational social movements impact conceptions of state 
sovereignty through regime change. It analyzes which characteristics best analyze the 
TRL’s vision of regime change and the meaning of Westphalian sovereignty. Third, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Daniel Philpott. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International 
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12 Helen Stacey. “Relational Sovereignty.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
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dissertation considers the case of Pope John Paul II, Solidarity, and the democratization 
of Poland. Fourth, it considers the case of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, defensive jihad, and 
the Soviet-Afghan War. Finally, general conclusions are drawn, and transnational 
religious leaders find a place as an important unit of analysis in international relations 
literature, particularly as pertaining to state sovereignty.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Theoretical Landscape 
 
 
 The hypothesized causal relationships in this dissertation, presented in Chapter 
Two, are built on five basic variables: the transnational religious leader, transnational 
social movements, a regime change goal that may or may not be consistent with 
Westphalia, regime change and state sovereignty. These variables are informed by a 
broad base of social science literature. This chapter investigates the theoretical context 
for these variables and identifies a place in the literature in which this study makes a 
contribution. It forges a theoretical pathway to be followed in each case study. First, the 
subject of the place of religion in international relations theory is itself a subject of debate 
and creates a broader context for the importance of studying both transnational religious 
leaders. Second, both transnational religious leaders and their associated transnational 
social movements must both be placed in the broader context of transnational literature. 
Third, the characteristics of both transnational religious leaders relate to literature on 
leadership, hard versus soft power, secularization theory, and modernization theory. 
Fourth, the characteristics of both transnational social movements relate to literature on 
the role of ideas in movements, mobilizing and political opportunity structures, and the 
nature of transnational activism. Fifth, the role of both transnational religious leaders in 
causing regime change relates to literature on regime change as an intervening variable 
and regime change as related to transnational movements. Finally, the two transnational 
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religious leaders perhaps make their clearest contribution in the body of literature on 
sovereignty, as related to conceptions of both Westphalian and modern state sovereignty. 
Religion and IR 
 
Much of international relations literature simply does not address religion, and 
certainly not as an important variable to analyzing international affairs. John Esposito and 
Michael Watson, in a review of the significance of religion in the global order, agree that 
religion is not considered significant by Western academics. They find, “In particular, 
with very few exceptions, ‘standard texts’ in politics and international relations wholly or 
very largely ignore religion.”13 They offer several points of disagreement with this 
approach. The worldwide resurgence of religion in the twenty first century can be 
witnessed in, “South Africa’s apartheid movement, Muslim politics, liberation theology 
in the Third World, Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, Hindu fundamentalism in India, 
conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Lebanon.”14 They acknowledge that from the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 to the twentieth century: 
The modern state has followed its own course of development to 
become the most powerful of society’s institutions… Its advance has 
seen the role of religion recede, first and foremost in the West but, as 
the twentieth century progressed, increasingly in other regions of the 
world as well.15 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 John Esposito & Michael Watson, eds., Religion and Global Order (Cardiff, Wales: 
University of Whales Press, 2000), 17. 
14 Ibid., 18. 
15 Ibid., 23–24. 
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However, the twenty first century, according to Esposito and Watson, does not follow 
this pattern. Two major trends in world events that have over time increased the 
significance of religion in global politics are 1) the downfall of communism and the 
“renewal of religion’s place in society in the ex-Communist bloc”16 and 2) the Islamic 
resurgence, “symbolized above all by Iran’s Islamic Revolution."17 On a more systemic 
level, religion contributes to the development of a new world order in its interactions with 
contemporary capitalism, neo-liberal globalism, and civil society and ecumenism. But 
even when there is congruence in these fields, “a principle opposition, and alternative 
principles, to the existing global order reside in religion.”18 In other words, religion, 
which has always posed a challenge to a Westphalian system in which states were 
primary, now has more influence in an increasingly transnational world, a world in which 
power also resides in society, not just the state, a world in which transnational ideologies 
and transnational organizations hold increasing significance. 
Other authors raise the issue of the significance of religion to the discipline as 
well. In The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International 
Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty first Century, Scott M. Thomas holds 
that three events in international relations- the Iranian revolution, the rise of Solidarity 
and the Polish Revolution, and the events of 9/11- have raised a newfound awareness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 19. 
17 Ibid., 20. 
18 Ibid., 35, referencing R.H. Roberts. 
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about how the global resurgence of religion is transforming international relations19. He 
writes about the first lesson learned from these events:  
There is a global resurgence of religion taking place throughout the 
world that is challenging our interpretation of the modern world-what 
it means to be modern-and this has implications for our understanding 
of how culture and religion influence international relations.20  
 
According to Thomas, the twentieth century may be the last modern century. Post-
modernity in the twenty first century challenges that idea that there is a single grand 
narrative- the Western concept of modernity- one that social scientists have primarily 
used to explain religion and international relations. Thomas’ second lesson is that the 
global resurgence of religion “indicates international relations needs to consider the wider 
debates in social theory over modernity, post modernity, and secularization.” Specific 
events in international affairs also give reason to consider these debates. Thomas 
references Keohane, who is in agreement, writing: 
The attacks of September 11 reveal that all mainstream theories of 
world politics are relentlessly secular with respect to motivation. They 
ignore the impact of religion, despite the fact that world-shaking 
political movements have so often been fuelled by religious fervor.21 
 
Third, Thomas questions how ideas or religious beliefs influence policymaking. He asks 
“whether religion can be defined simply as a set of ideas or even symbols that constitute a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International 
Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty first Century (New York, NY: Norton, 2005), 
10. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr. Power and Independence, 3rd ed. (NY: Longman, 2001). 
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cultural form of soft power.”22 He also questions the way research programs involving 
culture and religion are framed in international relations, “because they often involve 
unstated assumptions about the nature of religion and liberal modernity.”23 Finally, he 
finds that globalization has facilitated “a constantly evolving role of religion in 
international relations”24, referring to “new religious leaders in the sociology of religion 
that are shaping the global cultural, religious and political landscape.”25 
Although international relations literature largely does not acknowledge the 
impact of religion upon world politics, there are some scholars working at this 
intersection, making a contribution not only to the field of political science but also to the 
policy world. In God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics, Toft, Philpott, 
and Shah offer advice to policymakers as they face a world in which religion and 
religious players hold increasing significance. They hold two theses. The first states that 
“a dramatic and worldwide increase in the political influence of religion has occurred in 
roughly the past forty years,” according to “the set of ideas that a religious community 
holds about political authority and justice, or what we call political theology.”26 The 
second thesis explains the “wildly different politics of religious actors” according to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 12. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 13 
25 Ibid. 
26 Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and 
Global Politics (New York: Norton, 2011), 9–10. 
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“mutual independence of religious authority and political authority.”27  
Among various aspects of religion in the 21st century, the authors consider the 
topics of religious terrorism and religious civil wars. They find that religious terrorism 
deserves more attention than secular terrorism for two reasons. First, religiously 
motivated terrorism is more deadly.28 Second, religious terrorism is related to the global 
trends of globalization, democratization, and modernization.29 They write: 
Religious terrorism is a ‘glocal’ phenomenon in which global 
dynamics and local issues are interlinked. Whereas most religious 
terrorism was conducted locally, today there exists a vast network of 
local groups with global ties that share ideas, resources, and personnel 
to wage their terrorist campaigns. Because all these trends are likely 
to persist, if not intensify, in the coming years, we will continue to see 
demonstrations of religious terrorism like those we saw on September 
11, 2001. The bottom line is that religious terrorism is an urgent 
matter.30 
 
The authors also review basic facts about religious civil wars. First, religious civil 
wars are “more destructive than nonreligious civil wars, causing more deaths among 
combatants and noncombatants alike.”31 Second, “they last longer by an average of two 
years.”32 Third, they continue, “civil wars where religion is a central component recur 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 122. 
29 Ibid., refers to Hoffman. 
30 Ibid., 122. 
31 Monica Toft, “Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War,” International 
Security 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 98. 
32 Ibid., 116. 
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twice as often as civil wars lacking religious motivation.”33 Fourth, “they make up an 
increasing proportion of all civil wars.”34 Finally, religious civil wars increasingly involve 
Islam.35 They find that there was a rise in the proportion of civil wars with religion as a 
basis either peripherally or centrally in the 1970s, paralleling the rise in religiously 
motivated terrorism. The trend is related to “three broad trends that explain the global 
resurgence of religion more generally: modernization, democratization, and 
globalization.”36 The book ends by offering ten recommendations to policy makers, or 
“ten rules for surviving God’s Century.”37 The book essentially encourages policy makers 
to be aware of the significance of religion in world politics and to harness it to make good 
public policy.  
Though Esposito and Watson, Thomas, Toft, Philpott and Shah, and others are 
contributing to a growing literature on the impact of religion upon international affairs, 
there are still major subject areas in need of research. One such area pertains to the 
subject of transnational religious leaders and state sovereignty. 
Transnational Literature 
An avenue through which to study the intersection of religion and international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Monica Toft, Presentation “Religion, Civil War, and International Order,” BCSIA Discussion 
Paper, Discussion Paper 2006-03. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs (July, 2006): 9. 
34 Ibid., 9. 
35 Toft, “Getting Religion?”, 113. 
36 Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, God’s Century, 172. 
37 Ibid., 207. 
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relations is the transnational nature of religious leaders, communities, ideologies, and 
movements. A broad body of literature on transnational civil society sets the stage for the 
study of our independent variables, transnational religious leaders and transnational 
social movements. The definition of a transnational religious leader is informed by 
literature on transnational civil society. Lipschutz defines transnational civil society as 
“the self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge and action, by decentered, 
local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they were not there.”38 
According to Haynes, transnational civil society aims “to cultivate regular, expanding 
interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or 
does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental 
organization.”39 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye count the presence of transnational 
networks as one of four conditions that comprise complex interdependence, and argue 
that these networks limit governments’ abilities to control outcomes.40 Thomas Risse-
Kappen, Matthew Evangelista, and Daniel Thomas argue that transnational networks 
contributed to the end of the Cold War by promulgating ideas about national defense, 
human rights, and democracy. 
In her classic work, The Third Force, Ann Florini examines the rise of 
transnational civil society. She writes, “Transnational civil society networks-the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ronnie Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society.” 
Millennium, 21, 3 (1992): 390. 
39 Jeffrey Haynes, Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power. (Surrey, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2012): 145. 
40 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (3rd edition) (New York: 
Longman, 2001). 
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emerging third force in global politics-tend to aim for broader goals based on their 
conceptions of what constitutes the public good. They are bound together more by shared 
values than by self-interest.”41 Transnational civil society attempts to shape international 
norms in two ways: directly (by persuading policy makers to change their minds about 
what is the right thing to do) and indirectly (by changing public perception of what 
government should be doing). Florini finds that transnational civil society “exercises 
influence through its ability to make someone, policy makers or publics, listen and act. 
The currency of its power is not force, but credible information and moral authority.”42  
 According to Florini, broad trends that are enabling the growth of strong 
transnational civil society include the growth of domestic civil society, technological 
changes, growing focal points for transnational civil society to meet around, increased 
funding, and the ability of transnational civil society coalitions to learn from and build on 
previous efforts.43 She emphasizes that to be successful the transnational civil society 
must be “firmly connected to local reality”44 because “vigorous domestic civil societies 
provide the nodes for transnational networks.”45 Florini analyzes transnational civil 
societies’ limits of power. There is “no single, coherent transnational civil society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Florini, Ann M., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo, Japan: 
Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), 7. 
42 Ibid., 11. 
43 Ibid., 217. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 218. 
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agenda.”46 The networks are powerful only as long as they hold credibility. When the 
transnational civil society forgets that its power is soft and acts as though its power is 
hard, “it not only fails to achieve its immediate objectives by also undermines the moral 
authority that is its real claim to influence.”47 According to Florini, the bases of 
legitimacy and accountability of transnational civil societies can be broken down into 
superior knowledge, delegation/government approval, and representativeness. Looking 
towards the future, she predicts increased partnering between transnational civil societies 
and the private sector, more direct participation in the management of global issues, and 
the creation of a global polity, “not a world government, but something of a common 
culture with broadly shared values.”48 Florini lays a conceptual groundwork for the 
analysis of the transnational nature of the religious leaders in the following case studies. 
Keck and Sikkink take the concept of transnational civil society one step further 
in defining transnational advocacy networks. They write, “by building new links among 
actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations, transnational advocacy 
networks multiply the channels of access to the international system.”49 These networks 
are unique in their advocacy. They “are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, 
and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be 
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47 Ibid., 214. 
48 Ibid., 237. 
49 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1. 
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easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their “interests.”50 Ideas play a distinctive 
role in defining transnational advocacy networks. They write, “Since (transnational 
advocacy networks) are not powerful in the traditional sense of the word, they must use 
the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the information and value 
contexts within which states make policies.”51 Transnational advocacy networks 
differentiate themselves from other transnational networks in their motivation, which is 
driven by shared principles, ideas and values. Keck and Sikkink’s transnational advocacy 
networks are “noteworthy in part for their ability to alter the foreign and domestic 
behavior of governments, not-withstanding their own lack of direct coercive capacity.”52 
The transnational religious leaders in this study contribute to the creation and 
mobilization of transnational advocacy networks to achieve their goals.  
Transnational Religious Leaders (TRL)  
A transnational religious leader (TRL) is an individual actor who, as guided by a 
religious ideology, acts towards political ends, benefiting from both material (people, 
weapons, capital) and nonmaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world 
leaders) resources across state lines in support of those ends. When analyzing the 
differences between transnational religious leaders, the strength of four characteristics 
will be measured: leadership, hard versus soft power, relationship to secularism, and 
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51 Ibid., 16. 
52 John M. Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and 
Regime Change 1510–2010 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 34. 
24 
	  
	  
relationship to modernity. The following provides the theoretical support for these 
categories. 
TRL- LEADERSHIP 
However great the idea, ideas are useless without a leader to guide them. 
According to Philpott:  
Ideas do not perform their labors in the abstract… In history, these 
labors are enacted by particular people in particular places, by 
townspeople, political organizers, theologians, professors, lobbyists, 
parliamentarians, generals, and head of state, by people who discuss, 
persuade, preach, pressure, order, cajole, and shoot…53 
 
Ideas alone do not make an effective transnational religious leader. Leadership matters. 
To isolate the impact of transnational religious leaders upon social revolution, domestic 
politics, and the mechanics of mobilization, they must be considered as individual actors. 
Theory on transnational religious leaders should take into account classic leadership 
literature, such as James’ Macgregor Burn’s Transformational Leadership. This work 
distinguishes between transactional and transformational leadership. Transactional 
leadership “motivates through the measured application of promised rewards and 
threatened punishments,”54 while transformational leadership motivates by “transforming 
the identities and goals of individuals to coincide with those of the group.”55 Burns also 
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55 Ibid., 23. 
25 
	  
	  
theorizes an ideal leadership that minimizes coercive power and enables followers to 
accomplish goals that even the leader may not have fully realized. Thus both the leader 
and the follower are encouraged towards greatness and transformation. 
            Transnational religious leaders are unique in transnational literature. There is 
sparse transnational literature assessing individual religious actors. There has been an 
assumption in international relations theory that secular leaders would emerge in 
politically dominant positions instead of religious leaders. The implication was that in 
“order successfully to build nation-states, political leaders would have to remain as 
neutral as possible from the entanglements of particularistic claims, including those 
derived from religion.”56 As the role of religion and religious leaders in international 
relations expands, this assumption is called into question. 
TRL - “HARD POWER” VERSUS “SOFT POWER”                                                                                        
In the 1970’s, Nye and Keohane, Karl Kaiser, Edward Morse and others, “stressed 
the growing role of transnational, international and multi-national actors, and global, non-
military forces such as technology, trade, communications, and culture, in shaping 
policy.”57 Transnational networks influence state behavior, and the state “does not 
monopolize the public sphere.”58 These scholars sought to describe the sphere of 
international interactions under a variety of names: transnational relations, international 
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civil society, and global civil society.59 Although they did not directly address 
transnational religious leaders, they proved that there was a space for nontraditional, non-
state actors in international relations. TRLs have been successful in leveraging 
transnational civil society for political ends and in shaping the course of domestic 
politics, thereby contradicting traditional norms of sovereignty. This makes TRLs an 
important international force that could be further addressed within transnational 
literature. 
One of the few scholars who directly studies religious actors is Jeffrey Haynes. 
He researches what he calls religious transnational actors, and finds that, “While varying 
widely in what they seek to achieve, they also share an important characteristic: each 
seeks to use what I call “religious soft power” to advance their interests.”60 They “all wish 
to see the spread and development of certain values and norms, which impact on 
international security and order.” They seek “to influence international relations by their 
ability to disseminate ideas and values.”61 Haynes holds that religious transnational actors 
must have soft power in order to be successful in international relations.62 
“Soft power” as a concept was developed by Joseph Nye in 1990.63 Nye writes 
that soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and 
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policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is 
enhanced.”64 On the other hand, he defines hard power as the capacity to use military, 
financial or diplomatic force or to threaten to use it. Haynes adopts this notion of soft 
power, writing: 
Soft power attracts or co-opts people; it does not coerce them. Soft 
power influences people by appealing to them not by forcing them to 
comply. Soft power covers certain attributes-including, culture, 
values, ideas- collectively representing different, but not necessarily 
lesser, forms of influence compared to “hard” power.65 
 
When religious transnational actors use soft power, it is “religious soft power.”66 It is a 
unique form of soft power because its appeal is based in theological ideals and values. 
According to Haynes, in order to be successful, religious transnational actors must both 
disseminate an attractive cross-border message and adapt to local circumstances.67 
Haynes finds that the amalgamation of extant non-state transnational actors, both 
secular and religious, comprises ‘transnational’ or ‘global’ civil society.”68  Transnational 
civil society has three components according to Haynes. First, “like domestic civil 
society, transnational civil society (TCS) encompasses various, principally non-state, 
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groups with social and/or political goals.”69 Second, these groups “interact with each 
other across state boundaries and are not overtly manipulated by governments, although 
they might have links.”70 Third, TCS takes a variety of forms and some are secular in 
orientation.71 The transnational leaders addressed in the case studies each contribute to 
the development of transnational civil society and leverage it as they use soft and hard 
power to accomplish their aims. 
TRL – RELATIONSHIP TO SECULARIZATION 
If transnational religious leaders impact state sovereignty through revolution and 
regime change, that process may be accessed through literature on secularization, 
modernization, and religion and international relations more broadly. Secularization is a 
historical process in which religion and religious institutions lose social significance. The 
secularization thesis holds that as societies progress through modernization and 
rationalization, religion loses social authority and significance.72 
Mark Juergensmeyer, in The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the 
Secular State, surveys religious activists from around the world and characterizes them as 
religious nationalists, finding them to have both religious and political interests. These 
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religious nationalists respond “in a religious way to a political situation.”73 He compares 
the loyalty to a secular vision of the nation and to a religious worldview, writing: 
For that reason, I believe the line between secular nationalism and 
religion has always been quite thin. Both are expressions of faith, both 
involve an identity with and a loyalty to a large community and both 
insist on the ultimate moral legitimacy of the authority invested in the 
leadership of that community.74 
 
The line between politically defined and religiously defined ambitions is not always easy 
to define. Juergensmeyer suggests that certain religious denominations are more 
compatible with the secular basis for world order. He references a Christian theologian, 
Arend Theodor van Leeuwen, who suggests that the secular basis for politics is not only 
European, but specifically Christian. In his book, Christianity in World History, van 
Leeuwen “argued that the idea of separating out the things of God from the things of 
people in such a way as to deny the divine nature of kingship was first formulated in 
ancient Israel and then became a major motif of Christianity.”75 In the term 
secularization, van Leeuwen specifically was referring to the separation of religious and 
temporal spheres.76 
The social functions of traditional religion and secular nationalism are similar, 
and Juergensmeyer designates “ideologies of order” as a category to include them both. 
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Other writers have suggested different terms- consider Benedict Anderson’s “imagined 
communities” or Ninian Smart’s “world views”. Clifford Geertz speaks of ideology as a 
“cultural system.” Juergensmeyer writes: 
Both religious and secular-nationalistic frameworks of thought 
conceive of the world in coherent, manageable ways; they both 
suggests that there are levels of meaning beneath the day-to-day world 
that give coherence to things unseen; and they both provide the 
authority that gives the social and political order its reason for being. 
In doing so they define for the individual the right way of being in the 
world and relate persons to the social whole.77 
 
He finds that these two “ideologies of order” – religion and secular nationalism- are 
potential rivals, vying to be the ultimate authority for social order.”78 He predicts that this 
confrontation will become increasingly significant, and he asks the question: “Will the 
confrontation between religious and secular nationalism harden into a new Cold War?”79 
Juergensmeyer identifies negative characteristics of religious nationalism as “the 
potential for demagoguery and dictatorship, the tendency to Satanize the United States 
and to loathe Western civilization, and the potential to become violent and intolerant.”80 
He identifies the positive characteristics of religious nationalism as the following: 
“religious nationalists’ appreciation of tradition and historical rootedness, and their 
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insistence on grounding public institutions in morality.”81 A third classification he sets 
forth is “aspects of religious nationalism that we cannot live with easily but that we might 
have to learn to coexist with.”82 This classification includes: 1) the insistence of religious 
nationalists on divine justifications for human laws and democratic institutions 2) the 
assumption that certain lands are the province of only one religion 3) their exaltation of 
communitarian values over individual ones. In Juergensmeyer’s survey of religious 
nationalism around the world, Juergensmeyer claims that all religious nationalists aim to 
take down the secular state and replace it with a government founded on religious 
principles. This “anti-modernist” trend encompasses a new world order comprised of 
religious groups vying for theocratic states. Juergensmeyer predicts that religious 
nationalism will expand and urges American policy-makers to cooperate. He alludes to 
the possibility of a synthesis in which elements of democracy are upheld and carried in 
new religious states. 
According to Jose Casanova, four developments took place in the 1980s that 
“gave religion the kind of global publicity which forced a reassessment of its place and 
role in the modern world.”83 The developments included: the Islamic revolution in Iran 
(beginning in the 70’s), the Solidarity movement in Poland, the role of Catholicism in the 
Sandinista revolution and other political conflicts throughout Latin America, and the 
public reemergence of Protestant fundamentalism as a force in American politics. He 
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writes: 
What was new and unexpected in the 1980s was not the emergence of 
“new religious movements”, “religious experimentation”, and “new 
religious consciousness”-all phenomena which caught the imagination 
of social scientists and the public in the 1960s and 1970s- but rather 
the revitalization and the assumption of public roles by precisely those 
religious traditions which both theories of secularization and cyclical 
theories of religious revival has assumed were becoming ever more 
marginal and irrelevant in the modern world.84 
 
Casanova’s central thesis posits the “deprivatization” of religion in the modern world, 
meaning that “religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the 
marginal and privatizing role which theories of modernity as well as theories of 
secularization had reserved for them.”85 He comes to this by breaking down traditional 
secularization theory into three parts, analyzing each separately, and finding that 
secularization theory only partially captures the path of religion.                                                                       
Casanova essentially dissects the commonly-held mainstream theory of 
secularization, and analyzes it in three parts, “secularization as differentiation of the 
secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization as decline of 
religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a 
privatized sphere.”86 The first theory of secularization is secularization as the segregation 
of secular spheres from religious standards and institutions. Casanova then develops two 
sub theses, writing: 
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…Two other sub theses have often been attached which allegedly 
explain what will happen to religion as a result of this process of 
secularization. One sub thesis, the decline-of-religion thesis, 
postulated that the process of secularization would bring in its wake 
the progressive shrinkage and decline of religion until, some extreme 
versions added, it eventually disappeared. The other sub thesis, the 
privatization thesis, postulated that the process of secularization 
would bring in its wake the privatization and, some added, the 
marginalization of religion in the modern world.87 
 
Casanova develops these theses by conducting a comparative historical study of public 
religions in the modern world, making claims related to each part of the secularization 
theory.88 His cases include: Spain, Poland, Brazil, Evangelical Protestantism in the US, 
and Catholicism in the US. He finds the first thesis, secularization as differentiation, to be 
“the valid core of the theory of secularization” and “a general modern structural trend.”89 
However, he finds the second thesis, the decline of religious beliefs and practices, to not 
be a modern structural trend, but merely a dominant historical trend in Western 
societies.90 He writes that “the more religions resist the process of modern differentiation, 
that is, secularization in the first sense, the more they will tend in the long run to suffer 
religious decline, that is, secularization in the second sense.”91 He finds the third thesis, 
privatization of religion, to not be a modern structural trend. He writes: 
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…There are public religions in the modern world which do not need 
to endanger either modern individual freedoms or modern 
differentiated structures… Privatization is not a modern structural 
trend but, rather, a historical option. To be sure, it seems to be a 
modern “preferred option,” but it is an option nonetheless.92 
 
In other words, Casanova finds that religion is not in the process of functional 
differentiation from the secular spheres of state, economy and science, as secularization 
theory claims.93 
 The studies conducted by Juergensmeyer and Casanova and other modern 
scholars who refine traditional secularization theory create a lens through which to view 
transnational religious leaders’ attitudes towards secularization and, in turn, to study how 
those attitudes impact behavior, particularly political behavior on the global stage. 
TRL – MODERNIZATION THEORY 
Similar to discourse on secularization, theoretical discourse on modernization 
helps contextualize how traditional religious leaders contribute to revolution, regime 
change, and altered state sovereignty. In Multiple Modernities, S.N. Eisenstadt writes: 
The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to 
understand the contemporary world-indeed to explain the history of 
modernity- is to see it as a story of continual constitution and 
reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs.94  
 
In Eisenstadt’s theory of multiple modernities, modernity and Westernization are not 
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identical, and Western patterns of modernity are not the only “authentic” ones.”95  He 
writes:  
The appropriation of non-Western societies of specific themes and 
institutional patterns of the original Western modern civilization 
societies entailed the continuous selection, reinterpretation, and 
reformulation of these imported ideas.96  
 
As different iterations of modernity have developed, the nation state is often the center of 
collective identity among activists and protesters who lead social movements. Eisenstadt 
writes: 
The ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation-state, its 
position as the charismatic locus of the major components of the 
cultural program of modernity and collective identity, have been 
weakened; new political, social, and civilizational visions, new 
visions of collective identity, are being developed.97 
 
He offers examples of such social movements, including 1) movements with a local 
scope or agenda (ex. ecological movements, the women’s movement in the West) 2) 
Fundamentalist movements (Muslim, Jewish, Protestant Christian communities) 3) 
“ethnic” movements (Soviet Union, Africa, and the Balkans). 
According to Juergensmeyer, these social movements do not signal Fukuyama’s 
“end of history”, as in the end to ideological clashes between programs of modernity.98 
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Nor do they signal Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” between the secular West and 
societies that reject modernity. Eisenstadt writes:  
Rather the trends of globalization show nothing so clearly as the 
continual reinterpretation of the cultural program of modernity; the 
construction of multiple modernities; attempts by various groups and 
movements to reappropriate and redefine the discourse of modernity 
on their own new terms. At the same time, they are bringing about a 
repositioning of the major arenas of contestation in which new forms 
of modernity are shaped, away from the traditional forum of the 
nation-state to new areas in which different movements and societies 
continually interact.99 
 
Transnational religious leaders fit into Eisenstadt’s paradigm in that they are often leaders 
of social movements that lead unique programs of modernity, programs that may not fit 
into the traditional Western paradigm. Transnational religious leaders can reject, accept, 
modify, or even lead programs of modernity. Understanding how a transnational religious 
leader views modernity is critical in examining his/her relationship with revolution, 
regime change, and sovereignty.  
Transnational Social Movements 
TSM – POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
Philpott proposes two roles by which ideas exert influence on politics and social 
revolutions. The first role of ideas is to “convert people to new identities, leading them to 
want new political ends.”100 In its second role, ideas wield social power, coaxing heads of 
state to pursue new courses and to “interest in a new constitution of international 
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society.”101 The transnational religious leaders studied in this project used the power of 
shared ideas and values to mobilize people internationally to influence domestic political 
ends. Often these ideas had a theological nature that transcends territorial boundaries, but 
have localized consequences. Fox and Sandler find that religion and religious ideas 
influence human behavior. Religion has several basic influences:  
First, it can influence people’s worldviews, which in turn influences 
how they think and behave. Second, it is an aspect of identity. Third, 
it is a source of legitimacy, including political legitimacy. Fourth, it is 
associated with formal institutions that can influence the political 
process.102 
 
These basic influences, particularly religion as identity translated into 
political legitimacy, are present in the two case studies of this paper. 
In analyzing transnational religious leaders, a distinction must be drawn between 
theological and political ideas. Sometimes the theological ideas used by religious leaders 
have political content. In Jihad in Saudi Arabia, Hegghammer finds that the jihadist 
movement in Saudi Arabia is driven primarily by extreme pan-Islamism. In Saudi Arabia, 
“support for suffering Muslims abroad became a major source of political legitimacy and 
social status.”103 Hegghammer distinguishes jihadism from Islam, and theological 
categories from political content, writing: 
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Many of the theological descriptors commonly used in the literature 
on Islamism, such as salafi, Wahhabi, jihadi salafi, and takfiri, do not 
correspond to discrete and observable patterns of political behavior 
among Islamists. I therefore rely instead on terms that signal the 
political content of the ideology at hand or the immediate political 
priorities of a given actor, such as “revolutionary” or “pietist”… A 
social movement is by definition united by a shared set of political 
preferences… This is not to say that the terms Salafism or Wahhabism 
should be discarded, only that they are more useful for analyzing 
theological discourse than political behavior.104 
 
He finds that the relationship between theology and militancy is not a causal one. 
Wahhabism shapes the way in which activists articulate and legitimize their agenda – it 
doesn’t determine the “core content of their activism.”105  
Like Hegghammer, a central concern of this paper will be to understand the 
relationship between theological discourse and mobilization for political action. How 
does theology influence mobilization? How can we separate theological content from 
political content in the language of social revolution? How does theology influence 
domestic politics, and ultimately the international understanding of state sovereignty? 
TSM – MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
In the volume Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics, John D. 
McCarthy contributes identifies categories through which social movements are 
analyzed, applies them to transnational social movements, an identifies areas for future 
research. He expounds upon six core concepts: strategic framing processes, activist 
identities, mobilizing structures, resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, 
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and repertoires of contention.106 The definition of strategic framing is borrowed from 
McAdam, who wrote, “The conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion 
shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate 
collective action.”107 McCarthy points out that having an activist identity is not enough; 
one must have the opportunity to act, and the costs of transnational activism are higher 
than domestic activism. A mobilizing structure includes “the more or less formally 
organized everyday life patterns upon which movements build collective action, ranging 
from religious groups and neighborhood associations to workplace cliques and friendship 
groups.”108 Transnational social movements must mobilize “some labor, financial support, 
and in-kind support, and legitimacy in order to increase their chances for survival.”109 
Resource mobilization also matters. Financial support is even more important for 
transnational social movements than for local social movements.  
A political opportunity structure captures the relationship between the state and 
the social movement. McCarthy writes: 
The emergence, shape, and development of that movement are 
interpreted as a collective response to the development of the scope, 
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resources, and penetration of the modern state-as national states 
aggregated power and resources, movements came more and more to 
target state authorities with demands for social change in existing 
societal arrangements.110 
 
Dimensions of political opportunity structures include: 1) the relative openness or closure 
of the institutionalized political system 2) the stability of elite arrangements 3) the 
presence of elite allies 4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.111 The most 
popular thinking holds that as authority becomes increasingly invested in transnational 
bodies, social movements become more transnational in scope and target. However, the 
impact of national political opportunities should not be disregarded. Finally repertoires of 
contention refers to characterizing movements by the mix of strategies and tactics they 
employ. Strategies are “a mix of public education, direct aid to victims of injustice, and 
attempts to change structures directly,” yet he finds acts of transnational movements to be 
understudied.112 
A social movement can be defined as “an organized and sustained effort of a 
collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups and organizations to promote or to resist 
social change with the use of public protest activities.”113 Political movements, more 
specifically, are movements that “make changes in power arrangements, especially those 
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structured through the state, a central part of their program.”114 Building further on the 
concept of political movements, “in each society, there are movement that, regardless of 
their specific or individual goals, have similar basic demands and a common 
constituency: these sets of coexisting movements constitute movement families.”115 These 
movement families emerge during periods of intense protest activities, increased turmoil, 
and the emergence of new forms of collective action; these periods represent the peaks of 
protest cycles.116 Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on 
common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, 
and authorities.”117  
TSM – NATURE OF ACTIVISM 
        This study of transnational religious leaders is also informed by literature on 
transnational activism. Although the literature is young, in 2005, Sidney Tarrow outlined 
a method for studying transnational activism in The New Transnational Activism. Tarrow 
identifies six processes of transnational contention: global framing and internalization, 
diffusion and scale shift, and externalization and coalition forming.118 He delineates 
rooted cosmopolitans and transnational activists. The term “rooted cosmopolitan” was 
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first used by Mitchell Cohen in 1992, when he called for “the fashioning of a dialectical 
concept of rooted cosmopolitanism, which accepts a multiplicity of roots and branches 
and that rests on the legitimacy of plural loyalties, of standing in many circles, but with 
common ground.”119 Tarrow builds on that definition, writing:  
What is rooted in this conception is that, as cosmopolitans move 
physically and cognitively outside their origins, they continue to be 
linked to place, to the social networks that inhabit space, and to the 
resources, experiences, and opportunities that place provides them 
with.120  
 
Alternately, transnational activists are: 
A subgroup of rooted cosmopolitans whom I define as individuals and 
groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and 
opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against 
external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with 
transnational allies.121  
 
Two types of activists include “nesting pigeons” and “birds of passage.” He writes, 
“…nesting pigeons use their ties to their home communities to foster development and to 
keep family ties alive, birds of passage, ‘cheaply, safely, and in a self-satisfying way, can 
play national hero on the other side of the world’.”122 The nature of activism can also be 
defined along more simple terms, such as if the actor uses violent or nonviolent means. 
But Tarrow contributes a lens through which to study where the activist is rooted, where 
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his or her alliances lie, and how he practically achieves his political ends through 
activism. 
Regime Change 
In this paper, regimes are considered upon their merit as indicators of challenges 
to conceptions of sovereignty. Krasner explores the concept of the international regime as 
an intervening variable, which can be related to the case studies. He defines international 
regimes “as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area.”123 He conceptualizes them as standing 
between basic causal factors (power, interest, values) and outcome/behavior. He 
distinguishes between principles/norms and rules/procedures, writing “changes in rules 
and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes”124 and “changes in 
principles and norms are changes of the regime itself.”125 He finds: 
If principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a 
regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly 
inconsistent with principles, norms, rules and procedures, then a 
regime has weakened.126 
 
After establishing this definition of regimes, he is able to weigh their worth as 
intervening variables. 
He references three schools of thought about regimes. The first, represented by 
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Susan Strange, is consistent with the structuralist orientation towards a world of rational 
self-seeking actors. It holds that actors (individuals, groups, classes or states) define the 
system through their own interests, power and interaction. Principles, norms, rules and 
decision making procedures have little impact on outcomes and behavior. The second 
school, modified structural, is represented by Robert Keohane and Arthur Stein. They 
start with a world of sovereign states maximizing their interest and power. They find that 
for most situations regimes are irrelevant because there is a direct link between basic 
causal variables and related behavior. However, under certain circumstances where 
individual decision making leads to suboptimal outcomes, regimes may be significant.127 
The third approached, held by Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala, and Oran Young, 
is informed by a Grotian perspective. It holds that regimes are pervasive phenomena of 
all political systems. Hopkins and Puchala suggest that elites with transnational ties are 
the practical actors in international relations. Sovereignty is a behavioral variable, not an 
analytic assumption. 
Another scholar contributes to regime change as a variable by analyzing its micro 
and macro level processes in a transnational world. John Owen distinguishes 
transnational ideological networks (TIN) from traditional definitions of transnational 
networks. Transnational ideological networks are “networks organized around an 
ideology or plan for ordering public life.”128 He writes, “TINs aim not simply to change 
policies or laws, but to replace, in country after country, one regime with another to 
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preserve a regime against replacement.”129 He adopts David Easton’s definition of a 
regime as being constituted by “institutions, operational rules of the game, and ideologies 
(goals, preferred rules, and preferred arrangements among political institutions).”130 In 
favoring one regime, Owen finds that TIN’s engage in contentious politics, referencing 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly. Although all TINs are radical, they are not all violent or 
even revolutionary. Yet they do perpetually strive to alter domestic regimes 
internationally either because they believe regime change coincides with their interests or 
because they are internationalists. Regardless of their motivation, they all “recognize 
their common interests and interdependence across states, and… help one another 
through various means, including the sharing of information, strategies, and tactics, and 
the clarification of principles and goals.”131 Owen notes that individual transnational ideas 
entrepreneurs (TIEs) “attempt to persuade, and are more likely to succeed the more 
credible actors adopt them; for example, a regime type gains credibility when a major 
power implements it.”132 
Owen uses a micro and macro level of analysis to explain how transnational 
ideological networks and their rules impact regime change. One the macro level, a 
transnational regime contest causes, on the micro level, events that polarize elites. Elite 
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polarization causes rulers forcibly promoting regimes on the micro level, which causes 
the original variable on the macro level, a transnational regime contest. Owen’s 
hypotheses center on transnational ideological polarization, which he defines as “the 
progressive segregation of elites and mass public across states along an ideological axis, 
so that political preferences among elites across states are simplified and intensified.”133  
His micro-level hypotheses include: 
Figure 1 - Owen's Micro-Level Hypothesis134 
 
 
 
Owen’s macro-level hypothesis revolves around long waves of regimes. A long 
wave endures until one regime type suggest that vastly superior on terms all elites accept. 
The patterns can be explained according to the following causal relationships: 
 
Figure 2 - Owen's Macro-Level Hypothesis135 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Ibid., 37. 
134 Ibid., 71. 
135 Ibid., 72. 
47 
	  
	  
Owen provides a useful framework for analyzing the interaction between domestic 
variables and international variables. His transnational ideological contest will prove 
useful in analyzing macro-level forces in this paper’s two case studies. 
In analyzing the regime change that takes place in our case studies, literature on 
the relationship between domestic and international politics is relevant. The relationship 
between international relations and domestic politics is more interactive than many 
comparativists allow for. According to Gourevitch: 
The international system is not only a consequence of domestic 
politics and structures but a cause of them… International relations 
and domestic politics are… so interrelated that they should be 
analyzed simultaneously, as wholes.136  
 
Transnational religious leaders peddle in ideas. They are powerful because of ideas which 
transcend territorial boundaries. They are able to use this power to shape international 
legitimacy towards a state. The international system, through ideas or ideology, can 
greatly impact internal political development, for example, “Catholic versus Protestant; 
Napoleon and the French Revolution versus the Ancient Regime; fascism, communism 
and bourgeois democracy against each other. These lines of ideological tension shaped 
not only the international system but internal politics as well.”137 The international state 
system imposes on domestic society through revolution – “the outbreak and outcome of 
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these revolutions is unintelligible without an examination of international factors.”138 This 
is applicable to the study of transnational religious actors, who preach revolution 
internationally, and ultimately, either through the structure of international coalitions or 
through the perception of state legitimacy, impact domestic politics, and sometimes 
domestic regime change. Gourevitch holds that students of comparative politics “treat 
domestic structure too much as an independent variable, underplaying the extent to which 
it and the international system are parts of an interactive system.”139 Gourevitch’s model 
suggests that valuable in analyzing the interaction between domestic and international 
structures in the case studies. 
Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is a “big” idea.140 It has defined how we think about international 
relations, law, and politics in the modern era. According to Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty 
is one of the constituent ideas of the post-medieval world: it conveys a distinctive 
configuration of politics and law that sets the modern era apart from previous eras.”141 
Jackson writes, “Sovereignty is a distinctive configuration of state authority. By ‘state’ I 
refer to the conventional meaning: a defined and delimited territory, with a permanent 
population, under the authority of a government.”142 Sovereignty is “both an idea of 
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supreme authority in the state, and an idea of political and legal independence of 
geographically separate states.”143 Sovereignty is a pluralistic arrangement of authority in 
that there are many sovereign states. He continues, “Their independence is independence 
in relation to each other. Their supremacy is supremacy over their own subjects or 
citizens.”144 Fundamentally, for Jackson, “Supremacy and independence cannot exist 
separately.”145 
Successful sovereignty demands authority and power. The relationship between 
authority and power was famously expounded upon by Thomas Hobbes: “Covenants, 
without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”146 Jackson 
finds that Hobbes: 
Closely bracketed sovereignty and power, the authoritativeness of 
states and the capabilities (and capacities) of states, because he 
recognized the futility and uselessness of sovereignty without 
power.147  
Successful sovereignty also demands legitimate authority. Transnational religious leaders 
can translate state legitimacy in the eyes of the international community into domestic 
politics and regime change. The politics of transnational civil society is “centrally about 
the way in which certain groups emerge and are legitimized (by governments, 
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institutions, and other groups).”148 Krasner makes the distinction between authority and 
control, writing that “authority involves a mutually recognized right for an actor to 
engage in specific types of activities.”149 According to Philpott, “sovereignty is supreme 
legitimate authority within a territory.”150 According to Wolff, authority is the right to 
command and the right to be obeyed, which differs from power.151 Authority is legitimate 
when “it is rooted in law, tradition, consent or divine command and when those living 
under it generally endorse this notion.”152 
 The peace of Westphalia established sovereignty as “a territorial definition of 
political authority.”153 According to Philpott, Westphalian sovereignty has “three faces”. 
First, Westphalia made the sovereign state the most powerful and legitimate form of 
political unity. Second, it found a government with control over its territory to be the 
criteria for statehood. Third, Westphalia removed previously legitimate restrictions on a 
state’s activities within its territory.154 These three faces encapsulate the most traditional 
definition of sovereignty, that a sovereign, territorially defined state had supreme 
authority within its borders and was part of a world order in which states were the 
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dominant actors. This definition remained relatively unchallenged for centuries. 
 However, in the late twentieth century, particularly the 1990s, the conversation 
about sovereignty started to change. At that time, “World summits on human rights, the 
environment, population and women brought states together with relevant and often 
obstreperous NGO forums and created a new arena for world politics: transnational civil 
society.”155 The older theoretical discourse, united in the principle that states were the 
only meaningful actors in the international system, seemed inadequate to capture this 
experience. New theories were created in response. Bull discussed state cooperation with 
his “Grotian” concept of “international society.” Keohane, Krasner and others 
“elaborated on the idea of state cooperation via treaties, international organizations, and 
regimes.”156 Neomedieval discourse started to raise “the possibility of multiple 
overlapping institutions, organizations, and practices in conjunction with cooperating 
states that limited and shared sovereignty.”157 
Stephen Krasner has written extensively on sovereignty. In his early works, he 
identifies four different types of sovereignty. International legal sovereignty involves “the 
practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have 
formal juridical independence.”158 Westphalian sovereignty refers to a political 
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organization, “based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a 
given territory.”159 Domestic sovereignty refers to political authority within the state and 
its ability to exercise effective control within state borders. Interdependence sovereignty 
refers to the ability of public officials “to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, 
people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their states.”160 
Krasner’s four meanings of sovereignty -interdependence sovereignty, domestic 
sovereignty, Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty, and international legal sovereignty- “are 
not logically related, nor have they empirically always occurred together.”161 Political 
leaders often use the international legal sovereignty of their states to compromise 
Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. Furthermore: 
Issues of globalization and human rights, which have recently 
received so much attention, are old, not new, problems. States have 
always struggled to control the cross-border flow of ideas, goods, and 
people. The right of rulers to unilaterally and autonomously establish 
laws for their own polities has been challenged by external actors 
concerned about international security, minority rights, and fiscal 
responsibility.162 
 
In conclusion, Krasner finds that “Sovereignty’s resilience is, if nothing else, a reflection 
of its tolerance for alternatives.”163 Krasner holds that the norms of sovereignty were 
never strong, that they have always been challenged. Sovereignty no longer refers to its 
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traditional definitions, such as domestic order within borders, independence from other 
states, non-intervention, and ability to enter into international agreements. More recently, 
sovereignty has “come to be associated with the idea of control over trans-border 
movements.”164 He even goes so far as to call sovereignty “organized hypocrisy.”165 
Krasner updated these definitions in 2004 with the notion of “shared sovereignty.” 
He discusses the incentives developed countries have for “promoting better governance 
in failed, failing, and post conflict countries.”166 In such countries where the domestic 
sovereignty does not live up to the international legal or Westphalian sovereignty, he 
finds that two arrangements could offer a solution. The first solution would be that of a 
trusteeship or protectorate. The second would be “shared sovereignty in which national 
rulers would use their international legal sovereignty to legitimate institutions within their 
states in which authority was shared between internal and external actors.”167 This shared 
sovereignty would involve “the engagement of external actors in some of the domestic 
authority structures of the target state for an indefinite period of time.”168 Krasner writes: 
“National actors would use their international legal sovereignty to enter into agreements 
that would compromise their Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty with the goal of 
improving domestic sovereignty. One core element – the principle of autonomy – would 
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be violated.”169 The incentives for shared sovereignty among political decision makers 
include: avarice, post conflict occupation, desperation, and elections.170 
Other social scientists offered updated definitions of sovereignty around the same 
time. Helen Stacey argues for a new conception of sovereignty called “relational 
sovereignty”, writing: 
Relational sovereignty defines sovereignty as a measure of care by 
government for its citizens whereby external actors ascribe the level 
or the standard that another government must reach in servicing the 
needs of that government’s citizens. External actors rationalize this 
external appraisal as a standard of governance that a nation’s citizens 
must surely want for themselves, were they only able to effectively 
have their government supply it to them.171 
 
Relational sovereignty is similar to Krasner’s shared sovereignty in that it involves 
foreign countries setting the standards that a domestic government should reach in order 
to be considered sovereign. Krasner, however, calls for the foreign country to share the 
responsibility of creating the stable government necessary for that sovereignty. The 
concept of relational sovereignty developed at a time that the European Union was 
expanding and dialogue about international organization and governance was developing. 
Susan Rudolph offers an alternate vision for sovereignty in the world of 
transnational civil society. She writes that, “Once a non-state arena is imagined, in which 
states are significant but not only players, it becomes possible to specify a space for 
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transnational civil society in global politics.”172 She delineates civil society as “inside” the 
state and transnational civil society as “outside” the state. She finds that, “Transnational 
activity is guided by imaginary maps whose boundaries do not approximate the spaces 
depicted on political maps”, and considers the transnational realms of Catholic 
Christianity and the Tijaniyya Sufis as examples of arenas governed by considerations 
other than sovereignty. Such arenas do not replace or supersede political maps showing 
territorially defined states. She writes: 
We can imagine them as transparent plastic overlays, alternative 
meaning systems superimposed upon the meaning system of political 
maps. They do not replace state-defined space; they provide 
alternatives to it… What this suggests is less a waning of states than a 
more complex set of interrelations in which rival identities and 
structures jostle the state. New alliances and goals become possible as 
domestic civil society joins up with transnational civil society to 
challenge states and as states in concert employ elements in 
transnational civil society to limit particular states’ sovereignty.173 
 
Rudolph’s vision of sovereignty offers a new layer of meaning to the case studies in this 
paper, both of which involve multiple, overlapping, transnational civil societies. 
The ultimate goal of this paper will be to parse out and understand how 
conceptions of state sovereignty were altered in the two case studies. This finding will 
attempt to be accessed through the variables of transnational religious leaders, 
transnational social movements, and regime change. As transnational religious actors 
who lead transnational social movements based on religious ideology impact state 
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authority, they in turn change conceptions of sovereignty. According to Keck and 
Sikkink, if sovereignty is a shared set of understandings and expectations about state 
authority that is reinforced by practices, then changes in these practices and 
understandings should in turn transform sovereignty.”174 Philpott finds that “norms of 
sovereignty are… (matters of) basic authority. They are not solely matters of power but 
also of legitimate authority. Revolutions in these norms are rare, but they are revolutions 
of the most basic sort.”175 
Sovereignty evolves through revolution. According to Philpott, “tumult yields 
novel orthodoxy.”176 Revolutions which have led to a change in sovereignty in the past 
have been based upon transnational ideas adopted by transnational social movements and 
their leaders. According to Philpott, there have been several revolutions in sovereignty 
after Westphalia (the first revolution): Napoleon’s failed attempt at empire, 19th century 
minority rights and national self-determination (French revolution, WWI), and the end of 
colonialism. But the greatest revolution since Westphalia was the creation of the 
European Community, now the European Union, in which “a significant political 
authority other than the state has become legitimate.”177 Because of this revolution, “the 
Westphalian paradigm is being weakened and (the sovereignty of) the state is again… 
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problematic.”178 These historical revolutions set a precedent for the dynamics of the two 
case studies of social movements based on transnational religious ideals in this paper. 
The Solidarity movement’s role in the democratization of Poland and the Afghan Arab’s 
role in the Soviet Afghan war and the birth of a global jihadist movement add further 
challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty. This mounting challenge may someday 
contribute to a change in the Westphalian system and the place of individual transnational 
religious leaders within it. 
We are living in a world in which sovereignty is no longer wholly defined by the 
ideals of Westphalia. As transnational religious leaders and their domestic social 
movements based on transnational religious ideas lead to global political change, they are 
redefining conceptions of sovereignty. Transnational religious leaders’ contributions to 
global political change, social movements, and regime change are no longer the exception 
to the rule – they are offering a challenge to conceptions of traditional Westphalian and 
modern sovereignty that is systemic and weighty. The following chapters will attempt to 
isolate a causal relationship between the variables of transnational religious leader, 
transnational social movement, regime change and conceptions of state sovereignty, 
proving that the great revolutions in sovereignty that Philpott identifies are still evolving, 
and perhaps new iterations even being birthed today.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Research Design 
 
Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam - the first man grew up in Nazi 
occupied Poland, went on to lead the international Roman Catholic church, and 
contributed to the fall of Communism in his native country, and some argue, to the fall of 
Communism in Eastern Europe through nonviolent revolution. The second was an Arab 
from Palestine, a mentor to Osama Bin Laden, and is known as the “fighting cleric”. He 
went on to both author the theology and provide the opportunity for violent “defensive 
jihad” in the Soviet Afghan war, which contributed to Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan, 
and ultimately to the birth of global jihadism.  
What do these two men have in common? Even placing these figures in the same 
sentence may be unsettling or create dissonance for some readers. Yet, they have many 
shared characteristics. They were both leaders of transnational religious communities. 
They both mobilized people across state lines to work towards regime change, and in 
both historical circumstances, they worked against the Soviet agenda to varying degrees. 
Finally, they both challenged traditional and modern conceptions of state sovereignty. 
There is a current need in political science literature, especially literature involving 
religion and international relations, regime change, and sovereignty, to clearly define and 
scientifically analyze the transnational religious leader. Through the analysis of these two 
seemingly impossibly different figures, this dissertation will offer a systematic 
framework to understand how transnational religious leaders can, through regime change, 
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dramatically alter traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty, and challenge modern 
theories of state sovereignty. 
CHOICE OF CASES 
These cases were chosen in part because in each case regime change and 
conceptions of state sovereignty were clearly affected. However, there is a variance 
around how regime change was prompted and how state sovereignty was challenged. In 
Poland, John Paul II worked with Western countries to achieve a stable Poland. Though 
the Catholic Church had a working relationship with both Solidarity and the Communist 
regime, most of the pope’s public actions and statements lent legitimacy to Solidarity in 
the eyes of the world. This ultimately contributed to the birth of a democracy. In 
Afghanistan, Azzam appealed to sub state actors in the Muslim world to take violent 
action to bring about regime change, and this ultimately contributed to the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan and not long after, the birth of a new civil war. 
These cases were also chosen because characteristics of the transnational religious 
leader and their associated transnational social movements pose interesting similarities 
and differences. The cases lend themselves to controlled comparison to support theory 
creation. There is historical and circumstantial continuity between these two cases. Both 
cases occurred in the Soviet context. Both leaders had charismatic transformational 
leadership styles and enjoyed widespread international followings based on religious 
ideology. However, their political theologies, social movement structures, and methods of 
activism were very different. Poland was under Communist rule for decades before the 
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Pope’s sermons, whereas Azzam was speaking out against an ongoing invasion, which 
already had a significant domestic armed resistance. In other words, one was speaking 
out against oppression, the other invasion. John Paul aided a nonviolent social movement 
in its success towards democratic regime change. Azzam led the Afghan Arabs in both 
theological justification and the procurement of arms and money to support armed 
conflict with an invading force. The two leaders had vastly different understandings of 
the secular state and the modern world as a whole. Finally, these cases were chosen 
because they are informative to current policy problems. As an example, consider the 
contemporary influence of religious movements and ideology for regime change in the 
Middle East. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The first research objective is to theorize the inputs to the presence of a TRL. The 
second objective is to hypothesize a causal relationship between TRLs, their vision for 
and contributions to regime change, and their consequent impact upon modern 
conceptions of state sovereignty. The TRL’s goal for regime change, how that goal 
measures up against Westphalian principles, and his practical contributions to regime 
change are addressed in the third research objective. The TRL’s impact upon modern 
definitions of state sovereignty, through regime change, is addressed in the fourth 
research objective. 
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1. Theorize Enabling Characteristics of TRLs 
The first research objective is to theorize the inputs to the presence of a 
transnational religious leader (TRL). A TRL is an individual actor who, guided by a 
religious ideology, acts towards political ends, benefiting from both material (people, 
weapons, capital) and immaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world 
leaders) resources across state lines in the achievement of those ends. This understanding 
of the transnational religious leader is guided by the literature on transnational civil 
society, particularly the concept that these individuals are non-state actors that are not 
restricted by the boundaries of nation-states in realizing their goals.179 This understanding 
of the transnational religious leader is guided by literature on transnational advocacy 
networks in that TRLs are mobilizing people to act across state lines to achieve 
something political based on a theological idea.180 The transnational religious leaders 
studied in this project use the power of shared ideas and values to mobilize people 
internationally to influence domestic political ends. Though the theology and ideology 
transcend nation state boundaries, the objectives are political with consequences specific 
to the nation. The enabling characteristic of TRLs, including characteristics of the 
individual TRL and characteristics of the associated TSM are represented in the 
following chart. 
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Figure 3 - Enabling Characteristics of TRLs 
 
TRL-Leadership 
 The first characteristic of a transnational religious leader is his/her leadership 
style. Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette find that leadership is an activity and a dialogical 
relationship. The dialogical approach demands study, not only of the ways that leaders 
lead through speech and action, but also how followers respond. They investigate where, 
within movements, leadership actually resides. They analyze it along two planes of 
inquiry. First, “leadership is exercised at all manner of levels and locations within 
movements, and not only by those obviously designated as “leaders’.”181 Second, “the 
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problem leadership addresses - what is to be done? - can alter situationally from moment 
to moment.”182 A seminal work, James’ MacGregor Burn’s Transnational Leadership, 
distinguishes between transactional and transformational leadership. Transactional 
leadership “motivates through the measured application of promised rewards and 
threatened punishments,”183 while transformational leadership motivates by “transforming 
the identities and goals of individuals to coincide with those of the group.”184 Burns also 
theorizes an ideal leadership that minimizes coercive power and enables followers to 
accomplish goals that even the leader might not fully realize. Thus, both the leader and 
the follower are encouraged towards greatness and transformation. 
 Research questions regarding the leadership style of the Pope John Paul II and 
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam include: Did the transnational religious leader adopt a 
transactional or transformational leadership style? What historical evidence supports this 
claim? In considering leadership as an activity and a dialogical relationship, how did the 
transnational religious leader lead? What do the response of his followers and changing 
historical circumstances say about him as a leader? How did the leadership of his social 
movement or religious community go on after his death? 
TRL-Hard versus Soft Power 
The second characteristic of a transnational religious leader is his whether or not he 
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wields hard or soft power, both, or none at all in the achievement of his aims. “Hard 
power” refers to the traditional means used by leaders or states to achieve their ends. It 
refers to coercing a state, group, or individual to do something, often by force or by threat 
of force. “Soft power”, a concept developed by Joseph Nye, refers to the ability to make 
an individual, group, or state “want” to do something.185 “Religious soft power”, a 
concept developed by Jeffry Haynes, refers to how “religious transnational actors” spread 
ideas, values, and norms.186 An actor using religious soft power might spread ideas 
through inspirational language or persuasive theological writings. “Hard power” as a 
concept works best within a realist framework of international relations. “Soft power” is 
best understood under a liberal or constructivist lens. A transnational religious leader can 
hold both hard and soft power simultaneously. Questions to access the type of power 
wielded by the transnational actors in the case studies include: By what means did the 
TRL achieve his aims? How did he mobilize his followers to action? How did he change 
the actions of a nation state or multiple nation states? Did he use or threaten to use force? 
Did he persuade people to want to act towards something? If he wielded both kinds of 
power, which was dominant and why? 
TRL-Secularization 
The third characteristic of the transnational religious leader is his or her relationship 
to the secularized state. In his study of “religious nationalists”, Juergensmeyer finds that 
religious nationalists are individuals with both religious and political interests who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Nye, Soft Power, 12. 
186 Haynes, Religious Transnational Actors, 6. 
65 
	  
	  
“appear… to be responding in a religious way to a political situation.”187 Juergensmeyer 
also explores the line between religious nationalism and secular nationalism, as well as 
the confrontation between religious nationalism and the secular state.  He even raises the 
question as to whether certain denominations lend themselves to a degree of comfort with 
the secular state, while others reject it. Questions to test how the TRL related to the 
secular state include: How did JPII and Azzam view the secular state? What factors 
determined this outlook (ex. theology, leadership, political agenda)? Did the TRL aim for 
the establishment of a theocratic state? Did he accept the value of democracy? How did 
the TRL relate to international organizations and international leaders? Was the TRL’s 
notion of state legitimacy and authority in international relations informed by his opinion 
of the secular state? If so, how? How does religious denomination impact this 
perspective, if at all? 
TRL-Modernity 
The fourth characteristic of the transnational religious leader is his relationship to 
modernity or programs of modernization. For decades, secularization scholars claimed 
that the apex of modernization in secular society would mark the downfall of religion, as 
measured by church attendance, religious belief, and privatization of religious 
institutions, among other things. Peter Berger, a sociologist at the forefront of the 
movement, claimed that the advent of the modern world would create world-wide 
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secularization188, a notion he recanted in the late 1980’s.189 Secularization has always been 
linked to the concept of modernization, and in the context of this study, a transnational 
religious leader’s concept of the secular state is often linked to his view of modernity. 
Modernity is a fluid concept. Eisenstadt introduces the concept of multiple modernities, 
writing, “The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the 
contemporary world-indeed to explain the history of modernity- is to see it as a story of 
continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs.”190 Key 
questions regarding modernity that can be applied to the case studies in this dissertation 
include: Did the transnational religious leader accept modernity? Did the transnational 
religious leader accept the privatization of religion? Did the transnational religious leader 
accept the hallmarks of modernity? Could modernity and religion coexist for the 
transnational religious leader, or were the two fundamentally opposed? Did the 
transnational religious leader accept a multiplicity of modernization programs, or just 
one? 
TSM-Political Theology 
The first characteristic of the transnational social movement is political theology. 
Often the theological ideas used by transnational religious leaders have political content 
that shape transnational social movements. In Hegghammer’s study of the jihadist 
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movement in Saudi Arabia, he finds that Wahhabism shapes the way in which activists 
articulate and legitimize their agenda, but not the “core content of their activism.”191 He 
observes that the “theological descriptors” used in the movement, “do not correspond to 
discrete and observable patterns of political behavior among Islamists.”192 Understanding 
the transnational social movement’s political theology involves studying the relationship 
between theological discourse and mobilization for political action. The concept of 
political theology is also similar to McAdam’s “strategic framing process”, defined as 
“the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of 
the world and of them that legitimate and motivate collective action.”193 Political theology 
is not just about content, but the framing of the message. In their studies of social 
movements, Hegghammer and Della Porta use a multi-variable framework, including an 
analysis of the system, the group, and the individual, to address how “human, material, 
and immaterial resources were marshaled and organized for political action.”194 The case 
studies to be explored will examine how transnational religious actors framed their 
struggle and how they used ideology to create mobilization. The concept of “ideology” is 
relevant in all three levels of analysis: “as part of the environment in which agents 
operate, as part of their strategy to mobilize followers and as part of the individual 
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recruitment process.”195 Key research questions include: What are the theological 
concepts behind the political agenda of this transnational civil society? How are political 
aims articulated? With theological or political concepts? What is the view of the 
transnational social movement on the secular state? How does theology influence 
mobilization? How can we separate theological content from political content in the 
language of social revolution? How does theology influence the transnational 
community? How does it influence domestic politics, and ultimately international 
conceptions of state sovereignty? 
TSM-Mobilizing Structures 
The second characteristic of the transnational social movement is “mobilizing 
structures”, a term used by McCarthy in the volume Transnational Social Movements and 
Global Politics. According to McCarthy, mobilizing structures “include the more or less 
formally organized everyday life patterns upon which movements build collective action, 
ranging from religious groups and neighborhood associations to workplace cliques and 
friendship groups.”196 This concept also relates to literature on social movements, which 
can be defined as “an organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated 
individuals, groups and organizations to promote or resist social change with the use of 
public protest activities.”197 “Mobilizing structures” are the societal structures that make 
collective action possible. Key questions to be asked in each case study include: Why can 
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the collective action around the transnational religious leader be defined as a social 
movement? What made it a transnational social movement? How was public protest 
expressed? What social groups and networks made mobilization possible? Did the 
movement continue after the death of the transnational religious leader? 
TSM-Political Opportunity Structures 
The third characteristic of the transnational civil society is “political opportunity 
structures”, also a term used by McCarthy to capture the relationship between the state 
and the social movement. He writes: 
The emergence, shape, and development of that movement is 
interpreted as a collective response to the development of the scope, 
resources, and penetration of the modern state-as national states 
aggregated power and resources, movements came more and more to 
target state authorities with demands for social change in existing 
societal arrangements.198  
 
Dimensions of political opportunity structures include: 1) the relative openness or closure 
of the institutionalized political system 2) the stability of elite arrangements 3) the 
presence of elite allies 4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.199 Mainstream 
opinion holds that as authority becomes increasingly invested in transnational bodies, 
social movements become more transnational in scope and target. However, McCarthy 
finds that the impact of national political opportunities should not be disregarded. Key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 McCarthy and Wolfson, “Consensus Movements”, 255 references Charles Tilly, Big 
Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1984) and Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
199 McCarthy and Wolfson, “Consensus Movements,” 255, references McAdam et al., 
“Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process,” 10. 
70 
	  
	  
questions will include: Was the rise of the social movement related to a rise in state 
aggregate power and resources? Did the social movement become transnational in scope 
and target as a response to the state authority becoming more invested in transnational 
bodies? Was the institutionalized political system open or closed? How did this impact 
political opportunities? What was the nature of elite arrangements and elite allies? How 
did they impact the transnational social movement? Finally, what was the state’s capacity 
and propensity for repression, and how did that affect political opportunities for the 
movement? 
TSM-Character of Activism 
The fourth characteristic of transnational social movements is the character of the 
activism. Tarrow defines transnational activists as “individuals and groups who mobilize 
domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of 
external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with 
transnational allies.”200 The case studies present very differently at face value – a 
nonviolent labor movement that democratized Poland with the backing of international 
nation state allies, versus a violent resistance, with the support of a diffuse transnational 
jihadist movement that repelled Soviet invasion. Key questions include: Was the 
transnational activism violent or non-violent in nature? How was it communicated? What 
language was used to create action? How did it cross state lines? What was the guiding 
philosophy of war and conflict? Has the character of the activism of the transnational 
social movement changed over its history or remained consistent? 
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The overall analysis of the characteristics of the two transnational social movement in 
each of these cases will be guided by a multi-level social movement framework, as used 
by Hegghammer and Della Porta. This framework of social movements distinguishes 
between macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level variables, making it easier “to capture 
both root causes and tactical variation.”201 In other words, the framework analyzes the 
system, the group, and the individual. The macro level will examine international 
political developments, the domestic political space for activism based in theological 
ideals, and ideological developments in the transnational community.202 The meso level 
will examine “first movers and entrepreneurs, and on the strategies they employed to 
mobilize followers.”203 The micro level will examine the motivations of individual 
recruits.204 This analysis will answer broad questions about context, agency, and 
individual conversion and mobilization.  
2. Hypothesize Causal Relationships 
 The second research objective is to hypothesize a causal relationship between 
TRL, regime change goals and contributions to regime change, and conceptions of 
sovereignty. 
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Figure 4 - Hypothesized Relationship of TRL to Challenges to Modern State Sovereignty 
 
 
This hypothesized relationship proposes that certain characteristics of TRL and TSM 
influence a TRL’s regime change goals and their relationship to Westphalian sovereignty 
as it exists in the modern world. The goals are broken down into 1) effect policy change 
or regime change within the existing political context 2) effect state dissolution or geo-
political restructuring. The question is then posed as to if those goals are consistent with 
the Westphalian system. These goals are then translated into the regime change that was 
implemented, by the TRL and outside inputs. Finally, the TRL’s contribution to regime 
change is analyzed in terms of its impact upon, and challenge to, modern state 
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sovereignty. These meanings of these categories and relationships will become apparent 
through the comparative historical analysis in the two case studies. 
3. Identify Political Goals and Regime Change Contributions 
In both cases a transnational religious leader and a transnational social movement 
caused a response from nation states, resulting in regime change. This third research 
objective, shaped by literature on both transnational social movements and regime 
change, is twofold. First, the paper will identify to the extent possible, what kind of 
regime change the TRL envisioned and what his relationship to the Westphalian order 
was. The TRL who aimed for policy change or regime change within the existing 
political context accommodated to the Westphalian system. The TRL who aimed to effect 
state dissolution or geopolitical restructuring did not accommodate to the Westphalian 
system. Second, this paper will establish a process-driven explanation of regime change 
in the context of two case studies of transnational religious leaders. The explanation will 
center on political choices, choices “caught up in a continuous redefinition of actors’ 
perceptions of preferences and constraints.”205 Kitschelt delineates the central theoretical 
division in the field of political regimes as drawn between “structural” explanations 
versus “those who focus on the process of change itself-the sequence of events and the 
strategic moves of the actors.”206 This research project, falling in the latter category, will 
reconstruct two individual cases of regime transition to explain the impact of 
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transnational religious leaders on conceptions of sovereignty and of the system of 
sovereign states. Process tracing will be used to explain the chain of events related to 
transnational religious leaders’ and transnational social movements’ impact on regime 
change broadly defined, through a non-violent social movement in one case and a violent 
uprising in response to invasion in another. It will also be used to determine whether the 
causal process hypothesized is evident. 
 The analysis of regime change in each case study will consider the three traditions 
that Krasner presents in his study of regime change as an intervening variable. He writes: 
In sum, conventional structural arguments do not take regimes 
seriously: if basic causal variables change, regimes will also change. 
Regimes have no independent impact on behavior. Modified structural 
arguments, represented here by number of adherent of a realist 
approach to international relations, see regimes as mattering only 
when independent decision making leads to undesired outcomes. 
Finally, Grotian perspectives accept regimes as a fundamental part of 
all patterned human interaction, including behavior in the 
international system.207 
 
In evaluating the strength of regime change as an intervening variable, the cases can be 
placed within a structural, modified structural or Grotian perspective. Questions based on 
Krasner’s article will include: Were the political regimes in these case studies impacted 
by the presence of a transnational religious leader, characteristics of the transnational 
religious leader, and/or characteristics of the transnational religious community? Could 
these independent variables have impacted sovereignty without effecting regime change? 
How did the regime change impact state sovereignty and the global system of sovereign 
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states? How important is regime change as an indicator of challenges to conceptions of 
sovereignty in these case studies? 
In The Clash of Ideas in World Politics, Owen uses a micro and macro level of 
analysis to explain how transnational ideological networks and their rules impact regime 
change. According to Owen, on the macro level a transnational regime contest causes 
events that polarize elites on the micro level. The polarization of elites contributes to 
rulers forcibly promoting regimes, ultimately causing the transnational regime contest on 
the macro level. Owen’s hypotheses centers on transnational ideological polarization, 
which he defines as “the progressive segregation of elites and mass public across states 
along an ideological axis, so that political preferences among elites across states are 
simplified and intensified.”208 His micro-level hypotheses include regime instability and 
great-power war as causes of transnational ideological polarization.209 His macro-level 
hypothesis revolves around long waves of regimes. A transnational ideological contest 
will always endure until one regime type suggest that vastly superior on terms all elites 
accept.210 Parts of the framework of Owen’s work on warring ideas in world politics can 
be applied to the cases of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. Around the 
periphery of both cases, there were warring ideologies, broadly defined in terms such as 
the West versus Communism, or Islam versus secularism, among others. Questions 
include: What were the broader warring ideologies behind each social movement? Does 
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Owen’s basic causal framework apply to these case studies? Do the concepts of 
transnational ideological polarization and transnational ideological contests apply? How 
did regime instability versus great power war contribute to regime change in each case? 
How does the transnational religious leader as individual contribute to Owen’s paradigm? 
4. Impact upon Conceptions of Sovereignty 
 The fourth research objective is to explore the impact of transnational religious 
leaders upon conceptions of state sovereignty and the system of sovereign states through 
explanatory description and theory creation. The analysis of the case studies will be 
guided by the following questions: As arbiters of religious regimes, did the transnational 
religious leaders accept, reject, or transform the Westphalian system? How did they 
impact conceptions of sovereignty through regime change? According to thinkers like 
Gross, Morgenthau, and Philpott, the primary legacy of Westphalia is that the sovereign 
state, with supreme authority within its bordered territory, became the dominant actor in 
the international system. How are classic definitions of Westphalian sovereignty 
challenged, supported, or transformed by transnational religious leaders? By impacting 
the domestic politics and regime type of Poland and Afghanistan, did these TRLs weaken 
conceptions of the Westphalian state sovereignty, and in turn, of the world order of 
sovereign states? 
In addition to classic definitions of Westphalian sovereignty, contemporary 
definitions of state sovereignty will be considered as well. How do the case studies fit 
into Krasner’s four categories of sovereignty- international legal sovereignty, 
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Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty? Do 
these cases relate to Krasner’s claim that sovereignty is “organized hypocrisy”211? How 
does each case related to Krasner’s updated definition, “shared sovereignty”212 or 
Stacey’s “relational sovereignty”213? How does each case study relate to Philpott’s central 
claim that revolutions in sovereignty result from prior revolutions in ideas about justice 
and political authority?214 Does the transnational religious leader embody Philpott’s role 
of ideas as 1) ideas that shape identities across societies or 2) ideas that become a form of 
social power, influencing the interests of politics?215 This paper will build upon these 
theories by proposing a process through which state sovereignty is challenged, namely 
through the contributions of transnational religious leaders to regime change. 
This discussion of transnational religious leaders and sovereignty, and theory 
creation that results, will contribute to the literature on religion in international relations 
theory, religion and foreign policy, transnational religious actors and international 
relations, and religion and globalization. It will also introduce the transnational religious 
leader as a unit of analysis in international relations theory, which is traditionally based 
on units of nation states alone. 
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SOURCES AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 As previously stated, the first research objective is to theorize the characteristics 
of transnational religious leaders and their associated transnational social movements. 
The eight characteristics hypothesized are based in social science literature. The second 
objective is to hypothesize a causal relationship between TRL holding certain 
characteristics, their goals for and impact upon regime change, and the resulting 
challenge to conceptions of state sovereignty. After the characteristics have been 
theorized and the causal relationship hypothesized, the questions posed can be answered 
by meeting the third and fourth research objectives. The following includes their sources 
and data analysis. 
The third objective is to 1) explore the regime change goals and relationship to 
Westphalian world order of each TRL 2) to establish a process-driven explanation of 
regime change in the context of two case studies. To achieve the third objective, I will 
use intelligence documents and other archival resources to support a comparative case 
analysis. This will include archival research within the virtual archive of the Cold War 
International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, and the 
Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. I will use the 
information collected from these sources to explain the historical context for revolution 
and domestic regime change in each case and to identify the process by which it 
happened. I will use small-n comparative analysis and process tracing as tools of data 
analysis. In the context of these historical accounts, the strength of the characteristics of 
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TRL and TSM will be tested. The paper will measure the strength of the variables in 1) 
demarking differences in two cases and 2) highlighting the unique nature of transnational 
religious leaders in relation to other transnational actors. 
 The fourth research objective is to explore the impact of transnational religious 
leaders upon sovereignty through explanatory description and theory creation. To address 
this research objective, I will rely on secondary resources (biographies, academic 
commentaries) and primary resources (texts, public speeches). For the case of Azzam, I 
reviewed the “Al-Qaeda Collection” at the Conflict Records Research Center at the 
Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, which 
contains Al Qaeda primary documents recovered by the US Army in the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and translated into English for purposes of research. Documents reviewed, 
among other things, included fatwas, administrative Al Qaeda documents, jihadist poetry, 
internal letters between Al Qaeda leadership, and recruitment material. Although many of 
the documents in this collection are related to the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
there are also a number of documents either from the time of the Soviet Afghan war, and 
from modern authors commenting upon that time in Al Qaeda history. For the case of 
Pope John Paul II, I reviewed the “Soviet Flashpoints Collections” files relating to Poland 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s at the National Security Archive. Documents reviewed, among 
other things, included Solidarity Congress meeting notes, U.S. State Department cables, 
Soviet and European diplomatic cables, notes from phone conversations, letters written 
by U.S. presidents, CIA National Intelligence Estimates, and other intelligence 
documents. 
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Summary 
 I hypothesize that through the following relationships one can explain why some 
transnational religious leaders and their associated transnational social movements 
challenge state sovereignty by impacting regime change: 
Figure 5 – Hypothesized Relationship of TRL to Challenges to Conceptions of Modern 
State Sovereignty 
 
The modes of analysis as laid out in this section are as follows: 
1. Characteristics of TRL = leadership style, hard versus soft power, relationship to 
secularism, and relationship to modernity 
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2. Characteristics of TSM = political theology, mobilizing structures, political 
opportunity structures, and the nature of the activism 
3. Regime Change = 1) analyzing the nature of each TRL’s regime change goals and 
its level of consistency with Westphalian sovereignty 2) comparative historical 
analysis of case studies, evaluating strength of regime change as an intervening 
variable in structural, modified structural or Grotian perspective, and application 
of Owen’s micro and macro levels of analysis 
4. Conceptions of Sovereignty = traditional definitions of Westphalia (Gross, 
Morgenthau) and modern definitions of state sovereignty (Krasner, Philpott, 
Strange) 
In analyzing the characteristics of TRLs and their TSMs in two historical cases, I 
attempt to isolate factors that cause some TRLs to have regime change goals that do not 
work in common conceptions of the Westphalian system, while other TRLs’ comfortably 
accommodate their goals to it. I will also analyze how the transnational religious leaders 
in these cases studies practically contributed to regime change, and how those 
contributions impact modern, evolving definitions of sovereignty. By isolating the 
variables of this equation in each case study, this dissertation builds a framework in 
which to analyze other transnational religious actors involved in transnational social 
movements and regime change. By testing the hypothesized causal relationship, a more 
detailed process is added to existing literature on evolving definitions of sovereignty. 
More broadly, this dissertation will contribute to the literature on sovereignty and 
towards the integration of religion and international relations theory. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Pope John Paul II - Son of Poland, Bishop of Rome 
 
 To Poland the Church brought Christ, the key to understanding that 
great and fundamental reality that is man. For man cannot be fully 
understood without Christ. Or rather, man is incapable of 
understanding himself fully without Christ. He cannot understand who 
he is, nor what his true dignity is, nor what his vocation is, nor what 
his final end is. He cannot understand any of this without Christ… It 
is therefore impossible without Christ to understand the history of the 
Polish nation—this great thousand-year-old community—that is so 
profoundly decisive for me and each one of us… Today, here in 
Victory Square, in the capital of Poland, I am asking with all of you, 
through the great Eucharistic prayer, that Christ will not cease to be 
for us an open book of life for the future, for our Polish future.  
We are before the tomb of the Unknown Soldier… The history of the 
motherland written through the tomb of an Unknown Soldier! I wish 
to kneel before this tomb to venerate every seed that falls into the 
earth and dies and thus bears fruit. It may be the seed of the blood of 
a soldier shed on the battlefield, or the sacrifice of martyrdom in 
concentration camps or in prisons. It may be the seed of hard daily 
toil, with the sweat of one's brow, in the fields, the workshop, the 
mine, the foundries and the factories. It may be the seed of the love of 
parents who do not refuse to give life to a new human being and 
undertake the whole of the task of bringing him up. It may be the seed 
of creative work in the universities, the higher institutes, the libraries 
and the places where the national culture is built. It may be the seed 
of prayer, of service of the sick, the suffering, the abandoned—"all 
that of which Poland is made".  
All that in the hands of the Mother of God—at the foot of the cross on 
Calvary and in the Upper Room of Pentecost! All that—the history of 
the motherland shaped for a thousand years by the succession of the 
generations (among them the present generation and the coming 
generation) and by each son and daughter of the motherland, even if 
they are anonymous and unknown like the Soldier before whose tomb 
we are now. All that— including the history of the peoples that have 
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lived with us and among us, such as those who died in their hundreds 
of thousands within the walls of the Warsaw ghetto. All that I embrace 
in thought and in my heart during this Eucharist and I include it in 
this unique most holy Sacrifice of Christ, on Victory Square.  
And I cry—I who am a Son of the land of Poland and who am also 
Pope John Paul II—I cry from all the depths of this Millennium, I cry 
on the vigil of Pentecost:  
Let your Spirit descend. Let your Spirit descend and renew the face of 
the earth, the face of this land. Amen. 
Homily in Victory Square, Warsaw on June 2, 1979 
-Pope John Paul II 
 
In his lifetime, Karol Wojtyla played many roles, including that of quarry worker, 
actor, poet, theologian, bishop, archbishop, and cardinal. But when he was elected pope 
in 1978, taking the name John Paul II, he took on the role of a transnational religious 
leader and wielded a geopolitical power that few achieve, based in a theology of peace, 
solidarity, and human dignity. He was the first Polish Pope and the first Slavic Pope. The 
international Catholic community largely responded positively to the fact that he had 
emerged from behind the Iron Curtain. Pope John Paul II exercised his international 
influence as a theological leader and made a political goal possible– Poland’s freedom 
from Communist rule, although the details of his political intentions are a matter of 
debate.  Pope John Paul II was meaningful as a transnational religious leader, and he 
contributed to regime change, in the sense of non-violent, internal regime replacement, in 
two senses. First, he was a pastor promulgating a transnational religious ideology and 
leading a transnational community. He transformed the psychology and thinking of 
millions of Poles through his spoken and written word. This role can perhaps best be 
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examined by his first pilgrimage as pope to his native Poland in 1979, when he became 
the first pope to visit a Communist country. Second, he was the leader of a powerful, 
sovereign, and international institution, and he acted as something akin to a head of state. 
This can be examined through his international statesmanship, reflected in speeches, 
encyclicals and US intelligence documents between the years 1980–1982. In this second 
role, he had a unique, close relationship with the militarily strong US president and 
governmental leadership, but this did not give him military power. His power in both 
roles was based on spiritual and transformational leadership, though the second role 
required an understanding of realist geopolitics. Although he rejected realism, the Pope 
was perhaps successful in defeating Communism in Poland because he was able to act as 
both a transformational pastor and global leader who understood diplomacy and secular 
politics. Both roles enabled him to promote a theological agenda, with political 
implications. 
TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADER AS PASTOR 
Pope John Paul II became a powerful transnational religious leader who 
contributed to regime change in the role of pastor in his pilgrimage to Poland in 1979. At 
an open air mass in Victory Square in Warsaw, John Paul II asked, “Why did God choose 
a Polish pope?” and he invoked God to, “Fill the earth, fill the land”. To his audience, 
this meant that Jesus and God could not be limited, a radical concept in the context of 
communism. Throughout the rest of the pilgrimage, he preached thirty-two sermons in 
nine days. Millions of Poles heard his message of human dignity, religious freedom and 
spiritual rebirth.  George Weigel observed, “It was a lesson in dignity, a national 
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plebiscite, Poland's second baptism."216 His pilgrimage was a moment in which the Poles 
understood their own strength as a nation that pre-existed Communist rule. Paczkowski 
and Byrn write that this pilgrimage was:   
…Seen almost universally as a turning point for the country as 
millions of Poles greeting the pontiff suddenly became aware of their 
own strength. At the same time, they understood the relative 
helplessness of the authorities, who put on a bold front during the visit 
but for all practical purposes, had already lost the battle for the 
people’s soul.217 
 
In his first homily in Victory Square in Warsaw near The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 
the pope offered to God the history of all the peoples who had lived on that land, saying:  
“…And I cry from all the depths of this millennium, I cry on the vigil of Pentecost: “Let 
your Spirit descend. Let your spirit descend, and renew the face of the earth, and the face 
of this land.” Amen.”218 According to Garton Ash, the crowd responded rhythmically, 
chanting: “We want God, we want God, we want God in the family, we want God in the 
schools, we want God in books, we want God, we want God…”219 George Weigel writes: 
Seven hours after he had arrived, a crucial truth had been clarified by 
a million Pole’s response to John Paul’s evangelism. Poland was not a 
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Communist country; Poland was a Catholic nation saddled with a 
Communist state.220 
 
This pilgrimage was perhaps “the most fantastic pilgrimage in the history of 
contemporary Europe.”221 The pope subtly opposed being identified simply by the 
political regime one lived under. At one stop he said, “The future of Poland will depend 
on how many people are mature enough to be nonconformists.”222 Garton Ash writes, 
“For nine days the state virtually ceased to exist, except as a censor doctoring the 
television coverage. Everyone saw that Poland is not a Communist country-just a 
Communist state.”223 Here country connotes Polish national identity based on shared 
history and shared values, as opposed to the state, which is defined by the current 
political regime. 
From the pope’s homilies and speeches during the pilgrimage, it can be 
interpreted that he was not a traditional international relations realist. He believed that 
culture drove history, not military power.224 The pope believed that “the realists were 
wrong, not because military and economic power were unimportant, but because culture 
was more important. And the most powerful component of culture was cult, or 
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religion.”225 In other words, the pope understood personal, spiritual, and social identities 
to drive human interaction. Man’s relationship with God was the primary relationship, 
upon which man’s relationship with others was built. The role of state was in part to 
allow for religious expression. Man’s identity was too complex to be captured by one 
regime. The Pope did not agree that Polish identity could be reduced to that of atheist 
Communists. During Pope John Paul II’s pilgrimage, Poles heard a message about the 
state not being an end unto itself. The pope believed the state had a right “to the 
formation of its own culture and civilization.”226 This commitment to culture was not just 
evidenced by the Pope’s words, but by his heritage. In his Victory Square homily he said, 
“Was it not Christ’s will…that this Polish Pope, this Slav Pope, should at this precise 
moment manifest the unity of Christian Europe?”227 John Paul II and others saw Poland as 
a positive example for the rest of Europe. At the end of the twentieth century, faced with 
a crisis of modernity, “Poland had responded by intensifying its Christian faith. This was 
a lesson with resonance far beyond Poland’s borders.”228 In decades to come, Poland was 
to face the crisis of faith that came along with the problems of democratic freedom. 
However, the moment of the Pope’s pilgrimage in 1979 was a spiritual experience for 
many. 
By reawakening the popular Polish consciousness to its roots as a Christian 
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nation, a nation defined by things older (and perhaps more profound) than the current 
government, Pope John Paul II empowered Poland to respond to communism in a new 
way. Political scientist Bogdan Szajkowski wrote that the country in nine days had lived 
through a “psychological earthquake, an opportunity for mass political catharsis.”229 
Adam Michnik described it as a great “lesson in dignity.”230 But perhaps Ascherson 
framed it best, writing:  
Inescapably, the word for all this is love. (The Pope) receives it from 
the nation, as only liberators and dictators have taken it in history, but 
somehow he gives the dangerous gift back again, leaving on one side 
an intact man and on the other millions of people who go back home 
with a better respect for themselves.231 
 
Through the revival of an old theological identity, a new political identity was born.  
 
TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADER AS HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION 
Although Pope John Paul II may always be remembered for transformative 
moments as a pastoral leader with rhetorical brilliance, exemplified by that first 
pilgrimage to Poland, he had another, perhaps more realist role to play in the fall of 
Communism in Poland. As both the head of the international church and a beloved Polish 
leader, he was able to productively dialogue with the US, enabling him to create a global 
community at least supportive of a more stable Poland, and at most supportive of the 
birth and nonviolent progression of Solidarity. The following analyzes US security 
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documents from 1980–1982 to expose John Paul II’s actions as both the head of the 
institutional church and an inspirational force behind Polish Catholic identity. His 
relationship with the US, in particular, gives insight into his contribution to the fall of 
Communism in Poland in his role as head of an international organization.  
Before and during the birth of Solidarity, President Jimmy Carter hoped to use 
Pope John Paul II to keep stability in Poland, and he courted the Pope’s opinion on the 
Polish situation. On August 27, 1980, President Carter wrote a letter to the allies about 
Poland. It was sent to Thatcher, Giscard, and Schmidt. Carter, in the midst of attempting 
to organize a unified response in the event of a Soviet military move, writes, “The best 
outcome from every standpoint would involve accommodation between the authorities 
and the Polish people, without violence… and I am heartened by the conciliatory 
approach adopted publicly by the Pope and Cardinal Wyszynski.”232  Carter’s message 
appears to be more concerned with stability than it is with democratic transition. Just two 
days later on August 29, 1980 there was a State Department cable from Washington DC 
to Rome, outlining a personal message from the President to the Pope. Its subject is 
“Poland: Presidential Message to Pope”, and it reads:  
Your Holiness: -Events in Poland are of such importance that I would 
like very much to have your personal assessment of them, and also to 
share mine with you… -I would particularly value your advice as to 
what approach Western governments should adopt in this complex 
situation; I would similarly by grateful for your analysis of the likely 
outcome in Poland. I assure you that my fellow countrymen and I 
share a deep concern for Poland and its people.233 
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In this document the President of the United States asks for the “advice” of John Paul II. 
Carter had been interested in the state of affairs in Poland for a long time; in 1977 he 
visited Poland in his first trip abroad as president with his chief advisor on foreign policy, 
the Polish born Zbigniew Brzezinski. This cable bears witness to the weight the pope 
held in the international community, a weight he used to bring the Solidarity movement 
into favorable international opinion. Is also raises the question as to if Carter is looking 
for advice, or for a positive relationship to advance a predetermined agenda. 
Brzezinski’s memoirs describe the positive relationship between the Pope and 
Carter. He writes: 
I never discussed the Pope in any detail with Carter, but in the course 
of several exchanges with Pope John Paul II… whom I came to 
admire enormously both for his conviction and for his extraordinary 
political grasp, His Holiness did make one very perceptive comment 
about my President. Recounting his Washington conversations, the 
Pope smiled and said, “You know, after a couple of hours with 
President Carter I had the feeling that two religious leaders were 
conversing.” I told this to Carter, who was immensely pleased by that 
comment, and I thought that this, too, was in itself quite revealing.234 
 
Beyond the congenial relationship between the two world leaders, this quote also perhaps 
alludes to the impact of Carter’s Christian faith upon his conversations with the Pope. 
Carter visited the Vatican on June 21, 1980 on his was to an Economic Summit in 
Venice. Brzezinski writes: 
The stop in Rome gave me a unique personal opportunity to spend 
close to seven hours with Pope John Paul II. I was again struck in our 
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conversations… by how political the Pope’s thinking was… In his 
comments, the Pope reviewed carefully the political situation in the 
Middle East, which we feared might become stalemated; relations 
with China; and the internal situation in the Soviet bloc, with special 
attention to Poland. I wrote in my journal: “The most impressive 
personality of the trip was clearly the Pope. Having spent seven hours 
with him was the high point of the trip for me. He came across clearly 
as a man of extraordinary vision and political intelligence. In a sense, 
I think it is fair to say that today he is the outstanding Western leader. 
I particularly appreciate his sense of authority and his understanding 
that Western man does crave a sense of direction which is firmly and 
clearly defined.”235 
 
Brzezinski’s earlier quote and this journal entry also reflect Brzezinski’s opinion that the 
John Paul was politically aware and adept, supporting the theory that the pope had some 
awareness of the political impact of his theological leadership in regards to the situation 
in Poland. 
In August of 1980, the Solidarity movement, a Polish trade union federation, 
began to assert itself more effectively against Communist party control. In Brzezinski’s 
memoirs, he writes: 
On August 25 (1980), I urged the President to underline American 
interest in these developments through Presidential letters to Prime 
Minister Thatcher, President Giscard, and Chancellor Schmidt, as well 
as to the Pope, and to initiate an exchange of views on this subject so 
that a common Western policy would emerge.236 
 
The pope, at this point, was already familiar with Solidarity. His theology and public 
sermons supported its break onto the international stage through demonstrations that 
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month at the Gdansk Shipyard. It was the first non-Communist trade union movement in 
a Warsaw Pact country.  Solidarity was “a broad anti-bureaucratic social movement, 
using the methods of civil resistance to advance the causes of worker’s rights and social 
change.”237 The movement was comprised of a diverse membership, from those 
associated with the Catholic Church to members of the anti-Soviet Left. Solidarity had 
roots in a Polish national consciousness that predated 1980. Garton Ash writes:  
The fact that Wyszynski’s Church succeeded in keeping the allegiance 
of most of the peasant families who flocked to find work in the new 
socialist industrial centres is of capital importance for an 
understanding of Solidarity. This stubborn allegiance of the young 
working class, at once pious and patriotic, was unique in Eastern 
Europe. So was the manner in which the Church and non-Communist 
intellectuals kept alive the Poles’ autonomous and collective memory-
the national conscience-against the Party’s determined efforts to 
destroy it.238 
 
Solidarity had roots in the KOR (the Workers’ Defense Committee), founded after 
protests in June 1976 to give aid to prisoners and their families. It was a civil society 
group, the first major anti-Communist civic group in Eastern Europe. KOR protested the 
Communist government and organized legal and financial support for the families of 
political detainees. It collaborated with Warsaw intellectuals and sponsored a series of 
lectures on forbidden subjects. KOR was not religious and mobilized intellectuals from a 
variety of backgrounds. It achieved success when the Polish government declared 
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amnesty for jailed strikers in the spring of 1977. By 1979, as a result of the KOR, there 
was an alliance of workers, intellectuals and the Church, “unprecedented in Polish 
history, unique in the Soviet bloc, unseen in the West, which was to grow into 
Solidarity.”239 
There were major protests in Poland in December 1970 and June 1976 in response 
to the Soviet regime’s 30–100% increase of prices on beef, pork, and chicken, but it was 
the protest in July 1980 that sparked the birth of the Solidarity movement. After 
Communist party leader Edward Gierek introduced new prices on meat while refusing to 
increase wages, a strike took place in the State Aviation Works PZL in Swidnik. This 
caused train operators in Lublin, on July 16, to block the railways connecting Poland to 
the Soviet Union. On August 14, 17,000 workers in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk went 
on strike. They were led by Lech Walesa, an unemployed electrician who had climbed a 
12 foot high fence to present himself at work. The workers demanded an eight-point 
program of economic reform and the creation of a free trade-union movement. One of the 
first actions of the strike was to hold a mass, attended by 4,000 strikers, while 2,000 
friends and family stood outside the gates. Shipyard carpenters made a cross adorned 
with the Black Madonna and other religious symbols. Weigel writes:   
The Madonna on the shipyard gates, the daily strike Mass, and those 
rows of strikers queued up to visit open-air confessionals also 
symbolized the different kind of political struggle in which they were 
engaged. This was going to be a nonviolent and self-regulating 
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revolution-one that proved Robespierre, Lenin, and the other violent 
men in the modern revolutionary pantheon wrong.240 
 
Although the Solidarity movement was not explicitly religious and was in rooted in the 
secular KOR, it became steeped in Catholic symbols, supported by many Catholic 
officials, and inspired by Polish Catholic history and identity.  
Pope John Paul immediately supported the movement in a message to Cardinal 
Wyszynski on August 20th. Cardinal Wyszynski was the Primate of Poland, and many 
consider him responsible for the survival of Christianity during Communist rule in 
Poland. Some even regard him as a national hero. The message read:   
I pray that, once again, the Episcopate with the Primate at its head… 
may be able to aid the nation in its struggle for daily bread, social 
justice, and the safeguarding of its inviolable right to its own way of 
life and achievement.241 
 
After Cardinal Wyszynski preached a sermon mildly criticizing the movement, the pope 
again intervened. At his general audience on August 21, he “defended the strikers, 
arguing that the problems they were forcing onto the agenda were real and could only be 
resolved by bringing “peace and justice to our country.””242 On August 31, an agreement 
was signed that allowed for independent self-governing trade unions, and for a form of 
power sharing that “meant the end of the totalitarian system.”243 
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Meanwhile the US government continued to consider the Pope as it responded to 
Soviet actions. In response to signs of a possible Soviet invasion of Poland, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, now National Security Advisor, began convening meetings to decide what to 
do. Early in his tenure as president, Carter cut the staff of the National Security Council 
in half and reduced the eight standing committees to two, the Special Coordinating 
Committee (SCC) and the Policy Review Committee (PRC). On September 23, 1980, an 
attachment to a Security Council document states: “The purpose of the SCC is to review 
the current intelligence on Soviet troop movements and the state of our contingency 
planning.”244 Under the section on “U.S. Policy: Contingency Planning”, under “Key 
Questions” is listed the question: “Pope: Should we consult with the Pope? If so, how and 
when?”245 The US National Security Advisor proposing a papal consultation suggest that 
the regard the US government had for Pope John Paul II as a powerful actor, in both a 
constructivist and realist sense, in the Polish space during the Cold War. The Pope’s 
influence was constructivist in the sense that the Pope’s ideas and theology shaped 
dialogue among US leaders. It was realist in the sense that he led the Catholic Church, an 
organization actively shaping relations between Solidarity and the Communist regime on 
the ground. The influence of the Polish born Brzezinski, and his support of Polish 
nationalism, may have come to bear on this request as well. 
On October 22, Minister of Defense of the Polish People’s Republic, General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski secretly launched a working group of military officers to prepare for 
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the imposition of martial law.246 Their plans increasingly responded to pressure by 
Warsaw Pact allies for action. Moscow’s relations were set by Soviet party general 
secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, who pushed his Polish counterpart, Stanislaw Kania to take 
a stance against Solidarity. Kania had replaced Edwark Gierek as General Secretary of 
the Polish Communist Party in September, 1980, and he would be replaced by Jaruzelski 
in 1981. Brezhnev came to believe that Soviet force might be necessary. The invasion of 
Poland by the Warsaw Pact armies was set for December 8, to be completed by 
December 21. Movement of troops, expected to take seven days, began after the 
December 1 visit to Moscow of the commander of East Germany’s ground forces, Gen. 
Horst Stechbarth. General Secretary Kania, humiliated by the proposed role of the Polish 
army, and nervous about domestic resistance sought to persuade Brezhnev to take an 
alternate course. 
The US was well informed of these developments due to satellite surveillance, on 
the ground intelligence, and information from Col. Ryszard Kukliski, a Polish officer 
working in the group preparing plans for martial law. In addition, National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski “did all the right things to deter the invasion. These 
included public disclosure of the military build-up around Poland to deny the invaders the 
advantage of a surprise, and the dispatch of carefully calibrated warnings to impress upon 
Moscow the costs of aggression as well as the benefits of restraint.”247 Brzezinski sent an 
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explicit message to that effect via the White House hot line on December 3.248 Brzezinski 
writes that on that day: 
I convened a meeting with Brown, Muskie, and Turner in my office. 
We agreed that the President should issue a public statement 
reiterating for the record that any Soviet action would have far 
reaching consequences for East-West relations and that American 
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union would be directly and very 
adversely affected.  In addition, we decided to send a message to 
Brezhnev repeating these points, while also underlining our 
established position that the United States had no intention of 
exploiting the developments within Poland itself to threaten legitimate 
Soviet security interests.249 
 
This account of the day is significant in that it highlight’s US intentions to halt Soviet 
aggression, but not to induce regime change. The concern was with stability, not 
democracy. The lack of interest in regime change is also supported by Brzezinski’s 
reference to “legitimate Soviet security interests.” 
On December 5, Kania gave a presentation at a summit of Soviet leadership, in 
which he attempted to assure the attendees that the Communist party would recover and 
defeat the opposition by political means. He argued to Brezhnev that “if there were an 
intervention there would be a national uprising. Even if angels entered Poland, they 
would be treated as bloodthirsty vampires and the socialist ideas would be swimming in 
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blood.”250 He successfully convinced Brezhnev to conditionally postpone his invasion. 
Vojtech Mastny writes, “The top Polish military, having begun on their own preparations 
forcibly to suppress the anti-Communist movement, therefore became indispensable for 
the attainment of Soviet goals.”251 
US Assistant for National Security Affairs Brzezinski called the pope at the 
Vatican on December 7 to share intelligence and brief him on the security situation in 
Poland. In his memoirs, he writes: 
Finally, with the President’s approval, I phoned the Pope and briefed 
him on the situation. (I do not know if the Pope has ever been phoned 
from the United States before but I reached him late in the evening, 
Vatican time, and his secretary’s first response, when I identified 
myself and asked to speak to the Pope, was to say, “I will see if I can 
find him.” The Pope came on thirty seconds later, and in a way, the 
conversation was historically unique. Here was the Assistant for 
National Security Affairs to the President of the United States 
conferring with the Roman Pontiff in the Vatican in Polish about 
peace and Poland.)252 
 
The very fact that Brzezinski made this call speaks to US foreign policy interest in 
including the Vatican in its actions towards Communist Poland, and the value US 
leadership placed on the relationship. Brzezinski himself seems aware of the “historically 
unique” value of the conversation and comments on it here. The Pope consequently wrote 
a letter to Brezhnev on December 16, 1980 in response to ongoing concern about a Soviet 
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military invasion into Poland. He wrote:  
Having in mind, then, the various serious motivations of the 
preoccupation created by the tension over the actual situation in 
Poland, I ask you to do everything you can in order that all that 
constitutes the causes of this preoccupation, according to widespread 
opinion, be removed. This is indispensable for détente in Europe and 
in the world. I think that this can be obtained only by abiding 
faithfully to the solemn principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which 
proclaims criteria for regulating the relations between states, and in 
particular the principle of respect for the inherent rights of sovereignty 
as well as the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of 
each of the participating states.253   
 
Here, the Pope, while speaking with moral authority, appeals to a tenant of international 
law- specifically the principle of nonintervention. On January 15, 1981, Walesa and a 
delegation of Solidarity leaders met at the Vatican with John Paul “for private 
conversation and public audience. The Pope’s public remarks captured his distinctive 
view of the driving force of history, as he described Solidarity as a movement for, rather 
than against, something.”254 By meeting with the Solidarity leaders in the Vatican, Pope 
John Paul gave them legitimacy in the eyes of world leaders.  
Although the Pope’s public speeches and writings ultimately led to an increased 
international respect for Solidarity, intelligence documentation of the Church’s actions on 
the ground showed a more complicated picture. Consider the following National 
Intelligence Estimate: National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 12.6-81) dated January 27, 
1981, which reads:  
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The Church  
25. Since the Communist takeover the Polish Catholic Church has 
fiercely and successfully defended its independence and retained the 
loyalty of the country’s overwhelming Catholic population. With the 
election of a Polish Pope, John Paul II, and his triumphant visit in 
June 1979, the Church has significantly enhanced its effectiveness as 
a political force. But is has always used its influence cautiously- 
usually behind the scenes-and had extended its support to the 
government in times of national crisis.  
26. In early December, sensing that Soviet military intervention was 
increasingly likely, both Cardinal Wyszynski, the Polish Primate, and 
Pope John Paul II ended a somewhat ambiguous period of silence to 
urge calm and to ease the pressure on the regime. This is a position to 
which the Church now appears committed and which could be a 
decisive factor in future confrontations. We can expect to see the 
Church play a more outspoken role in urging moderation in future 
confrontations. In the present situation, the Church hierarchy has lent 
its support both to Solidarity and to the Kania regime, but has avoided 
committing itself to an alliance with either.  
27. But the regime can retain the support of the Church only so long 
as it eschews the use of force. In addition, the Church has particular 
interests and will pose demands of its own- greater access to the 
media, church construction, expanded clerical and religious education, 
etc.- and therefore has a natural interest in encouraging a progressive, 
if cautious, liberalization, and in exacting its own political price from 
the regime for its support.255 
 
 
Some members of Solidarity, the general Polish population, and even younger members 
of the clergy had the opinion that Wyszynski extended too much support to the regime at 
the expense of Solidarity. However, a change in leadership was unlikely. This document 
finds that “the episcopate is likely to remain united under Wyszynski, who enjoys strong 
papal backing, and to continue to play a moderating role toward the regime, the workers, 
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and the population at large.”256 This document highlights the complicated relationship 
between Church, regime, and Solidarity in 1981 Poland. The Church engaged in a 
multitude of behind-the-scenes efforts at peaceful dialogue with both the regime and 
Solidarity. The Church at times acted on behalf of the regime over Solidarity, suggesting 
that its interest in Poland was to prevent bloodshed and keep stability, not democratic 
regime change. Yet the Church also had an interest in “progressive, if cautious 
liberalization.” The US sought to capitalize on the stabilizing, if somewhat paradoxical 
efforts of the Church, to achieve a peaceful end to the conflict. In the context of Pope 
John Paul II, this document questions the idea that he purposely worked towards the fall 
of Communism, or at least in all times and circumstances. There is also a clear lack of 
evidence on whether the pope and Wyszynski were unified at all points in the crisis. 
Three months after backing down from a Soviet military solution, in March 1981, 
the Communist leadership decided that Solidarity must end and that the Polish regime 
should impose martial law. The Solidarity movement imposed a strike, but lifted it on 
March 30th after reaching a compromise with the government. On September 5, the first 
Solidarity Congress opened in Gdansk, and immediately called for free elections to the 
Polish Parliament. On October 18th, 1981, Stanislaw Kania was rejected by the party 
Central Committee, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski became First Secretary. The 
economic situation continued to erode and on November 28, the Central Committee of 
the Polish Communist Party suggested that Communists in parliament give the 
government emergency powers, including the ability to ban strikes.  
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On February 10, Jaruzelski assumed premiership while retaining the title of 
Minister of Defense and called for a ninety-day truce with Solidarity, all the while 
secretly accelerating plans for martial law. After completing his plans on February 20, 
Soviet leaders “insisted that the measure should be timed with the progress of the 
Warsaw Pact maneuvers and implemented without further delay.”257 They planned for 
joint action with forces under Jaruzelski’s command. Just as in the previous year, the US 
learned of plans of Soviet invasion, which they expected to begin March 28–29. On 
March 27, Solidarity organized a four-hour warning strike, threatening to continue four 
days later with a strike of indefinite duration. The Defense Ministry began to seek a 
compromise. Brezhnev, angered at a Soviet politburo session asked, “But at what price? 
The price of a subsequent surrender to opposition.”258 Once intervention was abandoned, 
the Kremlin lost confidence in Kania. Jaruzelski “despised Solidarity, ruling any 
compromise with it as a prescription for anarchy.” He succeeded Kania as PZPR First 
Secretary on October 18, while retaining both titles of Premier and Minister of Defense. 
Despite his pressing for Soviet troop support, on October 29, Andropov confirmed that 
troops would not be brought into Poland at a Politburo session, but the party supported a 
state of martial law. 
Unlike the happenings the previous year, the US misjudged what was happening, 
focusing solely on the possibility of Soviet invasion and overlooking the possibility of 
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martial law. Even Moscow was in the dark on the exact timing and definitiveness of plans 
for martial law. However, in advance of imposing martial law, Jaruzelski did request 
military support should the situation become critical – a request immediately denied by 
the CPSU Politburo. At the Politburo meeting, Suslov stated that the USSR’s investment 
in détente made it “impossible for us to change our position. World public opinion will 
not allow us to do so.”259 This quote gives evidence to the theory that Soviet foreign 
policy and actions within Poland were indeed impacted by world opinion. 
Martial law affected the state of US aid to Poland, which the Pope and Solidarity 
had played a role in securing. On December 1, 1981, before martial law was 
implemented, a memorandum for the president from Alexander Haig Jr. to President 
Reagan demonstrated US commitment to the cause on economic grounds, stating:  
As a result of Walesa’s public call for U.S. aid and private messages 
from Pope John Paul II, I am confident that our assistance can be 
presented and implemented in a way that not only minimizes the risk 
of Soviet intervention or counteraction but enhances the already 
formidable power of Solidarity and the Church.260 
 
Here Haig conflates the power of Solidarity and the Church as one, and mentions Walesa 
and Pope John Paul II in the same sentiment. This suggests that Haig viewed the two men 
and the two organizations as one, lending power to the Solidarity movement. A week 
before this message, Washington had authorized $30 million of food to be sent to the 
people of Poland. Here Haig is proposing an additional aid package of $100 million and a 
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long-term multilateral program of up to $2.5 billion. After martial law was imposed, 
Reagan established an economic embargo on Poland, but with an exception for 
humanitarian aid. In January, his administration announced it would help Poland avoid 
defaulting on loans to the West. 
On December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski shut down all the private phone lines in the 
country, declared a “state of war”, and imposed martial law. The initiation of martial law 
surprised both Solidarity and the West, and there was no significant resistance. 
Roadblocks were set up, and Solidarity leaders, including Walesa, were arrested. In 
response, the Pope held a prayer vigil in St. Peter’s Square. He alluded to Solidarity’s 
informal motto “So that Poland shall be Poland.”261 The next day, when 1,300 coal miners 
barricaded themselves in the “Piast” mine in protest, violence ensued. An assault on 
December 16 resulted in the deaths of nine miners and four security personnel and more 
than forty injuries. A few days later on December 18, 1981, Pope John Paul II wrote to 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Chairman of the Military Council of National Salvation 
(WRON), to appeal to him to remove martial law from Poland. The WRON was a 
military junta administering the People’s Republic of Poland during the period of martial 
law from 1981 to 1983. Copies of the letter were also sent to Walesa and church 
leadership on the ground, including Cardinal Glemp and Cardinal Macharski. In the 
letter, John Paul II states that he will also inform the ambassadors to the Vatican, which 
included the American ambassador. The pope wrote to the General “with an urgent 
request and also a passionate invocation to cease operation, which carry with them the 
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shedding of Polish blood.”262 He continued:    
This right is being demanded by the entire nation. Also demanding it 
is the opinion of the entire world, all societies who correctly connect 
the matter of peace with respect for human rights and the right of 
nations. Universal desires for peace call for this, in order that martial 
law not be continued in Poland.263 
Again, the Pope, a figure of spiritual authority, appealed to “human rights” and the 
“rights of nations”. He was clearly comfortable in the post-Westphalian context. Also, by 
threatening to inform the ambassadors of the Vatican, he perhaps betrayed an awareness 
of his power as an international leader with strong allies. After the imposition of martial 
law, the US continued to operate on the mistaken assumption that Soviet invasion was 
still a real probability and that Jaruzelski was Moscow’s puppet. 
 On December 20, 1981, a Discussion Paper From Executive Secretary, NSC to 
US Executive Office of the President, Signatory L. Paul Bremer III reads:  
US/Allied Responses to Developments in Poland  
In order to prevent further deterioration in Poland, establish the 
conditions for reconciliation which would preserve the gains and 
prospect of reform, and deter the Soviet Union from further 
interference, we are confronted with the necessity to begin to make 
difficult choices vis-à-vis both Warsaw and Moscow. These actions 
would be taken unilaterally as well as within NATO and with other 
key nations. Other actions which could be taken within a matter of 
days…  
6) Seek Papal visit to Warsaw264  
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US leadership again sought a papal visit in order to deter aggression on the part of the 
Soviet Union. As much as the Pope benefited from his US alliance in that it conferred 
legitimacy upon Solidarity, the US benefited from the relationship because he represented 
the possibility of a peaceful path forward in a volatile Cold War front situation.   
On December 21, 1981, there are two documents of note. The first is an “Internal 
Memorandum in the US International Communications Agency. Subject: US Response to 
Polish Crisis”, which reads:  
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the US position on the 
Polish crisis and identify ways of expressing that position 
internationally…. Thirty-three proposals for Presidential, diplomatic 
and private sector action were recommended…  
Proposals  
32. That the President send Cardinal Krol on a special mission to the 
Vatican to consult on the crisis. 265 
 
John Joseph Krol was an American prelate of the Catholic Church, and at the time 
was archbishop of Philadelphia. US plans to seek the Pope’s informal opinion, or at the 
least his willingness to go along with their position on the crisis again highlights the 
influence John Paul II held in the international community. The second document, a State 
Department cable, also on December 21, 1981, is addressed: “From Amembassy Vienna 
To Secstate WashDC” with the subject “Kreisky calls the world situation dangerous.” 
The document reads:  
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1. Chancellor Bruno Kreisky asserted in a Vienna press conference 
Dec. 18th that the developments in Poland have played a major role in 
bringing about the most dangerous world situation since 1945…  
2. “…Adding that in considering the chances for a return to normalcy 
in Poland he (Kreisky) was placing hope in the moral significance of 
the Roman Catholic Church in Poland.266  
 
This document demonstrates another Western leader seeking a political path forward in 
Poland through the “moral significance” of the Church, but it also raises the question of 
“normalcy.” It seems to suggest that the Austrian Chancellor was in favor of stability in 
Poland, which did not necessarily translate into democratic regime change. 
On December 22, 1981, an internal State Department document entitled “To: The 
Secretary… From: EUR - H. Allen Holmes, Acting” with the subject “Poland – 
Additional Bold Initiative for NSC”267 reads:  
None of the steps we have taken so far vis-a-vis Poland have been at 
the level of boldness and drama which is required… The President 
could travel to Paris next week to meet with Mitterrand, Thatcher, 
Schmidt and Spadolini. The Big Five could in a single focus world 
attention on the moral and historical significance of developments in 
Poland. They could attend mass for the Polish people in Notre Dame 
Cathedral, issue a common statement directed to Brezhnev and 
Jaruzelski and in general dramatize the fact that the Western alliance 
is based on values as well as military might.268 
 
This meaning of this letter can be interpreted in various ways. It could demonstrate that 
the Western world was willing to communicate a message based on values, even to the 
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extent of planning for Western leaders to attend a mass at Notre Dame Cathedral. Such an 
event would support the Pope’s vision of the role of Catholicism in supporting the 
Solidarity movement, and more broadly, Judeo-Christian values in supporting an end to 
Communism in Eastern Europe. Or this State Department document could be an attempt 
to use the moral authority of a Catholic mass to advance predetermined political ends, 
namely promotion of stability, prevention of further Soviet advancement in the region, 
and the avoidance of bloodshed. 
 On December 29, 1981, there is a State Department cable entitled, “To: Office of 
the Secretary of State; From: EUR- Lawrence S. Eagleburger, with the subject “Poland—
Three Initiatives for You to Take” which reads:  
One of the greatest dangers we face over the next few months is that a 
possible lack of dramatic events in Poland could lead Europeans (and 
Americans) to lose interest…  
In addition to the measures we are already taking, there are three new 
initiatives we recommend:  
1. Galvanizing the Churches in the U.S. and Europe. As you know we 
have a general problem with the churches both here and in Europe, 
i.e., El Salvador, anti-INF deployment, etc. The Polish situation 
provides an opportunity to launch a dialogue, to work together on 
Poland and gradually to try to bring them into a more realistic overall 
framework. As a first step, I recommend that you agree to see the 
leadership of the major American church organizations as soon as we 
can organize a meeting next week. You could urge them inter alia to 
use their extensive contacts with European churches to keep attention 
focused on Poland.  
 
            (Note that this recommendation was marked “Approve” by the secretary.)269  
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This document can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, it could be an 
example of the US government encouraging Western society to use religion as a means of 
political expression and a demonstration of political strength. This varies from the 
example of a mass at Notre Dame, which was more focused on a moral message. The 
proposed meeting acknowledges the grassroots organizing power and soft power of 
churches internationally. In the Cold War, informal networks between churches presented 
a possible antidote to stalemate. On the other hand, the “more realistic overall 
framework” is likely a projected path for Pole to accept communism peacefully and to 
keep Europe stable as it is. This would be in keeping with the reference to the “problem” 
churches present in opposing Communist regimes in Latin America. They were creating 
trouble for the US in the region by pursuing democratic freedoms by threatening the 
status quo. 
 On January 22, 1981, a State Department Memo, entitled “A Positive U.S. 
Initiative for a Free Poland”, reads:  
… II Recommended Policy  
It will obviously be difficult to attempt any significant policy 
initiatives so long as martial law is in effect. However, it is 
recommended that a well-conceived strategy be developed, which can 
be implemented once martial law is relaxed or terminated.  
The Policy recommendation can be stated as follows: 
 ..the Administration should develop a sound plan… aimed at subtly 
strengthening free market forces, private ownership of land, worker 
ownership and self- management of industry, decentralized economic 
(and ultimately political) decision- making, agricultural productivity, 
and ultimate integration of Poland into the relatively free market 
economies of the OECD…  
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III Supporting Arguments  
d) The program is strongly rooted in Catholic social thought, notably 
the principles of personalism, subsidiary and pluralism set forth in 
Quadregesimo Anno (1941) and Laborem Exercens (1981). The 1981 
Encyclical, for example, states “A way toward that goal (of helping 
workers to share in ownership) could be found by associating labor 
with the ownership of capital, as far as possible, and by producing a 
wide range of intermediate bodies with economic, social and cultural 
purposes; they would be bodies enjoying real autonomy with regard to 
the public powers, pursuing their specific aims in honest collaboration 
with each other and in subordination to the demands of the common 
good, and they would be living communities both in form and in 
substance in the sense that the members of each body would be 
looked upon and treated as persons and encouraged to take an active 
part in the life of the body.” (Paragraph 14.)270  
 
This document can also hold different interpretations. It could be notable because the US 
State Department is supporting an economic recovery plan for Poland rooted in Catholic 
social thought, or at least written in the language of Catholic social thought to create 
political buy in. There seems to be an acknowledgement that using Catholic principles 
will empower Polish workers, much the same way the Pope employed Catholic language 
to spur mobilization. However, this is not necessarily an acknowledgement of the 
importance of Catholic social teaching in lessening communism. It could rather be 
interpreted as an acknowledgement of Roman Catholicism and the pope as a valuable 
tool in promoting US foreign policy of status quo and stability in Poland. 
John Paul II delivered a World Day of Peace speech on New Year’s Day 1982, 
when he denounced the “false peace of totalitarian regimes.” At the Angelus that day he 
thanked all those who were praying for Poland because what was at stake as 
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“important… not only for a single country, but for the history of man.”271 Pope John Paul 
II again alludes to the right of nations to self-determination and the good of democracy, 
but he places it in a broader theological context of what is good for man.  Another theme 
runs through his homilies and writings, which is that Poland will lead the way spiritually 
for the rest of Europe. In John Paul II’s worldview, Poland’s self-determination as a 
nation state was critical to her ability to evangelize the rest of the continent. 
The year 1982 is analyzed in two National Intelligence Documents. The Special 
National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 12.6-82) dated March 25, 1982, entitled “Poland’s 
Prospects over the Next 12 to 18 Months”, read:  
16. With Solidarity suspended, the Polish Roman Catholic Church 
once again becomes the primary defender of the population against 
the regime. But it too is on the defensive. Despite its vast moral 
authority, its political power is limited. The Church is most concerned 
about preventing bloodshed and a Soviet military intervention; 
consequently it has avoided becoming the focal point of active 
resistance to martial law. The regime counts on this self-limitation and 
thus believes it can ignore many of the demands of the Church, 
although it is also apprehensive of Church influence-especially at 
lower levels… 
18. A key event in Church-state relations this year and perhaps an 
important sign of how the regime intends to structure its relations with 
the Polish people will be the projected visit of Pope John Paul II to 
Poland in August to commemorate the 600th anniversary  of Poland’s 
holiest shrine, that of Our Lady of Czestochowa. The Pope probably 
has reservations about coming to Poland out of fear of bestowing 
legitimacy on the martial law regime or of being blamed for incidents 
or provocations during his trip. The regime also undoubtedly has 
serious doubts about letting the visit take place. While a papal visit 
could marginally enhance the regime’s image, it could more 
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importantly boost public morale and strengthen resistance. The 
Soviets, who blame the rise of Solidarity partly on the Pope’s 1979 
visit, reportedly oppose his returning this year.272 
 
This document reflects the continued complicated relationship between Church, regime, 
and Solidarity. It clearly observes that the Church, in its avoidance of unnecessary 
bloodshed, “has avoided becoming the focal point of active resistance to martial law.” 
This is just another piece of evidence that the Church gave support to both Solidarity and 
the regime at separate times during the 1980–1981. It notes the detrimental effect upon 
the regime of the Pope’s 1979 visit and their reluctance to relive that experience in a 
celebration of the 600th anniversary of the shrine of Our Lady of Czestochowa. It also 
mentions a potential fear on the part of the Pope of bestowing legitimacy on a martial law 
regime through a papal visit. Even a decision to celebrate the anniversary of Our Lady of 
Czestochowa was complicated for John Paul II as the head of an international 
organization with a transnational message within a Communist context. Even when his 
theological aim (to strengthen the Catholic identity of Poles) and political aim (to 
strengthen Solidarity while avoiding bloodshed) were clear, the means to achieve them 
were both enabled and complicated by his geopolitical significance.  
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The Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 12.6-82) dated August 30, 
1982, entitled, “Poland’s Prospects over the Next 12 to 18 Months”, reads:  
The Catholic Church  
30. Under martial law the Church has retained its traditional role as 
broker between the regime and society. Its official position has been 
largely determined by the view, as articulated by Archbishop Primate 
Glemp, that the Jaruzelski regime is preferable to any likely 
alternative and that violence therefore should be avoided to protect 
society and the country from greater peril. The Church’s behavior has 
also been motivated by its desire to preserve the concessions won for 
it largely by Solidarity in the past two years.  
31. The Catholic Church occupies a special place in Jaruzelski’s 
designs, and his attitude toward it probably illustrates his willingness 
to compromise. Recognizing the Church’s moral authority as well as 
its enhanced political influence now that Solidarity has been forced 
underground. Jaruzelski has not only exempted the Church from the 
strictures of martial law but also left intact most of the gains it made 
after August 1980…  
34. Pope John Paul II has also reportedly been less than satisfied with 
Glemp’s inability to stand up to the regime more forcefully. But for 
the sake of Church unity, the Pope, too, has acquiesced in the role the 
Church has played under Glemp in trying to calm passions. 
Apparently similar considerations also made him agree to postpone 
his planned trip to Poland until sometime next year. We do not 
anticipate a significant change in church-state relations in the coming 
months. Despite signs of growing apprehension about Glemp’s 
ineffectual leadership, the Church officials will continue to use their 
periodic contacts with the regime to press for the release of internees, 
amnesty for those arrested and imprisoned, and for lifting martial law. 
In fact, these contacts, which have taken place largely behind the 
scenes, will probably constitute the only dialogue that can be expected 
between the Jaruzelski regime and society in the foreseeable future.273 
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The degree to which this NIE analyzes church actors and internal dynamic speaks to the 
importance the US intelligence community placed upon the role of the Church in 
mediating Communism in Poland. This document identifies the behind the scenes 
dialogue between the Church and the regime as the “only dialogue” occurring. It 
highlights John Paul II’s two roles. As head of an international organization, his decision 
to visit or not visit Poland impacted the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. As head of a 
transnational organization operating in a national context, his decision to visit or not visit 
would impact nationalist sentiment and potentially cause unrest. This document also 
clearly states that at this point, the Church preferred the Jaruzelski regime to “any likely 
alternative” and that violence “should be avoided to protect society.” This highlights one 
of many moments when the Church actually supported the regime in order to avoid 
bloodshed and preserve even moderate amounts of concessions won by Solidarity over 
the past two years.  
The Fall of Communism in Poland 
In the summer of 1989, Gorbachev wrote to the pope and requested a visit.274 On 
December 1, 1989, he visited the Vatican, the first time a Russian leader had visited the 
pope in over a century and the first visit by a Soviet head of state. Gorbachev recounts the 
conversation in his memoirs. He writes: 
…I noted that there were many identical terms in my statements and 
his. ‘This means that we must also have something in common “at the 
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source” – in our ideas,’ I said. As if in reply to my thoughts, John Paul 
II referred to perestroika as a process that ‘allows us to search jointly 
for a new dimension of co-existence between people that will be 
better adapted to the needs of the individual, of different people, to the 
rights of individuals and nations. ‘The efforts you undertake,’ he 
continued, ‘are not merely of great interest for us. We share them.’ He 
pointed out another important idea: ‘No-one should claim that the 
changes in Europe and the world happen according to the Western 
model. This is contrary to my profound convictions. Europe must 
breathe with both its lungs.’ ‘This is a very precise image,’ I replied.275  
 
The two leaders also address the topic of freedom of conscience and freedom of worship, 
topics on which Pope John Paul II was concerned with the status of Catholics in the 
USSR. On this, Gorbachev writes: 
I explained my approach to these issues. ‘We intend to realize our 
plans by democratic means,’ I said. ‘However, I have been thinking 
about the developments of the past years and have come to the 
conclusion that democracy alone is not enough. We also need 
morality. Democracy can bring both good and evil – there is not 
denying it. You have what you have. For us, it is essential that 
morality should become firmly established in society – such universal, 
eternal values as goodness, mercy, mutual aid. We start from the 
principle that the faith of believers must be respected. This applies 
both to Orthodox believers and to representatives of other religions, 
including Catholics.’ We agreed in principle to establish official ties, 
and to exchange permanent representatives between the Vatican and 
Moscow.276  
 
Weigel recounts the meeting in his biography of Pope John Paul II as well. According to 
Weigel, the Soviet President and the Pope talked for an hour and a half, a half-hour 
longer than expected. When the meeting concluded, they came out of the papal library to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 508–509. 
276 Ibid., 509. 
116 
	  
	  
make final statements to the press. “John Paul’s hands were trembling with emotion when 
he came to the podium to deliver his formal address of greeting.”277 The Pope made a 
formal appeal for improved religious freedom in the USSR, and referenced the Helsinki 
Final Act as support for its necessity. He said that he expected “the law on freedom of 
conscience soon to be discussed by the Supreme Soviet will help to guarantee to all 
believers the full exercise of the right to religious freedom.”278 The Pope also “looked 
forward to the birth of a new humanism, a new ‘concern for man,’ that would in turn give 
birth to a ‘universal solidarity.’”279 In an unexpected move at the end of his statement, 
Gorbachev invited the Pope to visit the Soviet Union, one of many dramatic moments 
during the historic meeting. Weigel called the meeting “an act of surrender” on 
Gorbachev’s part, and claimed that “the curtain has been run down on the drama of 
atheistic humanism.”280 
Ultimately the Communist government was forced to negotiate. The Round Table 
Talks led to semi-free elections in 1989 and a Solidarity-led coalition government. In 
December, 1990, Walesa was elected President. From the very beginning of the Gdansk 
strike, “the imagery of the Church was everywhere.”281 Although the Church had a rich 
symbolic presence in the movement, the Solidarity union itself, as a social movement, is 
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secular and politically unrelated to the Church. However, there is “evidence for arguing 
that without the Church, and, in particular, without the example set by the Church in how 
to resist incorporation by a one-party State, Solidarity could not have come into 
existence.”282 The movement had some philosophical roots in the Catholic tradition. For 
example, the 1987 encyclical Solicitudo Rei Socialis, John Paul II identifies the concept 
of solidarity with the poor as a constitutive element of the Gospel. The Church kept 
Polish national culture and identity alive when Poland was divided and ruled by the 
German, Hapsburg, and Russian empires. According to MacShane, the Church offered a 
spiritual national identity that provided solace to a people whose political self-expression 
was denied by the foreign occupier.”283 Through the 1979 trip and subsequent trips in 
1983 and 1987, the pope made two contributions to the defeat of Communism in Poland: 
1) he offered people a safe place to meet, which led to the creation of a new civil society 
and 2) he offered them an alternate intellectual worldview.284 
Solidarity ultimately led to the upheaval of Communism in Poland, and it 
contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union.  Solidarity intensified the spread of non-
Communist ideals and movements throughout the countries of the Eastern Bloc, 
weakening their Communist governments. The Polish roundtable talks were held 
February 6 to April 5, 1989, during which the government initiated talks with Solidarity 
and other opposition groups in order to calm social unrest. The result was a dramatic 
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redefinition of Polish government. Political power was vested in a bicameral legislature 
and in a president. Solidarity became a legal political party. Free elections to 35% of the 
seats in the Sejm and 100% of the seats in the newly created Senate was assured. The 
Polish legislative elections of 1989 took place on June 4 and June 18. The elections 
brought major, unexpected victory to Solidarity. Solidarity won 99% of the seats in the 
Senate and the Sejm, taking 160 of the 161 seats eligible. Despite the resounding success, 
65% of the seats remained divided between the Communist party and its satellite parties. 
This election enabled democratically elected representative to gain real power. It made 
possible Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s cabinet and a peaceful transition to democracy. The full 
democratic transition happened after the Polish parliamentary elections of 1991. These 
elections in Poland, in which non-Communist candidates won significantly, inspired a 
series of peaceful anti-Communist revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Aspects of 
Solidarity were copied by groups opposing Communism throughout the Eastern Bloc, 
eventually leading to the downfall of the Soviet Union.  
But Solidarity may not have happened without the pope. Lech Walesa confirmed 
the Pope's influence, saying, “The Holy Father, through his meetings, demonstrated how 
numerous we were. He told us not to be afraid.”285  Garton Ash put it this way, "Without 
the Pope, no Solidarity. Without Solidarity, no Gorbachev. Without Gorbachev, no fall of 
Communism."286 Regarding the fall of Communism, Gorbachev has also stated: “It would 
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have been impossible without the Pope."287 Solidarity’s rise to political power ultimately 
led to the upheaval of Communism in Poland, and arguably to the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Solidarity intensified the spread of anti-Communist ideals and movements 
throughout the countries of the Eastern Bloc, weakening their Communist governments. 
These elections in June 1989 elections in Poland inspired a series of peaceful anti-
Communist revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Aspects of Solidarity were copied 
by groups opposing Communism throughout the Eastern Bloc, eventually leading to the 
downfall of the Soviet Union. 
Meaning to Hypothesized Causal Relationship 
 Pope John Paul II’s challenge to the existing political order in Poland can be 
parsed into the variables of the central hypothesized causal relationships. The 
characteristics to be tested of the transnational religious leader are broken into four 
categories: leadership style, hard versus soft power, relationship to the secularized state, 
and relationship to modernity. The characteristics to be tested of the transnational social 
movement related to Pope John Paul II, Solidarity, can also be broken into four 
categories: political theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, and 
nature of activism. 
 John Paul II had a transformational leadership style, putting Poles in touch with 
an identity that transcended the Communist state. He also voiced the ideals of the 
Solidarity movement and the Polish people on the world stage, and he inspired people 
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around the world to feel as though they too were part of the Solidarity movement. Both 
the activity and dialogical approach to leadership are present in this case. John Paul II 
clearly exercised public leadership through his diplomatic actions, public speeches and 
written statements, and world travels. But his success is best measured in people’s 
responses to him. Within Poland, Lech Walesa, Cardinal Wyszynski, and other local 
actors coordinated the logistics of the movement. On the world stage, leaders like 
President Carter, President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher, and even ultimately 
Gorbachev responded through diplomatic visits, public statements, and private 
correspondence. John Paul’s leadership inspired people in the Solidarity movement to 
achieve things even beyond his own vision. After his death, John Paul II was remembered 
fondly by many. His legacy and written works still impact Catholic theology worldwide 
and Polish Catholic identity. He is still lionized for his role in democratizing Poland. 
 The Polish pope wielded soft power. His ability to make individuals, groups, and 
states “want” to act in accordance with his agenda was evident on many levels. World 
leaders sought to leverage their relationship with him, as chief of the Vatican and pastor 
to the Polish Catholic community, to advance their own agenda. Yet in their 
correspondence with him, there also a sense of respect and openness. The Solidarity 
movement, though rooted in a non-Catholic intellectual movement, was inspired by his 
spoken and written word. Masses of Poles came to be near him during his pilgrimages. 
He spread theological ideas, values and norms that had political consequences. Although 
he did not hold hard power, he had a political sense of the how leaders operated in a 
realist world. He knew that the United States and other militarily strong Western 
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countries needed to be behind the agenda of democratization in Poland. He seemed to be 
aware of the importance of cultivating allies among great powers, especially in the West, 
and yet he rejected a purely realist view of world politics. The Pope’s “soft power” was 
his dominant hand. It gave him the ability to share a vision of man, God, society, and 
state that shaped world history. 
 Pope John Paul II does not fit into Juergensmeyer’s category of “religious 
nationalists” who “appear… to be responding in a religious way to a political 
situation”.288 Although he was a religious nationalist in the sense of believing that God’s 
relationship with man drives human history, he was not against the secular state. He stood 
for religious freedom, but was not advocating for a Polish theocracy or a government 
founded on strict religious principles. He clearly accepted the post-Westphalian world 
order of secular states, but he rejected the Communist interpretation of the secular state. 
Denomination may have played a role in this, as many argue that the Roman Catholic 
Church has adapted to the modern world order of secular states more readily after 
Westphalia than did the global Islamic community. Although John Paul II saw man’s 
dignity and associated rights as rooted in his relationship with God, he accepted the 
legitimacy and authority of the state to protect and respect that dignity. 
 The Pope’s relationship with modernity was equally complex. He accepted 
modernity in the world order of sovereign nation states. However, he clearly rejected the 
modernization of public morality as it relates to a secularized society. For example, his 
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acceptance of the secular state and the modern society did not change his traditional 
stances on Catholic moral issues, such as homosexuality, contraception, or abortion. In 
other words, to Pope John Paul II, a secular state could be supported, so long as it 
protected the freedom of religious expression and rejected a dominant “modern” 
secularization agenda. He led a worldwide institution that promoted religious expression, 
religious belief, church attendance and even a strong role of religion in public life. He did 
not believe that a secular state necessarily made a secular society necessary. John Paul II, 
in his extensive travels and leadership of the global Catholic Church, was in touch with 
different cultural programs of modernity, and operated in the world described by 
Eisenstadt’s “multiple modernities.” He was well known for his deep respect for cultures 
around the globe, which, evocative of his young days in theater, he displayed by kissing 
the ground of each country he visited. Religion, modernity, and the secular state could 
coexist for John Paul. 
 The first characteristic of Solidarity, the social movement related to Pope John 
Paul II, is political theology. Toft, Philpott and Shah refer to political theology as “the set 
of ideas that a religious community holds about political authority and justice.”289 These 
ideas can be purely political in nature, yet communicated and used to mobilize people 
through religious terms. Or they can be theologically rooted. In Pope John Paul II’s case, 
his vision for man and his relationship with society was rooted in the Bible and Roman 
Catholic tradition. However, he found a way to reconcile the primacy of man’s 
relationship with God with the secular, democratic state. For him the role of the state was 
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to protect freedom of religion and promote human dignity through opportunity. This view 
could be held concurrent with the spread of Western democracy and the aim of defeating 
Communism, very political ideas. Thus, while John Paul’s view of man may have been 
biblical, ultimately his theology was used to promote a very specific political message in 
Poland and to impact regime change.  
 The second characteristic of the transnational social movement is “mobilizing 
structures”, which include “everyday life patterns upon which movements build 
collective action.” The Solidarity movement is a clear example of a social movement, 
according to Neidhart and Rucht’s definition of a social movement as “an organized and 
sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups, and organizations to 
promote or resist social change with the use of public protest activities.”290 It began with a 
collection of economically and culturally dissatisfied shipyard workers in Gdansk and 
grew into a popular labor movement in Poland supported by citizens and world leaders 
internationally. Solidarity used strikes and public protest activities to impact regime 
change over the course of several years. As the movement grew in Poland, it gained an 
increasingly transnational support base. This support across state lines ultimately 
translated into legitimacy for Solidarity as a movement and for a newly democratic 
Poland. The Church also played an important role on the ground in creating meeting 
spaces and other logistical support for the Solidarity movement. Church leaders often 
acted as in a diplomatic capacity in meetings between Soviet authorities and Solidarity 
leadership. 
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A social movement’s political opportunity structures capture the relationship 
between the state and the social movement, in this case between the Communist Poland 
and Solidarity. The institutionalized political system was closed and elites were rewarded 
for buy-in to the Soviet system. Elite allies internationally provided the largest political 
opportunity for the social movement. The state had a high capacity and propensity for 
repression. The rise of Solidarity at first benefited from international political opportunity 
structures, in part created by the pope, as international opinion surged in their favor. 
Ultimately however, regime change had to be achieved through domestic political 
opportunities. The worker’s strikes in May and August of 1988, coupled with worldwide 
pressure, led the Communist regime to recognize Solidarity. This led to the Round Table 
Agreement in 1989, which recognized Solidarity as a legal political party and guaranteed 
free elections for 35% of seats in in Sejm and 100% of seats in the newly formed Senate. 
The June 4, 1989 elections inspired the “Revolutions of 1989” in other parts of Eastern 
Europe. As domestic political opportunities were created, the democratization process 
was reinforced on the international level, exemplified by Pope John Paul II receiving 
Lech Walesa in Rome after the Roundtable Agreement was signed. 
 The fourth characteristic of a transnational social movement is the character of 
activism. Tarrow defines transnational activists as “individuals and groups who mobilize 
domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of 
external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with 
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transnational allies.”291 The Solidarity movement was comprised of Polish members, but 
also international supporters, ranging from people associated with the Catholic Church to 
the anti-Soviet left and the anti-Soviet right. But on all levels of activism, Solidarity was 
nonviolent in nature. It was a nonviolent social movement with the backing of 
international nation state allies that democratized Poland. It was communicated in 
nonviolent terms, and sometimes couched in theological language. Meetings were held 
secretly in churches, and the clergy often participated. Religious symbolism was a part of 
public gatherings and protests. The ideology behind the transnational aspect of the 
Solidarity movement incorporated both Catholic theology and a support for democracy. 
Solidarity as a labor movement survives today. Though its influence has been lessened, it 
will always be well known for its role in bringing down Communism in Poland. 
Meaning to Regime Change  
Meaning to regime change can be examined through 1) Pope John Paul II’s goals 
for the Polish regime and their relation to Westphalian principles 2) the impact he had 
upon regime change and its strength as an indicator of challenged conceptions of state 
sovereignty. In terms of the first meaning, regime change goals, the actual intention 
behind and definition of Pope John Paul II’s political goals is difficult to pin point. 
Perhaps his political goals are best understood through his theological goals. Weigel 
writes: 
Realism in international relations theory read history as a realm of 
amorality. History was a butcher’s block, Hegel had argued. Wojtyla, 
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again, disagreed. In his Christian-Polish view, history was best read 
through the prism of moral analysis, and viewed through that prism, 
the subjugation of the nations within Stalin’s external and internal 
empires was a moral catastrophe.292  
 
The Communist state was understood as amoral by John Paul II, and he perceived its 
weaknesses. Weigel continues: 
This Pope, however, had measured communism’s weaknesses as well 
as its apparent strengths. And he knew that cultural resistance could 
be an effective antidote to the seemingly impregnable position of a 
criminal state.293 
 
It is clear from the US intelligence documents reviewed thus far from 1980–1982 that the 
Church on the ground in Poland alternatively and sometime simultaneously supported 
Solidarity and the Communist regime, often with the motivation of avoiding bloodshed 
and preserving the modest achievements the Solidarity movement had already gained. 
However, the Pope’s public statements and private correspondences seem to suggest that 
he favored the replacement of the Communist regime with a form of government that 
respected religious freedoms. He certainly was in support of a post-Westphalian world, 
and he believed in the principle of non-intervention and a state’s authority within its own 
borders. But it is not clear that he accepted the Communist regime in Poland as 
legitimate, and in fact, worked what public channels that were available to him to subtly 
promote Solidarity, so long as it did not entail further bloodshed. Perhaps his aims were 
solely theological, but the writings and speeches in support of those aims spelled out a 
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particular political consequence – moderate steps towards nonviolent regime replacement 
or internal political reform in Poland. This was not inconsistent with his understanding of 
Westphalia. Because his vision of the nation of Poland and the Polish people predated 
communism, he reforms were aimed at the nation, from which reforms to the state would 
follow. 
This case study offers a process driven narrative of regime change through the use 
of primary sources, including US intelligence documents, papal correspondence to world 
leaders, memoirs of the pope’s contemporary world leaders, and papal statements. Pope 
John Paul II and his transnational Solidarity movement caused a response from nation 
states, contributing to regime change. In the relationships hypothesized, regime change is 
an indicator, standing between the transnational religious leader and challenged 
conceptions of state sovereignty. The strength of regime change as an indicator can be 
related to Krasner’s delineation between structural, modified structural or Grotian 
perspectives on regime change as an intervening variable. The Communist political 
regime was clearly impacted by the presence of Pope John Paul II as a transnational 
religious leader and as a leader of a transnational Solidarity movement. The regime was 
impacted on the ground as clergy participated in and offered church space for Solidarity 
meetings. Church officials often played the role of negotiator between the Communist 
leadership and Solidarity members. Although the prominent role of John Paul II as a 
world leader and diplomat threatened basic models of international relations as consisting 
of a world of sovereign states with control over their own territory, the transnational 
support for the Solidarity movement resulted in the establishment of a democratic, 
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internationally respected sovereign state. Because the Pope did not seek to overhaul the 
Westphalian system, his contributions to specific regime change in Poland are an 
important component to analyzing how he impacted sovereignty. The regime change, 
although weakening the Communist state’s control over movement within its borders, 
actually strengthened state sovereignty in Poland by creating a reformed state whose 
power had legitimacy in the eyes of the world. Regime change was critical as an 
intervening variable in this case, and the steps taken towards democratization through 
non-violent means, actually reaffirmed the modern system of sovereign states.  
Owen’s theories on the clash of ideas in world politics offer a useful framework to 
further study the role of regime change in impacting sovereignty. His micro-level 
hypothesis includes regime instability and great-power war as causes of transnational 
ideological polarization, which he defines as a process in which “the progressive 
segregation of elites across states are simplified and intensified.”294 This transnational 
ideological polarization, in turn causes on the macro level, a transnational regime contest, 
which according to Owen, will always endure until one regime type suggest that vastly 
superior on terms all elites accept.295 On the macro-level, there were warring ideologies in 
this case study, including the West versus Communism, and religious freedoms versus 
the strict forms of the secular state, among others. Owen’s basic causal framework 
applies readily to this case study in that as the ideological axis became weightier and 
transnational, political preferences on the ground became simplified and intensified. The 
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course of contention followed an expected pattern, as the great power players diversified 
internationally, the movement on the ground also become increasingly transnational. The 
Communist Polish regime became increasingly unstable due to the protest politics of 
Solidarity on the ground and the shift of international opinion in its support around the 
world. This instability was exacerbated by the increased buy-in of Western countries, 
particularly the US, a process that was significantly aided by the efforts of Pope John 
Paul II.  
 Solidarity initially claimed to be non-political, campaigning for the reform of 
government, not its displacement. There were of course, other factors at play in the fall of 
Communism and the establishment of a democratic regime in Poland. Some argue that 
Solidarity was a convenient vehicle for grievances against the Communist regime that 
had already been in existence, and that any resistance movement arising at that time 
would have benefited from these preexisting tensions. Alternate reasons for the fall of 
Communism in Poland can be divided into long-term, short-term, and immediate reasons. 
Two long-term reasons included long standing hatred of Russia and antagonism between 
church and state.296 Anti-Russian sentiment existed long before the Cold War. The 
Church symbolized national identity so government abuse of the church mobilized people 
towards reform. Short-term reasons included problems with Russian authority created by 
the Cold War and economic grievances.297 The Cold War context intensified Russian 
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authority in Poland. The state’s inability to provide for its people was an important short-
term factor. The standard of living in Poland declined dramatically during the Cold War. 
The system was elite, not egalitarian in practice. Finally, the immediate reasons for the 
fall of Communism in Poland were Solidarity and a change in Russia’s foreign policy.298 
Russian policies beginning in the early 1980s undermined Communism in Poland. When 
Brezhnev died in ’82, the Soviets cracked down on corruption in satellite states. 
Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and “perestroika” exposed Communist corruption. 
 These variables do not obscure Pope John Paul II’s impact, but merely 
contextualize his actions. These long term, short term, and immediate causes made the 
fall of Communism possible, but only in conjunction with the actions of the pope. Pope 
John Paul II made two essential contributions to regime change. First, as a pastor of a 
transnational community, he tapped into an older Polish identity that viewed Catholicism 
as a basis for nationhood, based on the history of oppression of the Catholic Church in 
Poland. He then used this identity to mobilize people toward political reform. Second, as 
leader of the international Catholic Church, he was an effective diplomat in representing 
not only the Church’s, but also Poland’s, interests on the world stage. The Pope’s 
contributions to the fall of Communism and the birth of a democracy in Poland were 
substantive enough that regime change would not have been possible, at least in the form 
that it took, without him. Regime change is a strong variable in analyzing how the pope 
challenged traditional and modern notions of state sovereignty. 
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Meaning to Sovereignty  
In analyzing the Pope’s contribution to sovereignty, one can apply his two roles- 
pastor and head of international organization. In his role as pastor, Pope John Paul II used 
his personality and moral authority to develop a soft power. He mobilized millions of 
Poles to create a new national consciousness and identity that was not reliant upon 
communism. His teachings and public messages indirectly encouraged their participation 
in Solidarity. In this sense, he gave moral legitimacy to the Solidarity movement, thus 
ultimately contributing to the fall of Communism in Poland. In his role of head of the 
institution of the church, his positive relationship with US leadership engendered a 
positive world opinion for his interventions in Poland, even though John Paul himself 
may not have viewed it this way. In this sense, the Pope directed the approval of the 
international community and the Western world towards the Solidarity movement. He 
comfortably operated within a Westphalian international order with respect for state 
sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention by working for non-violent, internal 
political reform in Communist Poland. He worked toward a more peaceful world system.  
In both roles, the pope was balancing his transnational role as head of the church, 
as both a pastoral and institutional leader, with the need to implement his vision in a 
specifically national, i.e. Polish, context. Byrnes writes of a trend relevant both to Soviet 
times and to the Pope’s later papacy: “Central components of the political role of the 
Pope’s transnational church have to be carried out within very specific national settings 
by elements of the Catholic Church over which he has something less than total 
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control.”299 This raises a question about John Paul’s two roles. How cohesively could “the 
Church” as an international organization, act within the confines of a specific nation?    
Byrne writes that the Catholic Church’s prominent role in Polish society is the 
result of three historical developments:   
…the baptism of Duke Mieszko I in 966; the close identification of 
the church with Polish nationalism during the partitions, occupations, 
and externally imposed governments of the past two centuries; and the 
creation of a nearly homogeneous Catholic nation through the murder 
and expulsion of Jews and through the ethnic migrations resulting 
from Stalin’s movement of the Polish state westward in the late 
1940s.300 
Ewa Morawska brands the church the “traditional carrier of Polish civil religion” and the 
“major public spokesman for Polish civil society.”301 Both writers believe the Catholic 
Church, within the context of the Polish Catholic church, was a protector and carrier of 
Polish nationalism during difficult times in Polish history. Byrne also points specifically 
to the experiences of suffering of Catholic clergy in Poland during the Second World 
War, which created a strong relationship between the clergy and the people, a 
relationship that became important when it was time to oppose communism.302 Garton 
Ash writes, “The Church, the insurrectionary tradition, the cultural work of the 
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intelligentsia and romantic Messianism forged what can best be described as the Polish 
national conscience.”303  
This national conscience was also preserved by the Church during the Soviet era 
in Poland. The role of the church in opposing communism, though inconsistent, was both 
symbolic and concrete. It was concrete in that the church offered space for meetings for 
political organizing. The actions of the clergy were symbolically patriotic and 
nationalistic. The autonomy the church provided “came to form the basic frame of 
political opposition, picked up with much more fervor and purpose by Solidarity in the 
late 1970’s and throughout the 1980s.”304 Jan Kubik emphasized how John Paul II’s visit 
in spring 1979 reinforced and made visible the church’s “counterhegemonic subculture,” 
referring to its status as a kind of alternative Polish authority structure.305  When the pope 
made his pilgrimage to Poland, he tapped into this older, profound theological identity. 
Garton Ash describes the Poles as “an old European people with an unquenchable thirst 
for freedom; freedom in Polish means, in the first place, national independence; the 
Polish national identity is historically defined in opposition to Russia.”306 
After the fall of Communism, in the case of Poland and Eastern Europe, the 
Church no longer could play the complicated role of appeasing both Solidarity and the 
Communist regime, and it was searching for a new identity. Regardless of the Pope’s 
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level of commitment to the fall of Communism, when victory was achieved, the Church 
had to reorient itself to the new political realities of post-Communist Poland. The Church 
found it difficult to successfully negotiate issues like public education, abortion, and 
church-state relations in a new political context in the early 1990s. Although there was 
tension with some Poles who did not want to accept political direction from the Church, 
the church strongly defended what it believed should be its prominent role in Polish 
society. Pope John Paul II continued the same vision throughout the 1990s that he had 
under communism- a vision of Poland as a spiritual leader and heart of Europe. Byrnes 
explores the role national identity played among Polish bishops in the 1990’s, writing, 
“…as Poles themselves, the Polish bishops have reflexively shared the Pope’s vision, not 
only of Europe as a Christian civilization, but also of Poland the indispensable heart of 
that continental identity.”307 Byrnes expounds upon the Pope’s vision of Europe’s future, 
writing:  
“One can hear in the Pope’s speeches and statements on this question 
strong echoes of Cardinal Wyszynski’s notion of Poland as the 
“Christ of nations” that is determined to play a special, redemptive 
role in European history. Polish mythology holds that the Polish 
nation, repeatedly crucified on the cross of partition and occupation, 
will one day rise again at the center of Europe to serve as an example 
to, and a redeemer of, the rest of the continent.”308  
 
This kind of nationalist thinking was behind John Paul II’s declaration during his first 
visit to Poland in 1979 that it is “Christ’s will” that “this Polish Pope, this Slav Pope, 
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should at this precise moment manifest the spiritual unity of Christian Europe.”309 This 
kind of thinking is also “the basis for the Pope’s enduring conception of his church, and 
particularly his church in his Polish nation, as the essential foundation of Europe’s true 
and authentic unity.”310  John Paul II viewed Poland’s identity as fundamentally Christian, 
but he also understood the importance of nationalism and culture. The nationalist 
tendencies of Polish bishops and their interest in Polish matters is advantageous to the 
implementation of the Pope’s vision of a newly evangelized Christian Europe. Byrnes 
writes, “Transnationalism, in that sense, continues to operate through, and to be mediated 
by, the social and political structures of the new Republic of Poland.”311 
The paradox of the pope was that even as he successfully upheld Polish 
sovereignty in his efforts to liberate the nation from Communism, he threatened 
traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty by holding the power that he did as a 
transnational actor. This power took two forms. The first power resided in a cult of 
personality and even more so, the ability to transform how Polish people perceived 
themselves, as Poles and as humans. Garton Ash writes: “It is impossible to place an 
exact value on the transformation of consciousness wrought by the Polish Pope.”312 The 
second power resided in his close relationship with US leadership, which in a realist 
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sense, lent the power of global opinion to his actions. The United States sought to 
capitalize on the transformative power of the Pope, and the Pope’s messages to the Soviet 
Union had more weight behind them because of his international relationships. Yet, the 
Pope was no realist at heart. He believed that human spirituality and culture drove human 
history, and he advocated for a peaceful resolution to conflict, based in forgiveness. 
Speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1982, JPII described himself 
in these words: “This is the voice of one who has no interests nor political power, nor, 
even less, military force.”313  Although John Paul did not perceive his influence in 
political terms, he did wield political power. His theological principles were translated 
into political aims. His cult of personality in Poland was mobilized toward Solidarity and 
the political end of democracy. He was held in high regard by world leaders including in 
the Western world, including Carter and Reagan, a regard which could be translated into 
political influence.   
John Paul’s commitment to peace was rooted in a vision of Solidarity, “the 
unswerving and persevering commitment to the common good.”314 He attributes the fall 
of the Soviet Union to a moral victory, writing:  
The events of 1989 are an example of the success of willingness to 
negotiate and of the Gospel spirit in the face of an adversary 
determined not to be bound by moral principles. These events are a 
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warning to those who, in the name of political realism, wish to banish 
law and morality from the political arena.315  
 
During the Cold War, John Paul II practiced nonviolent strategies in the Polish 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. He believed the lessons he learned applied to 
international order:   
Many people learn to fight for justice without violence, renouncing 
class struggle in their internal disputes, and was in international 
ones… Just as the time has finally come when in individual states a 
system of private vendetta and reprisal has given way to the rule of 
law, so too a similar step forward is now urgently needed in the 
international system.316 
 
In the 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus, John Paul contributes to the development of 
the just war doctrine by “recasting (it)… within a more comprehensive theology of peace 
and reconciliation.”317 Traditional just war theory distinguished jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, describing moral conditions for entering war and how to fight war justly. John Paul 
contributed to a third condition, jus post bellum, or “the consideration of the 
consequences of a war and obligations all participants in a war have for rebuilding and 
for forgiveness.”318 He represents “his own Christ-centered spirituality as an alternative to 
the so-called realist approach that has typified his thinking about international affairs.”319 
He contributed to a new framework for a host of practical decisions about the use of 
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force, and he writes that the person who unites his own suffering to the suffering of 
Christ on the cross “is in a position to discern the often narrow path between the 
cowardice which gives in to evil and the violence, which, under the illusion of fighting 
evil, only makes it worse.”320 
The two-fold power to inspire Poles and to leverage the international community 
towards nonviolent internal political reform in Poland was much for one man to wield. 
According to classic definitions of Westphalian sovereignty, Pope John Paul II both 
accepted and challenged the Westphalian system. He contributed to the development of a 
democratic Poland. He easily accepted and operated within the Westphalian world order 
of secular states. A sustainable, democratic Poland, accountable to the Polish people and 
respected by states internationally, only served to strengthen the Westphalian system as a 
whole. He clearly believed in the nation-state system and in the principle of non-
intervention and sought to have it upheld on the Polish stage. However, he transformed 
Westphalian sovereignty as well. The weight of his individual influence upon Polish 
domestic politics posed a challenge to the Westphalian world in which states control the 
affairs within their own borders. 
Pope John Paul II took actions to support the birth of a democratic Poland with all 
four of Krasner’s categories of sovereignty – international legal, Westphalian, domestic, 
and interdependence. He wanted Poland to have the full benefits of a modern, secular 
state, including control over its territorial boundaries and recognition from other countries 
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with juridical independence. Yet, in his achievement of such a Poland, he built a strong, 
transnational network in support of the Solidarity movement and he mobilized people 
based on Catholic principles, thus making interdependence sovereignty impossible, even 
in the newly democratic Poland. Krasner’s “shared sovereignty” captures the Western 
economic assistance the Pope and Solidarity garnered for the fledgling democracy in 
Poland. Stacey’s “relational sovereignty” is relevant to in that the democracy built in 
Poland was inspired by the standards of care provided by the US and other western 
democracies for their citizens.  
But perhaps the pope’s transnational following and the multiple transnational civil 
societies that contributed to Solidarity need not threaten Krasner’s Westphalian 
sovereignty. Instead, Rudolph finds that “transnational activity is guided by imaginary 
maps whose boundaries do not approximate the spaces depicted on political maps.”321 She 
imagines transnational civil societies as “transparent plastic overlays, alternative meaning 
systems superimposed upon the meaning system of political maps. They do not replace 
state-defined space; they provide alternatives to it…”322 In the case of the pope, who 
theoretically supported the Westphalian order of secular, sovereign states, yet who gave 
meaning to communities with amorphous boundaries (such as the Roman Catholic 
community) unrelated to the territorial boundaries of nation-states, perhaps Rudolph’s 
description of “transparent plastic overlays” captures his profound impact as both 
international institution leader and pastor. 
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This case study adds something unique to the body of literature on sovereignty by 
posing a process of regime change through which sovereignty was simultaneously 
challenged and strengthened, and though the teachings and writings of Pope John Paul II, 
by proposing a vision for a strong Westphalian system that supports religious freedoms. 
In this case sovereignty was challenged by the strength of Pope John Paul II as a 
transnational religious leader in a system in which only states should be the dominant 
actors. It was strengthened because his vision for and contributions to non-violent 
internal regime change in Poland could occur without trampling Westphalian 
sovereignty. Through his leadership of the Roman Catholic Church and contributions to 
the Solidarity movement, he demonstrated that sovereignty is foundational to the secular, 
Westphalian world, but that world is strongest when it protects religious freedom and 
allows for nationalist identities based in religion. 
According to Philpott, “tumult yields novel orthodoxy.” Revolutions that have led 
to a change in sovereignty in the past have been based upon transnational ideas adopted 
by domestic social movements and their leaders. Philpott finds that “norms of 
sovereignty are… (matters of) basic authority. They are not solely matters of power but 
also of legitimate authority. Revolutions in these norms are rare, but they are revolutions 
of the most basic sort.”323 The Solidarity movement was a revolution about legitimate 
authority in Poland, but for Pope John Paul II, Poland’s liberation was part of a meta-
narrative about the spiritual redemption of Europe. He believed Europe to be a Christian 
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civilization, and Poland to be “the indispensable heart of that continental identity.”324 The 
Polish church was “the essential foundation of Europe’s true and authentic unity.”325 
Philpott holds that the ideas cause revolution by creating identity and social power. In his 
pilgrimages and role as pastor to the people of Poland, he presented them with an identity 
rooted in Christianity and old Polish nationalism that transcended their everyday reality 
in Communist Poland. This identity, in turn, gave structure to the social movement of 
Solidarity. This process of revolution and social movement based in old, powerful, forms 
of religious identity is what makes John Paul II unique as a transnational religious actor, 
as opposed to other kinds of transnational actors. Although he was specifically concerned 
with political reform in Poland, the pope’s vision was also theological. His life was 
dedicated to the Christian evangelization of the world. Poland, as a strong Catholic 
country with a believing population, was a means to influence the spirituality of the rest 
of Europe. This is to say that big ideas, even theological ideas, do inspire revolutions in 
sovereignty, as suggested by Philpott. 
This chapter has analyzed the impact of Pope John Paul II upon Polish 
sovereignty over the period of a few years. Over the course of his life, the pope impacted 
people on a global scale and was beloved by many. On April 27, 2014, Pope Francis I 
canonized John Paul II in a ceremony marked by unprecedented crowds in St. Peter’s 
Square, Vatican City. Twenty-four heads of state and one hundred delegates from 
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countries around the world were present.326 The young man from Krakow who lived 
under the Nazis and the Communists, who grew to inspire his Polish brethren and the 
transnational Catholic Church community to spiritual revolution, is much lionized in his 
death. His contribution, for better or for ill, to Westphalian sovereignty is only one of 
many that he made to the global community.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the “Hurricane of Virtue”327 
The Coming Hurricane 
By: ‘Azzam Ahmad’ Abdallah 
I swear by God that I shall not be silent; no I shall not go back a step. 
Oh, all of the world, look out as I have set the despair free and there 
is no regress. I have set free all repentance and regret; and I have 
taken up the sword, and shall not leave it behind. And I shall continue 
to fight injustice in a way it shall not come back. And I shall choke all 
of the unbelief. I shall fill the womb of the world to give birth to the 
glory without a cry. I shall not allow tyranny or despotism to remain 
on the face of the earth. I shall not allow the smile to show on the 
tempter’s face. I shall not leave an opportunity for the unjust to take 
one dirham or one penny. 
 
There will be no banner carried for vice and I shall lay vice in the 
coffin. I shall not depend on the world for one day so goodbye oh 
passing world. I shall not give up my sword, for truth without a sword 
is dead. The anger in my chest has cried; it has erupted like a volcano 
in this world. Hoist a banner for the sword and hoist it over every 
spear. Light a blazing fire, cast the tyranny into it. Capture all the 
unjust, drown them, you are the deluge. Oh Compassionate One (TC: 
one of the names of god), move the phalanxes for virtue and obliterate 
vice. I am the coming hurricane of virtue and I will not spare one 
devil in the world.328 
 
The second case study will consider Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, Islamism, and 
defensive jihad in the Soviet-­‐Afghan war, contributing to Soviet withdrawal and the 
outbreak of civil war in Afghanistan. Azzam, a Palestinian cleric who has been called 
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“the godfather of jihad”329 and “the fighting cleric” authored a religious ideological 
framework to justify and motivate war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. This chapter 
will investigate Azzam’s contributions to the Soviet-Afghan war and regime change in 
Afghanistan, his creation of a theology that has changed the global jihadist movement to 
this day, and his challenge as an individual transnational religious leader to Westphalian 
sovereignty. It will analyze Azzam, the Afghan Arabs, and the global jihadist movement, 
in light of the hypothesized TRL enabling characteristics and relationships proposed in 
the research design section. I use a collection of original Al Qaeda documents from the 
Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University (recently captured 
and translated by the US military from strategic sites in Iraq and Afghanistan), combined 
with contemporary scholarly reflections on the war and Azzam, and his own primary 
writings, to achieve these goals. 
Meaning to the “Land of Lions” 
Through the Saur Revolution on April 27–28, 1978, the Communist People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took over the Afghan government. The 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was then established from 1978–1987. It was then 
renamed the Republic of Afghanistan and existed until 1992. After the PDPA came to 
power, there was a power struggle between the Khalquists and the Parchamites, resulting 
in Nur Muhammed Taraki assuming power on April 30, 1978. Taraki and Hafizullah 
Amin, the organizer of the Saur Revolution, made unpopular reforms which modernized 
Islamic society. Large populations went into open rebellion, and the government 
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requested Soviet troops several times during the spring and summer of 1979, justified by 
a December 1978 treaty allowing them to request Soviet military assistance. 
The Soviets deployed the 40th Army, under Leonid Brezhnev, in Afghanistan on 
December 24, 1979. Although the Soviets quickly occupied major cities, almost 80 
percent of the country was not under government control.330  The Soviets expected it to be 
a straightforward government take-over. It proved to be anything but straightforward. 
Dibb writes: 
The Soviet plan was to stabilize the situation, strengthen the Afghan 
army, and then withdraw the bulk of Soviet forces within three years. 
But that was not to be the case: instead, the Soviet army was cast into 
a bloody war that would last for 9 years, 1 month, and 18 days. Over 
525,500 officers, sergeants, soldiers and support staff of the Soviet 
armed forces served in Afghanistan. At the time of the Soviet 
withdrawal in 1989, the official statistics from the Soviet government 
were than 13,833 had been killed or died of wounds, and there were 
50,296 wounded or missing in action. Thus one in every eight who 
served was killed or wounded or was missing. More important, in 
many ways, was the corrosive impact of this failed war on Soviet 
society and the huge humiliation geopolitically of the defeat on the 
reputation of the USSR.331 
 
This historic defeat, which made the USSR appear vulnerable, was in part orchestrated by 
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian cleric with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood 
who rejected the secularity of the Palestinian movement.  
The resistance to the Soviets was comprised of the Afghan Mujahedeen and 
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“Afghan Arabs”, Muslim jihadists from other countries who contributed to the struggle, 
fighting alongside the Afghans. Azzam recruited the Afghan Arabs and provided them 
with logistical support at the Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahedeen (MAK) (Special 
Services Office for Arab Afghans), which greeted and organized Arab militants entering 
Afghanistan. The MAK “created a global network of financiers and recruiters to bring 
fighters from around the world, especially Arabs from the Middle East, to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.”332 Azzam believed in rigorous military training of the Mujahedeen before 
sending them to battle. The Office of Mujahedeen Services was founded to make the 
Arab presence more organized and to have an active role in jihad and combat training. 
Aub Muhammed al-Sun, one of the early Mujahedeen leaders in Afghanistan, writes: 
“Despite many negatives, the office did its part because it was a new experience. In 
reality, its positives outweigh its negatives because it brought the Arabs to the point 
where their numbers increased and their contribution to the fight was effective.”333 
Although it faced bureaucratic problems, the MAK was an important step in the 
implementation of Azzam’s radical theology, which inspired the Mujahedeen to fight. 
Perhaps more important than laying the operational blueprints for an international 
network of Islamist fighters, Azzam authored a theological framework justifying violence 
in the defense of an Islamic territory. He taught that any land once ruled by the Islamic 
Caliphate should be recaptured from the infidels, and that Islamic rule should be 
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established globally. Azzam's motto was “Jihad and rifle alone: no negotiations, no 
conferences, no dialogue.”334 He argued that “the age of air travel and an Islam-wide state 
of siege made jihad fard ayn, an individual duty incumbent upon all Muslims, and not 
fard kifaya, a collective obligation limited to those under direct assault only.”335 This 
individual duty was to be carried out by every Muslim as a requirement of Islam, in 
addition to daily prayer and pilgrimage to Mecca.336 This revolutionary ideology was the 
very foundation for Afghan Arab resistance in the Soviet Afghan war. It was the heart of 
the Mujahedeen internationally, and Azzam’s greatest contribution to the war. He offered 
a transnational vision to motivate violent action and regime change in a localized, nation-
state context. Azzam’s “desire to seek out the true spirit of jihad led him to 
Afghanistan… but Azzam’s chief role was that of ideologue. His message which was 
preached worldwide, drew upon the Sharia-mindedness and will to action that were the 
ideological features of the Afghan jihad.”337 Azzam was instrumental in promoting the 
Afghan cause to the rest of the world. He not only recruited foreign fighters, but he made 
the struggle honorable and one’s duty to fight weighty. Afghanistan itself also made this 
possible. It was a unique venue where violent jihadist philosophy and an Islamic nation in 
danger called Mujahedeen to action internationally. 
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Azzam’s partner and protégée in this project was Osama Bin Laden. Azzam laid 
the organizational infrastructure of an international network that his pupil, Bin Laden, 
would later use to create Al Qaeda. Isam Dai Taz writes a biographical account of Osama 
Bin Laden which explains the early days of the Afghan Arabs and Mujahedeen 
movement in Afghanistan, including interviews with Bin Laden himself. Dai Taz spent 
years pursuing these interviews. The account refers to the “Land of Lions”, which was 
the first area in Afghanistan settled by the Mujahedeen, near Jaji. According to Dai Taz, 
Bin Laden said: 
We discussed what the place should be called, the brothers chose 
several names, and I was delighted with the Land of Lions. It was 
taken from poetry written by one of the Prophet’s companions, may 
God be pleased with them, praising the Prophet. It reads: 
‘Those pleased with the sounds of fierce battle 
Like the sounds of great burnings 
Should join a Land of Lions where swords 
 Are sharpened between the market and the trenches.’338 
 
Of the Afghani-Arab relationship, Bin Laden said: 
I noticed that the Afghans paid attention to- and were happy to have- 
the Arabs among them. The Arab presence gave the Afghans strength 
and commitment, and it increased their morale significantly. The 
Afghans loved the Arabs so much that they treated them like guest 
and would not assign them any military or combat duties.339 
Of the low number of Arabs who joined, he said: 
The number was small because the young Arab men at the time were reared in 
their home countries in a life far from the true glory of jihad and protecting one’s 
faith. Many of them regarded jihad as a choice- something that could be 
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delegated.340 
 
The Mujahedeen were anxious to fight as they built military fortifications in preparation 
for their first military objective. The author claims that Bin Laden calmed their fervor, 
writing: “It was truly a time of purity and great spiritual commitment.”341 
Perhaps the flipside of these accounts of pure spiritual growth in the “Land of 
Lions” are the accounts of life in the camps and training centers around Peshawar where 
three million Afghan refugees lived. Here, Arabs, Muslims, and international Islamists 
from around the globe interacted with one another. Kepel writes: 
Arab funds, abundant American weaponry, and trade in heroin were 
the mainstays of camp life, which was heavily infiltrated by the 
Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) and the American 
CIA, as well as by the leading organizations of Pakistani Islamism, 
notably Mawdudi’s Jamaat-e-Islami and the Deobandi madrassas.342  
As these organizations went beyond the boundaries of their localized contexts, “many 
unexpected ideological cross-fertilizations and grafts emerged.”343 He continues:  
In general, that network answered the purposes of the states that had 
underwritten it (the United States, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and 
Pakistan) by playing a key role in the discomfiture of the Soviets and 
creating a focus of attention for the jihadists of the world as well as an 
alternative to the Iranian revolution… At the same time, however, the 
network developed its own logic, which before long began to work 
against its original patrons.344 
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Jihad in Afghanistan was not implemented by Muslim states but by transnational Islamic 
religious networks. These networks “were assembled around ulemas and institutions that 
were already in place, such as the Muslim World League, or created ad hoc by the 
conservative Salafists, whose ideology fell somewhere between Saudi Wahhabism and 
the Muslim Brothers.”345 The Afghan jihad was “the ideological axis around which the 
Islamist movement revolved in the final quarter of the twentieth century.”346 The camps 
around Peshawar, visited by thousands of militants through the 1980s and 1990s “offered 
training that combined ultra-religious ideological brain-washing and fascination with 
violence.”347 
The Mujahedeen were ultimately successful in defending Afghanistan against the 
Soviets. The Politburo decided on withdrawal 1988 after the Geneva Accords were 
signed in April between the USSR, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the US. The withdrawal 
was completed by February 15, 1989. Dibb writes of the controversial accounts of the 
source of withdrawal: 
In December of that year, the Soviet Parliament condemned the 
invasion retrospectively, declaring the decision to invade had been 
taken by a narrow circle in the former leadership, namely Politburo 
members Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov and Gromyko. Dobrynin’s 
(1995: 443) conclusion was that ‘the decade of tragedy had left a deep 
scar in the hearts of our people, ended in ignominious failure, and 
shook the whole Soviet regime.’348 
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The loss was a blow to the Soviet Union, and attempts to understand the failed effort 
within a Marxist-Leninist framework were unsuccessful. Attempts to understand how the 
superior Soviet military failed was equally perplexing. Dibb writes: 
The Soviets came prepared to fight the war they had been trained for: 
high-speed mechanized warfare. They had to rearm and develop new 
tactics and new training while fighting the war. Despite overwhelming 
Soviet combat power, the Mujahedeen learned to dodge Soviet 
attacks, work around Soviet technology, and live to fight another day. 
In the end, the Mujahedeen national will was stronger than that of the 
Soviet leadership (Mataxis 2002: xv).349 
 
While the Mujahedeen’s strength fluctuated between 40,000 and 60,000 men during the 
war, they were arguably successful in recruitment and organization due to ideology.350 
Azzam and the leadership imbued in each Mujahedeen “the spirit of Islam, nationalism, 
and personal responsibility for the outcome of battle.”351 Furthermore, “The normal life of 
the Afghan people allowed the Mujahedeen to easily withstand burdens and deprivations, 
participate in guerrilla actions, and show an indifference to death.”352 Afghanistan was the 
first post- World War II failure of the Soviet Army. The Soviets had underestimated the 
strength of Islam, which they had viewed as a vehicle for expressing socio-economic 
aspirations. According to Dibb, “the Soviets simply did not understand who they were 
fighting.”353   As a result of the war, Soviets came to recognize Islam as a “global force 
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and not a mere disguise for socio-economic aspirations.”354 Afghanistan proved the 
strength of political Islam. 
After Soviet withdrawal, the 1989 to 1992 phase of the Afghan Civil War began. 
Najibullah remained in power from 1987–1992, but in 1990, the constitution made 
Afghanistan an Islamic state, and all references to communism were removed from the 
document. The Mujahedeen’s failure to obtain decisive military victory over the 
Communist regime after Soviet withdrawal: 
Proved that Islamic militancy had been incapable of overcoming long-
standing ethnic and national rivalries… instead of producing an 
internationally coordinated political movement, the Islamic wave lent 
ideological legitimacy and a political dimension to the rivalry between 
Persian Iran and the Arab states, to Pakistan’s military ambitions and 
to the ethnic strife within Afghanistan.355 
 
Although the country was left in instability, the departure of the Soviet troops did 
increase the political legitimacy of the Mujahedeen. A piece of Azzam’s vision had been 
achieved, a piece that might be replicated in other countries.  
Azzam did not see the civil war. He and his two sons were killed in November, 
1989 by a vehicle-borne explosive. The list of possible assassins is extensive, including 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Israeli Mossad, the KGB, Saudi Intelligence, militant Islamic 
factions, and even his pupil Osama Bin Laden. Azzam cofounded HAMAS with Sheikh 
Ahmed Yasin, and an unknown Al Qaeda author comments on Azzam’s mysterious 
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assassination and its possible relevance to that relationship: 
The Airport 1990... It was a painful strike in the back... It became 
evident that after the assassination of Dr. Abd-Allah Azzam the 
Pakistani authorities had acted in collusion. Saudi intelligence were 
clearly involved...Arab masses lost their (legitimate) leadership 
represented in Dr. Azzam who was assassinated in Peshawar, as well 
as in Osama Bin Laden who was detained by the Saudi authorities and 
prevented from departure. Perhaps this protected him-in my belief-
from facing the destiny of Dr. Azzam... By turning jihad towards 
Israel, Dr. Azzam revolted against "the rules of the game" so he had to 
pay the price for it: his life.356 
 
In document by a different unnamed jihadist, the author speaks to Azzam’s assassination 
and its possible relation to HAMAS: 
One of those close to Dr. Azzam says; a stormy meeting took place 
among the man and two representatives from HAMAS and the 
international brothers then, even the shouting of those attending the 
meeting were heard in the adjacent street. Dr. ‘Azzam shouted saying: 
“he will not nominate HAMAS from now on.” This meeting was a 
short period before his assassination.357 
 
The identity of Azzam’s assassin remains a mystery. 
 
Azzam’s assassination highlights the importance of perceived legitimacy when 
evaluating transnational religious actors and their role in regime change. Azzam may or 
may not have had a sophisticated political worldview. He may or may not have been 
skilled at the politics between factions like HAMAS and the Mossad. However, it is clear 
that he was viewed as “legitimate” by a Muslims internationally who donated money and 
aided in recruiting Mujahedeen through their networks. It was a legitimacy based in 
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religious fervor and religious intelligence. The legitimacy of the transnational religious 
individual can impact the legitimacy of the regime for which he or she is advocating. 
Azzam had theological legitimacy among the Afghan Arabs and a certain international 
Islamic community, but did not know how to create a political regime in Afghanistan 
respected by the broader international community through international diplomacy or 
otherwise. Nor did he have the political capital to build domestic consensus for the 
establishment of a theocratic state, though this was in part due to his untimely death 
months after Soviet withdrawal. 
 
Meaning in Jihadist Theology and Global Movements  
Azzam’s theological justification for jihad as an individual duty did not come out 
of a vacuum; it can be placed in the context of a long history of Islamic literature. 
Perhaps Azzam’s beliefs are best understood as an important chapter in a longer narrative 
on the rise of global jihadist ideology. Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) an Egyptian theorist and 
Muslim Brotherhood leader, understood Islam as a “social ideology that was directly 
competitive with secularism and a basis for political order that challenged the Western 
notion of the secular nation-state.”358 In a sense, global jihadi ideology seeks to establish a 
new world order, constructed along territorial lines, but defined by pre-Westphalian 
conceptions of the nation-state (the presence of Islamic rule). 
In books such as Milestones and This Religion of Islam, Qutb envisioned Islam as 
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a global political community, and his ideology influenced Azzam. Qutb “faulted the 
European creation of nation-states such as Pakistan, Egypt, and the Arab states out of the 
old Indian Raj and Ottoman Empire, thus attacking the very premises of secular 
nationalism in the Muslim world.”359 When young Islamic activists in Egypt in the 1970’s 
came into contact with these ideas and theological scholars teaching at Al-Azhar 
University, the contemporary jihadi movement was born.360 According to Juergensmeyer, 
the jihadi movement spread internationally from Egypt as a result of 1) students of Al-
Azhar bringing ideas to their home countries and 2) the exile of Egyptian Islamic radicals 
after the trial of the Anwar al-Sadat’s assassins, many of whom joined the Mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan.361 The theoretical basis for the Islamist movement was rooted in 1960s 
Mawdudi in Pakistan, Qutb in Egypt, and Khomeini in Iran. It became a powerful 
political force after the Israeli-Arab war of 1973. Kepel writes: 
The Afghan jihad against the Soviets became the great cause with 
which Islamists worldwide identified, moderates and radicals alike. In 
the minds of many Arabs, jihad supplanted the Palestinian cause and 
symbolized the shift from nationalism to Islamism… 
In addition to the local Mujahedeen, or holy warriors, the international 
brigades in Afghanistan hailed from all over the Muslim world: 
Egypt, Algeria, the Arabian Peninsula, and Southeast Asia. They lived 
in close communities, where they received intensive training in 
guerilla warfare techniques and built up a variant of Islamist ideology 
based on armed struggle and extreme religious rigor.362 
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Afghanistan provided a cause, as did Palestine, for jihadist around the world 
to rally around. 
A fatwa from an unnamed Al Qaeda source references other older Islamist 
thinkers who lay the groundwork for Azzam and ultimately Al Qaeda’s genre of thinking. 
This source references scholars such as Imam Ibn ‘Abd-al-Birr, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn 
‘Abidin. Imam Ibn ‘Abd-al-Birr, a famous Sunni scholar who died in 1071, writes:  
The duty of Jihad is also divided into two parts, one of them is a 
public duty to be incumbent upon every one of those free and matured 
who can defend, fight and carry arms; that is when the enemy arrives 
and fighting against the Islam home; in that case, it is the duty of 
everybody in that home to mobilize and go to war against the enemy 
including the heavy and skinny as well as the youths and the elders; 
and no one from the fighters and the wealthy, who is capable to go to 
war, ought to stay behind.363 
 
Ibn Taymiyyah, a notable scholar and logician who lived until 1328, writes:  
As far as the elimination battle, it is the most serious types of driving 
the assailer away from sacredness and from the religion; so it is a 
unanimous duty. Nothing is more obligated than driving away the 
assaulting enemy who spoils the religion and the world; it is 
unconditional that the enemy must be driven away as possible.364 
According to Ibn ‘Abidin, an Islamic scholar who lived in Syria from 1783–1836: 
It is an individual duty if the enemy is assailed on a fort of the Islamic 
ones, so it is the individual duty for someone who is near the enemy; 
and it is the collective duty for those who are behind them and at a 
distance from the enemy if they were not needed. But if they were 
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needed… then it becomes an individual duty just like prayers and 
fasting which they cannot neglect.365 
 
These scholars laid the groundwork for Azzam’s individual call to defensive jihad. 
 
Hegghammer distinguishes between “socio-revolutionary Islamism”, “classical 
jihadism”, and “global jihadism.”366 Classical jihadism, first articulated by Azzam, holds 
that the non-Muslim infringement of Muslim territory demands the immediate military 
involvement of all able Muslim men in defense of the said territory, wherever its location. 
Hegghammer views this iteration of pan-Islamism as a “macro-nationalism centered on 
the imagined community of the ummah, which is defined by religion.”367 Although the 
Muslim nation and community is a-territorial, pan-Islamists have a territorial vision of 
Muslim community – “all lands once ruled by Muslims, from Andalucía in the West to 
Indonesia in the East.”368 For Azzam, Afghanistan was a productive theater to give voice 
to his pan-Islamist ideas.369 Azzam envisioned the jihad against the Russians in 
Afghanistan as the first step in an international Islamist movement, towards an ultimate 
war against international communism, what he called “a war between the Ummahs 
(collective peoples of Islam) versus Communism.”370 This is evocative of the cosmic 
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images conjured by other religious terrorist groups – the war is larger than life, relates to 
a metaphysical conflict between good and evil, and transcends human experience.371 
Azzam’s pan-Islamist vision directly contributed to Bin Laden’s thinking and the 
principles of Al Qaeda. Although Azzam was not involved in the birth of Al Qaeda, the 
organization was in part built upon his philosophy, though important ideological 
differences exist to today. An unknown Al Qaeda member connects Azzam’s philosophy 
of defensive jihad with Al Qaeda’s philosophy of individual obligation to jihad. He also 
echoes Azzam’s concern with protecting Muslim lands, regardless of one’s place of 
origin, and he references the ultimate scope of jihad. He writes: 
It is the duty and obligation of every Muslim to struggle (Jihad) 
against the alliance of the Jews and Crusaders led by Israel and 
American who are occupying the consecrates of the Muslims: the 
Honored Kaaba (in Mecca), the Prophet’s Mosque (in Medina) and 
the al-Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) the ascension place of the Prophet 
(M). And to liberate every Islamic land occupied by the infidels 
through sacrificing lives and money in fighting for the sake of God 
and desiring His satisfaction, Whom be ascribed all perfection and 
majesty; be He exalted said “And fight with them until there is no 
more persecution and religion should be only for Allah” (The Spoils 
of War, verse 8.39).372 
 
Azzam also formulated theories of Al Qaeda al-Sulba (the Firm Foundation) that became 
the spiritual foundation for Al Qaeda. Azzam viewed Afghanistan as the beginning battle 
in a perpetual jihad. In Ayyat al- Rahman fee Jihad al-Afghan (God’s Signs in the Afghan 
Jihad), he writes, “The Afghan (-Soviet War) issue is the story of Islam wounded in every 
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part of the globe. Where nation-states have ripped it (Islamic nations) apart...”373 He 
viewed the Soviet-Afghan War as similar to situations in Chad, Philippines, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Egypt, and most importantly, Palestine. Azzam believed the situation in 
Palestine, like the Afghan jihad, was fard ayn. He believed that Palestine and Afghanistan 
were the “central issues in the Muslim world” in the 1980’s.374 
Azzam’s philosophy of defensive jihad shaped the later philosophy of Al Qaeda 
towards Christians and Westerners in Islamic lands. An undated fatwa, “Fatwa Calling 
for Ejection of Foreign Forces from Saudi Peninsula”, used Qur’anic and Sharia quotes to 
call for military operations against foreign and Christian forces in Saudi Arabia. At the 
end of the document there are spaces for names and signatures. The unknown author 
echoes Azzam’s philosophy of individual duty to jihad. He similarly references Ibn 
‘Abidin: 
As for the scholar’s opinions: The past and succeeding imam scholars 
during all Islamic periods agreed that if the disbelievers enter a city to 
occupy it, it becomes an obligation upon all those who belong to it to 
fight. The son will come out without his parents’ permission, and the 
indebted without his creditor’s permission. If they were insufficient, 
or fell short or were sluggish, or remained seated, then the individual 
obligation (on each Muslim) will fall upon the closest (neighboring), 
and the closest (to the neighboring). If they were insufficient or fell 
behind, then the individual obligation will include the whole territory, 
until the enemy is defeated and is pushed away from the territory of 
Islam.375 
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And later in the document: 
 
Ibn ‘Abidin said, “If the enemy attacks one of the Muslim border 
guards, the individual obligation falls upon those who are close to it, 
but those who are behind, distant from the enemy then it is an 
obligation of sufficiency if there was no need for them; but, if there 
was a need for them, if those close to the enemy were unable to resist 
the enemy, or if they were not unable but became sluggish and have 
not fought, it falls upon those who are next to them and becomes an 
obligation like prayer and fasting that they cannot abandon, and so 
forth in this sequence until it gradually falls upon the who nation of 
Islam, East and West (Hashiyat Ibn ‘Abidin: 3/238).376 
 
This document reiterates the notion of a developing jihadist narrative. The path of 
ideological growth can be traced from Ibn’ Abidin and early philosophers, to Azzam’s 
transnational defensive jihad, to Al Qaida’s call for the withdrawal of all foreign and 
Christian forces from Islamic lands. 
The jihad in Afghanistan and later the jihad of Al Qaeda can be compared to the 
“foreign fighter doctrine.” When it was introduced in the mid-1980s, the foreign fighter 
doctrine had two distinct differences from existing jihad doctrines:  
First, it offered a diagnosis focusing on an outside enemy, whereas 
Islamist revolutionary doctrine focused on the enemy within… 
Second, Azzam’s doctrine differed from orthodox Islamic views on 
jihad by offering a rationale for privatized warfare, for example, 
divesting national governments of the power to prevent individuals to 
go abroad for war.377  
 
Hegghammer writes: 
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… the foreign fighter phenomenon represents a violent offshoot off a 
qualitatively new sub current of Islamism- populist pan-Islamism- 
which emerged in the 1970s as a result of strategic action by 
marginalized elites employed in nonviolent international Islamic 
organizations… these activists-who were mostly based in the Hijaz 
region of Saudi Arabia- propagated an alarmist discourse emphasizing 
external threats to the Muslim nation. … The norms and networks 
established by the Hijazi pan-Islamists then enabled Arab activists in 
1980s Afghanistan to recruit foreign fighters in the name of inter-
Muslim solidarity. The “Arab Afghan” mobilization, in turn, produced 
a foreign fighter movement that still exists today, as a phenomenon 
partly distinct from Al Qaeda.378 
 
In other words, Afghan Arabs in the Soviet Afghan war were recruited internationally 
and supported by non-state actors, though they fought in a specific territorial context. 
They were regionally focused, specifically on Afghanistan and Palestine, until Azzam’s 
death. 
An Al Qaeda author writes about modern justification for jihad and references a 
book called Paths of Paradise. His account of circumstances around the individual 
obligation to jihad is directly related to Azzam’s earlier ideology, which changed the 
direction of jihadist thinking and weightily impacted Al Qaeda doctrine in later years. He 
writes: 
The jihad is a collective duty, it becomes an individual duty in three 
circumstances: 
If two enemies meet, and they lined up facing each other, it is 
forbidden for those who came to go away. “When you meet force, 
take firm stand against them.” Also “When you meet those who 
disbelieve in a battle-field, never turn your back to them.” (Al-Anfal). 
If the enemy invades a country then refer to the previous verses. 
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If an Imam “Religious Leader” called upon the people to fight “If you 
were called upon to fight, then go to fight.” (Al-Maghanni and the 
Great Illustration 10/364, 365). 379 
 
This shift from collective to individual duty was fundamental to both the 
Afghan Arab movement and later iterations of global jihadism. 
The victory of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan has stood as a bright moment for 
the jihadist movement, and is regularly referred to by Al Qaeda leaders as an example of 
victory for Islam that should be repeated and universalized. An unidentified Al Qaeda 
document references the victory and describes how it was difficult for the Islamist 
movement to move forward afterwards. He writes: 
Muslims have been able to conquer Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, 
by the grace of Allah, after fourteen years of fighting against the 
Communists, and after having suffered great sacrifices and pain. The 
people had been unable to do so, yet the Afghan Mujahedeen were 
able to destroy the Soviet Empire; and, three years later, they took 
down the Afghan Communist regime. It has been thought that an 
Islamic system would have been established automatically. The hopes 
of the Muslims, who had been involved and who had backed the 
Afghan jihad, were dashed. It was seen as a power struggle between 
the various Afghan organizations allied with the remnants of the 
structural fall of Communism… 
Having achieved the greatest accomplishment, over the course of the past fourteen 
years, through the blood of Mujahedeen, the march of Jihad has not been 
completed until the specified goal that was initiated is completed. This is the word 
of Allah, and it is supreme. It is, however, still relatively far away. There will still 
need to be several battles in various fields, but we think it may require an all-out 
war that may take roughly a decade, more or less. 
 
Even if we are to assume that we as Muslims are in need of a new phase, similar 
to the phase in which we engaged in the past, it will end up taking time and 
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sacrifice. We consider the main goals, and the sole focus of human existence to be 
the establishment of the sharia of Allah upon the earth. We say that this goal is 
right around the corner, or even closer than that, due to the previous periods of 
Afghani jihad, as well as interim periods, endured in order to achieve higher 
goals, which have only been flashes of lighting in the history of nations and 
mankind.380 
 
He also references the “current” (document written prior to 2003) struggle to control 
Afghanistan: “We cannot hope to establish an Islamic government in Kabul without 
complete and continuous war.”381 This is reminiscent of Juergensmeyer and Azzam’s 
cosmic, ongoing war and alludes to a continued philosophy of global jihad. 
After the fall of Kabul in April 1992, the Mujahedeen dispersed internationally, 
but primarily to Bosnia, Algeria, and Egypt. Their attempts at jihad in these countries 
were ultimately unsuccessful, with failure evident by 1995. Kepel writes, “A gulf had 
opened between the aims of the 1990s jihad extremists and the social, political, and 
cultural aspirations of Muslims during the 1980s, and it brought the Islamist movement to 
a standstill.”382 After the failure of the Salafist-jihadist militants in Bosnia, Algeria, and 
Egypt, many Islamists thinkers advocated ending armed struggle and embracing the 
integration of Muslim culture with democratic values. Kepel writes:  
The extreme wing of the movement found itself facing a political 
impasse. It rejected the democratic references invoked by the 
moderates; and as a result, raw terrorism in its most spectacular and 
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destructive form became its main option for reviving armed struggle 
in the new millennium.383 
 
Examples of this movement include the election of President Mohammed Khatami in 
Iran, the new Algerian government formed by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and the 
overthrow of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. 
On May 18, 1996, Bin Laden left the Sudan for Afghanistan and on August 23, 
1996, he published the “Declaration of Jihad on the American Occupiers of the Holy 
Places.” Like Azzam, Bin Laden had a leadership style that did not fit easily into 
traditional international relations literature. Kepel says that by refusing to acknowledge 
responsibility directly, Osama “deprives himself of any capacity to structure and unite 
behind him a mass movement capable of winning power in the Muslim world. He 
remains merely a symbol, an icon, whose only real contacts are with the activists 
belonging to his secret organization.”384 While it is true that Bin Laden could not win 
power in the traditional sense of ruling a country, that was not what he sought. His power 
was not in the ability to control the region, but to inspire other actors and individuals to 
transform the region. In other words, being a TRL can inspire movement transnationally 
with implications for the traditional nation state. That he did successfully, achieving his 
aims. He did not aim to rule a sovereign state, but rather to create and inspire a global 
movement, like his mentor, Azzam. 
According to Kepel, although a terrorist act provokes extreme reactions, it “does 
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not necessarily express the true strength of the movement to which it claims to belong. 
Despite the devastation it can cause… desperate terrorist acts do not translate easily into 
political victory and legitimate power.”385 Yet perhaps Kepel does not consider 
nontraditional sources of legitimate power. Azzam’s legitimacy was rooted in his 
theological purism and fanaticism, but he also wielded legitimate power in a traditional 
sense. Azzam changed the internal politics of Afghanistan by contributing to Soviet 
withdrawal and the onset of civil war. He may never have wielded the power of a 
politician, but he forced the hand of and controlled the future of a nation state. 
Azzam and Bin Laden were both strategic in their goals of a new international 
world order. Al Qaeda and its associated movements cannot always be characterized by 
disassociated actions inspired by leaders with irregular communication methods and 
naiveté to world politics, as they often are. A letter written by Osama Bin Laden to 
Mullah Omar prior to 2002 reads: 
…Jihad continuation in the Islamic Republics will keep the enemies 
busy and divert them away from the Afghani issue and ease the 
pressure off. The enemies of Islam problem will become how to stop 
the spreading of Islam into the Islamic Republics and not the Afghani 
issue. Consequently, the efforts of the Russians and their American 
allies will be scattered.386 
 
The victory in the “Land of Lions” ultimately led to victory in striking a fatal blow to the 
United States on 9/11. Kepel comments: “Thus, barely a generation after many Muslim 
nations won their independence, the Islamic world entered a religious era that largely 
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canceled out the nationalist period which preceded it.”387 
Meaning to Hypothesized Causal Structure 
In revisiting the hypothesized causal structure, we can analyze the variables as 
they relate to the case of Azzam in Afghanistan. A transnational religious leader can 
again be defined as an individual actor, who, as guided by a religious ideology, acts 
towards political ends, benefiting from both material (people, weapons, capital) and 
immaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world leaders) resources across 
state lines in the achievement of those ends. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the transnational 
religious leader in this case, can be analyzed according to eight characteristics, which 
enabled him to effect regime change, and ultimately to challenge state sovereignty, to 
varying degrees. The characteristics of a transnational religious leader include: leadership 
style, hard versus soft power, relationship to the secularized state, and relationship to 
modernity. The characteristics of a transnational social movement include: political 
theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, and character of the 
activism.  
The first characteristic of a TRL is leadership style. Within Burn’s paradigm, 
Azzam had a transformational leadership style. Through his theological writings and 
public speeches, he reshaped the identity of Muslims both within Afghanistan and 
throughout the Middle East. He offered a new vision for jihad that both rejected the 
importance of state boundaries in determining individual responsibility, and upheld pre-
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Westphalian territorial boundaries of Islamic territory as worth defending. It can be stated 
that his leadership motivated followers to accomplish goals that even Azzam might not 
have fully realized. Surely after his death, his teachings on defensive jihad shaped the 
jihadist movement going forward. Azzam’s transformational texts and speeches, 
however, framed his practical work on the ground organizing the Afghan Arabs. Barker, 
Johnson, and Lavalette’s analysis of leadership as an activity and a dialogical relationship 
is relevant here too. Azzam’s actions, both offering theological inspiration and materially 
organizing the armed Afghan Arabs, were responded to positively by his followers. 
Osama Bin Laden looked up to him as a wise mentor for years, until their opinions of the 
tactics of jihad dramatically diverged. Recruits and volunteers traveled from all over the 
region – Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt – to join the forces in Afghanistan, inspired by 
the mission as defined by Azzam. This band of jihadists ultimately contributed to the 
formation of Al Qaeda. 
 The second characteristic of a transnational religious leader is whether or not he 
wields hard or soft power, both, or none at all. In the case of Azzam, he used both hard 
and soft power in the achievement of his aims. “Hard power” refers to coercing a state, 
group, or individual to do something, often by force or by threat of force. “Soft power” is 
defined by Joseph Nye as the ability to make an individual, group, or state “want” to do 
something.388 “Religious soft power”, developed by Jeff Haynes, refers to how 
transnational religious actors spread ideas, values, and norms. Azzam certainly wielded 
hard power in that he gathered money and arms from international sources (in part from 
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the US) to supply his transnational force of Afghan Arabs. He recruited, funded, 
organized, and even led in battle an armed force that aided the broader effort in 
Afghanistan to repel the Soviets. He also, however, wielded soft power in that he offered 
the source of inspiration for people to join the Afghan Arabs and to donate money and 
arms. More fundamentally, he offered theological inspiration for every able Muslim to be 
invested in the fate of Afghanistan, regardless of his or her home country. 
 The third characteristic of a transnational religious leader is his or her relationship 
to the secularized state. Azzam would fit more easily into Juergensmeyer’s definition of a 
religious nationalist than John Paul II. Azzam not only responded “in a religious way to a 
political situation”389, but he also aimed for the establishment of a theocratic state. Azzam 
rejected both the secular state and the world system of secular states. However, he 
promoted gradual change, one country at a time, placing a primacy on Palestine and 
Afghanistan. It is possible that his religious denomination, Islam, made the confrontation 
with the secular state more difficult, but it is clear that the leader himself rejected the 
secular state and the Western influence in places holy to Islam. Because of his pre-
Westphalian vision, Azzam was not successful at international diplomacy with world 
leaders, a failing that contributed to the political void that arose after Soviet withdrawal. 
Azzam’s vision of state authority and state legitimacy was shaped by his rejection of the 
secular state. 
 The fourth characteristic of the transnational religious leader is his relationship to 
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modernity or programs of modernization. If modernization spelled the height of 
secularization, then Azzam rejected it. He did not accept the privatization of religion, its 
decreased relevance to public life, or a decline in religious belief and participation. If the 
modern world included a world order of secularized states pitted in opposition to each 
other by an anarchic system, in that sense Azzam also rejected modernity. He did view 
the world in terms of warring ideologies, for example, Islam versus secularism, Islam 
versus the West, etc. But these ideologies were driven by culture, man’s relationship with 
God, and religion. They were meta-level conflicts, unrelated to a realist world in which 
secular states are the dominant actors. 
 The first characteristic through which to analyze the “Afghan Arab” transnational 
social movement is that of political theology. The Afghan Arabs can be analyzed as part 
of a broader jihadist movement that was developing at the time. The people who 
participated in the Afghan Arab movement extended beyond the recruits on the ground, 
and included those who donated arms and money, those who circulated Azzam’s 
theological ideas, and those who believed in the cause of a theocracy for Afghanistan. 
Often the theological language used by transnational religious leaders has a political 
content that shapes transnational social movements. In the case of Azzam, theological 
discourse, particularly around the justification for defensive jihad, was closely related to 
political and military mobilization. Political theology is not just about content, but about 
the framing of the message, for the ultimate purpose of mobilization. Azzam called on 
individual Muslims everywhere to take part in armed struggle in Afghanistan. He made it 
their religious duty to participate and dissipated the significance of nation state 
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boundaries. Political aims were articulated with theological concepts, because the goal 
was a theocracy in Afghanistan, ultimately under a global Islamic Caliphate. These 
theological concepts and the language around them influenced world politics through 
transnational mobilization, domestic regime change, and Afghanistan’s evolving 
sovereignty status. 
 The second characteristic of the “Afghan Arab” TSM is “mobilizing structures” 
as defined by McCarthy to include “the more or less formally organized everyday life 
patterns upon which movements build collective action, ranging from religious groups 
and neighborhood association to workplace cliques and friendship groups.”390 It can be 
defined as a social movement if it is “an organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of 
interrelated individuals, groups and organizations to promote or resist social change with 
the use of public protest activities.”391 The Afghan Arabs constituted a social movement 
in that it was a sustained over a number of years and an effort of a collective of 
individuals from around the region, who worked toward the collective goal of regime 
change in Afghanistan. Public protest was expressed through military action, in 
conjunction with the Afghan forces. Non-recruits also participated transnationally by 
donating money and arms. The existence of a loose network of Islamic churches and 
social groups enabled Azzam’s message to spread easily and to be translated into the 
operationalization of a jihadist resistance to Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. 
 The third characteristic of the transnational social movement is political 
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opportunity structures, which capture the relationship between the state and the social 
movement.  In April, 1978, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan seized power 
in the Saur revolution. Within months, the Mujahedeen had launched an uprising. The 
political opportunity structures can be measured according to McCarthy’s four categories. 
The institutionalized political system was closed, and the elite arrangements were 
unstable. Friction between the Khalq and Parcham groups in government led to the 
dismissal of the Parcham Cabinet members. There was a series of assassinations and a 
period of unstable government during early PDPA rule. In September 1979, Taraki was 
assassinated by Amin, and in December, 1979, Amin was assassinated by the Soviets. 
The Soviets then organized a government led by Babrak Karmal. Najibullah took over as 
president in 1987 and in 1989, the Soviets withdrew, leaving the country in a state of civil 
war. Although direct Soviet assistance ended, the USSR continued to support Najibullah 
with economic and military aid until his fall in 1992. During the time of the Soviet 
Afghan war, there was a strong presence of elite allies. Mujahedeen were supported 
covertly by the United States starting in mid-1979 under CIA Operation Cyclone, which 
provided billions of dollars of cash and weapons over the course of the war.392 Under the 
Soviet government, which ruled during the Soviet-Afghan war, the state had a great 
capacity and propensity for repression. The pattern of escalation of transnational activity 
during the Soviet Afghan war seems to give evidence for the mainstream opinion that as 
authority becomes increasingly invested in transnational bodies, social movements 
become more transnational in scope and target. The more heavily the Soviets invested, 
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the more Afghan Arab forces swelled. Likewise, the more the US donated to the 
Mujahedeen, and the more the scope of the conflict became transnational. 
 The fourth characteristic of the transnational social movement is the character of 
the activism. Tarrow defines transnational activists as “individuals and groups who 
mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on 
behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in 
common with transnational allies.”393 Azzam’s social movement could be defined in 
terms of the Afghan Arabs he recruited and the network of Islamists supporting them, or 
more broadly in terms of the jihadist movement, which became increasingly transnational 
and international in nature as a result of his life and his writings. The nature of both the 
movement of Afghan Arabs and the global jihadist movement was violent. Theological 
and philosophical language was used to promote violence as a means to serve Allah. It 
was used to mobilize young men from around the Middle East region, and even around 
the globe, to travel to Afghanistan, and take up arms to defend a holy land against the 
Soviets. In addition to recruits, money, arms, and other material goods crossed state lines 
to support the violence on the ground. The guiding philosophy was that every man and 
woman, regardless of his or her location, was religiously obliged to take violent action to 
defend Afghanistan, and ultimately all once Islamic lands, against infidel invaders or 
occupiers. The character of activism of the global jihadist movement, although still 
shaped by Azzam’s life and writings, has changed since his death. It has become 
increasingly transnational, in that the violent action is not necessarily linked to a 
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leadership structure, and tactically, Al Qaeda and associated movements now focus on 
the “far enemy”, the United States, instead of the “near enemy”, regional players against 
Islamic theocracies in the Middle East. 
Meaning to Regime Change 
 The second research objective is twofold: 1) to analyze the TRL’s political goals, 
particularly as they relate to regime change, and the level of accommodation those goals 
did or did not make to Westphalia and 2) to establish a process-driven explanation of 
regime change in the context of the influence of Azzam as a transnational religious 
leader. As previously investigated, Azzam’s long term goal was the restoration of all 
once Muslim lands to Islamic rule under a global Caliphate. His short-term goal was to 
establish theocracies one country at a time in the Middle East, with a particular focus on 
Palestine and Afghanistan. Because these goals involved state dissolution and ultimately, 
geopolitical restructuring, they in no way accommodated to Westphalian principles of 
sovereignty. Furthermore, his preferred method of achieving these goals, through a 
transnational fighting force, disregarded the Westphalian principle of non-intervention. 
In analyzing his pragmatic contributions to regime change, this paper considers 
“regime change” in this case to refer to 1) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan and 2) the descent of the country into ongoing civil war until the 
establishment of the Taliban in 1996. The Soviet Politburo reached the decision to 
withdrawal from Afghanistan on principle on October 17, 1985. According to the 1988 
Geneva Accords, Afghanistan and Pakistan agree to non-interference and non-
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intervention. Foreign troops were to begin to exit on May 15, 1988. The US and USSR 
signed a declaration agreeing to refrain from interference and intervention. Soviet 
withdrawal was complete February 15, 1989, and Soviet Commander Boris Gromov was 
the last to cross the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan. According to Gorbachev, 
withdrawal was slow for two reasons: 1) fear of international embarrassment in admitting 
defeat 2) desire to establish a stable, friendly Afghanistan and to being the national 
reconciliation process.394 15,000 Soviets were killed in the decade long war and billions 
were spent. Westerner’s called it “Russia’s Vietnam”, and Mikhail Gorbachev called it 
“the bleeding wound.” The Mujahedeen took credit for Soviet withdrawal. Osama Bin 
Laden claimed that the credit for “the dissolution of the Soviet Union… goes to God and 
the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan”. However, other forces which contributed, perhaps even 
more so, to this Soviet defeat include 1) US funding and support (particularly on the 
shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles in 1987) and 2) the broader context of the Cold 
War. Would the US not have funded any credible resistance group to the Soviets, or did 
Azzam and the Mujahedeen provide a unique opportunity? Perhaps, but Azzam’s ability 
to appeal to a profound, traditional religious identity in mobilizing a transnational force to 
political and military action was a unique and invaluable contribution to Soviet 
withdrawal. 
The second meaning of “regime change” in this case is the dissolution of the 
country into civil war. Although the Najibullah government won no popular support, 
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territory, or international recognition, it survived beyond the departure of Soviet troops 
until 1992. This was primarily due to the fact that the Afghan Army had grown strong 
under Soviet direction, and they were successful in thwarting Mujahedeen attacks. 
However, from 1989 to 1992, the country, led by Najibullah, experienced ongoing civil 
war. It suffered in 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved and foreign aid dried up. 
Najibulla was ousted from power in April, 1992. That same year the post-Communist 
“Islamic state of Afghanistan” was established by the Peshawar Accord, and a new phase 
of civil war started, with opposing militias being supported by Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
Under Massoud, the Islamic State made gains in maintaining order, but on September 27, 
1996, the Taliban seized Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 
About 400,000 Afghan civilians died in the civil wars of the 1990s. Although the 
Mujahedeen took credit for the overthrow of Najibullah, there were other outside forces 
responsible, two in particular. First, in 1992, Russia refused to sell oil products to 
Afghanistan, triggering an embargo. Second, General Abdul Rashid Dostam and his 
Uzbek militia defected in March, 1992. 
The Taliban is a predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group that was in 
power in Afghanistan from 1996–2001, when the US took down the regime because it 
was harboring Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. During its reign, the Taliban received 
diplomatic recognition from only three countries- Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates. Taliban jurisprudence was drawn from the Pashtun’s pre-Islamic tribal 
code and interpretations of sharia informed by the Wahhabi doctrines of Saudi 
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benefactors.395 Strict rules on un-Islamic behavior was established. Women were required 
to wear the burqa or chadri, and men were required to wear beards at least the length of a 
fist. Women were banned from school and work; they could not leave the house without a 
male escort. Music, television, kite flying, pig, pork, statues of live things, alcohol, 
masks, chess, and wine, among other things, were banned. For these reasons, the regime 
was internationally isolated from its birth. Mullah Omar led Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as 
“commander of the faithful” from 1996–2001. He harbored Al Qaeda, and after 9/11, 
rejected US demands that he give up Bin Laden. The US, assisted by the Northern 
Alliance, toppled the Taliban in December 2001. The new government was led by Hamid 
Karzai and supported by the International Security Assistance Force. The Taliban has 
regrouped across the border in Pakistan, where its leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, 
leads an insurgency against the US-backed government in Kabul. In 2004, it changed its 
name to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The current president is Ashraf Ghani. 
Again, in analyzing Azzam’s impact on “regime change” in Afghanistan, we are 
specifically studying 1) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and 2) the 
devolution of the country into 7 years of civil war (during 1989–1996, government 
control switched multiple times due to assassinations and violent uprisings). Azzam’s 
Afghan Arabs contributed to the broader Afghan forces in repelling the Soviet invasion in 
1989, though the extent of that contribution is a subject of dispute. However, the 
resistance to Soviet invasion would have been comprised of only Afghans had it not been 
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for Azzam. His theology and work on the ground made a transnational force possible, a 
force that would provide the basis for Al Qaeda and other global jihadist groups after his 
death. Though the Soviets withdrew, the government was not replaced. Rather the 
country was left in a state of civil war from 1989–1992 and 1992–1996. Azzam’s Afghan 
Arabs did make up the basis of Al Qaeda, which was harbored by the Taliban beginning 
in 1996. Though Osama Bin Laden framed the fight in different terms than Azzam, 
Azzam’s philosophy still guided the jihadist group, particularly the notion of defensive 
jihad an individual duty to jihad across state lines. Thus, although Azzam contributed 
strategically to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the ensuing rise of 
civil war and Najibullah’s defeat, his greater contribution was philosophical. He authored 
the terms for Al Qaeda’s mandate and for disparate jihadist movements around the globe. 
In this way, he created a challenge to state sovereignty through the global impact of these 
groups and their exportation of terror to the West. 
Similar to Krasner’s study of regime change as intervening variable, in this case, 
the regime change is measured by its strength as an indicator of challenges to conceptions 
of sovereignty. The political regime, in this case a recently installed Soviet government, 
was impacted by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, in the sense that his Afghan Arabs contributed 
to the military defeat of the Soviet Army, which was invading in support of the young 
government. Azzam’s writings and contributions to the Afghan Arabs, accomplished 
something even greater, however. They made Afghanistan the premier location for a 
showdown between secularism and Islam, thus elevating the significance of the country’s 
destiny in the eyes of Muslims around the world. He created a narrative that ultimately 
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stated that success would not be achieved in Afghanistan until it was ruled as an Islamic 
theocracy. In this sense, the specific kind of regime change aimed for, theocracy, made 
regime change as an intervening variable important in the contribution to conversations 
of state sovereignty. However, Azzam and his associated movements challenged state 
sovereignty and the Westphalian system most profoundly by aiming to create a world 
based on pre-Westphalian, religiously defined boundaries. In this case study, Azzam and 
his associated social movement impacted conceptions of sovereignty without definitively 
impacting regime change, placing the case within a conventional structural perspective.  
The larger contribution Azzam makes to the global jihadist movement is not dependent 
on what kind of government resulted from the Soviet Afghan war in Afghanistan. Thus, 
regime change in this case, is a weak indicator of the challenge to conceptions of 
sovereignty. 
 The transition from young Soviet government to civil war can also be analyzed 
within Owen’s work on ideas in world politics. On the micro-level he finds that regime 
instability and great power war (both of which were present in Afghanistan) cause 
transnational ideological polarization, defined as “the progressive segregation of elites 
and mass public across state lines along an ideological axis, so that political preferences 
among elites across states are simplified and intensified.”396 Polarized elites then cause 
rulers to promote regimes, and on the macro-level, a transnational regime contest. This 
transnational regime contest continues indefinitely until one regime type suggest that 
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vastly superior on terms all elites accept.397 The complex story of governance and regime 
change in Afghanistan in the Soviet context can be told in terms of Owen’s warring 
ideologies. There were multiple struggles going on - Islam versus secularism, Islam 
versus the West, Communism versus the West, and Islam versus Communism. These 
transnational ideologies created polarization on the micro-level and a transnational 
regime contest on the macro-level. It is difficult to imagine this period of regime change 
in Afghanistan without great power contributions and the impact of international elite 
allies. Azzam was an author of how the struggle in Afghanistan was framed both 
domestically and internationally. However, he was also used as a player in great power 
politics between the United States and the Soviet Union. His theology universalized the 
Afghan story and he contributed to the transnational ideological contest. However 
important his vision of regime change in Afghanistan, it was secondary to the greater, 
long-term challenge to the Westphalian system posed by his theological writings and 
ideology. 
Meaning to State Sovereignty 
The final meaning of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam is his contribution to Westphalian 
sovereignty and modern definitions of state sovereignty. As an individual, Abdullah 
Yusuf Azzam played an unlikely role in creating regime change in Afghanistan. He was a 
religious actor that became transnational. He recruited Afghan Arab fighters 
internationally to fight in Afghanistan. He propagated an ideology that not only justified 
violence in defense of Islamic territory, but made it a religious obligation for the Muslim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Ibid., 72. 
180 
	  
	  
individual to fight, regardless of his home of origin. Through both his pragmatic efforts in 
establishing the MAK and recruiting fighters, and his incendiary, powerful theology, 
Azzam inspired revolution against the Soviet Union. The war he started ended in regime 
change, more specifically, the fall of the Soviet government and the rise of years of civil 
war and political instability. Azzam’s successful revolution and enduring ideology laid 
the groundwork for the modern jihadist movement, and perhaps even more significantly, 
for Al Qaeda. But there is an even greater significance to the life and efforts of this man 
in the Soviet Afghan war – he challenged one of the greatest principles in international 
relations theory – Westphalian sovereignty. 
A lengthy intelligence document, part of a series entitled, “Chat from the Top of 
the World,” the unnamed author gives an unusually personal account of Azzam and the 
consciousness of the Afghan people during the war. He writes that the Afghans believed, 
“that any battle is determined by the results achieved on the ground and that whoever 
controls the land is a winner irrespective of the number of people or equipment lost in the 
process.”398 Due to the fact that the Communists gained no new land during the war, they 
were considered defeated by the Afghans throughout the war. This is significant in the 
sense that the aims of the Mujahedeen were territorial in nature, not just to defend 
Afghanistan from Communism, but ultimately to defend all territories that were once 
Islamic from foreign forces. This is also significant because the basis for the territorial 
value was theologically imbued. 
According to this source, religious conviction drove the Mujahedeen, but there 
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was little understanding of the larger politics at play or the geopolitical significance of the 
war. He writes: “The Muslims offered their blood under a strong religious faith but did 
not know the reality of who was leading them and did not operate with understanding and 
knowledge.”399 Regime change was achieved solely through religious, not political, 
conviction on the part of the people fighting. This unknown author describes an 
interaction with Azzam in Ghowr: 
Haqqani didn’t call me at the agreed upon time and the reason was the 
arrival of Dr. ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam long with thirty five Arab young men 
came from Peshawar to liberate Ghowr. I have compared them to 
“People’s Resistance” at the time which we know in Egypt; which are 
that type of forces that our government forms along with every defeat 
in its wars with Israel… The contribution of these People’s Resistance 
Forces at its best is represented in the famous phrase they send out 
loudly at night; that is: “Turn off the light”. The Arab young men who 
came here were unfamiliar with the area, most of them have not been 
completely or even partially trained, and have no idea about what is 
going on around her except that Ghowr has fallen and that Dr. 
‘Abdullah had called upon them to fight and brought them here.400 
 
The Mujahedeen were as much inspired by Azzam as a leader as they were by the 
theology he espoused. The unknown author also comments on the religious, political and 
organizational ideology of the Arab Mujahedeen in 1986. He writes: 
It is out of the question that Dr. ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam is the greatest 
ideology pioneer of the Arab jihad rally in Afghanistan, and continued 
to be so until his martyr in November of 1989; although his standing 
had tangibly declined in that year. 
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Dr. Azzam is the legitimate founder of Jihad in Afghanistan; rather 
the Jihad burst which followed it, he was the political speculator of 
the Arab rally and what succeeded it from and Islamic depth in the 
Arab world and the crowds of the immigrants in Europe and 
American in particular… 
After that, Dr. ‘Abdullah’ was the only architect of the Arab activity 
on Afghani soil; which is the role he quickly lost with the emergence 
of Osama Bin Laden as a military Jihadist motivator with enormous 
push forward. Also, many had lost, with the multiplication of the Arab 
Jihadist break out on the Afghani surface and their financial, 
ideological, and organizational independence. Dr. ‘Abdullah’ did not 
bring anything new in his legitimate origin or his political vision; but 
his great advantage was his credibility, and his simmering emotion; 
which he confirmed in his complete field involvement without 
reservation in the Afghani crowd. 
The man rode the highest Jihad podium in the world of this century, 
gave his effective religious speech, defended jihad as a religious 
obligation and it has one path to defend the nation existence before 
the threats that destroyed it. Undoubtedly, Dr. ‘Abdullah’s’ writings 
and his taped speeches are regarded a witness to their time and a 
history for the ideology of the Arab jihad rally in Afghanistan.401 
 
This text is an example of the lionization common among jihadists when they speak of 
Azzam and the Mujahedeen success in the Afghan Soviet war. Yet, the source also notes 
Azzam’s lack of political skill and specific political vision.  
Azzam was a theological force and inspiration to jihadists internationally. He also 
provided pragmatic organizational support for the Afghan Arabs. Yet his vision for an 
ongoing, broader war may have been unrealistic and paradoxically defined. He aimed to 
recapture all lands that were once ruled by Islam from the infidels. It is paradoxical that 
he envisioned recapturing lands once ruled by Islam, but that he needed to do so through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Ibid., 222–223. 
183 
	  
	  
regime change of nation-states, territorially defined. This sentiment relates to another 
document from an unknown source written in 2002, discussing Afghanistan and the 
author’s criticism of the West’s desired world order, based on territory. He writes: 
World order is a term coined by European politicians during their war 
with the Ottoman Caliphates… It is a system of regulating the 
relations of the world to achieve political objectives, which are: 
To ensure control of the Christian European countries over the rest of 
the world. 
To organize the relationships within Christian Europe to avoid 
fighting among themselves for control over poor and weak countries, 
or divide the Islamic countries to European colonies. 
To exclude Islam from the international arena; this mean elimination 
of the Ottoman Empire and preventing Muslims from establishing big 
countries to carry out jihad against the Christians. 
This is exactly what they are doing currently with any country that 
attempts to implement Islam, like what is happening with 
Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iran.402 
 
This sums up how Al Qaeda viewed the Western agenda in 2003. Bin Laden, based on 
Azzam’s philosophy, envisioned a very different world order, in which foreign and 
Christian forces would exit all Islamic lands and in which the US, or the “far enemy”403, 
was the primary enemy. Both the perceived Western agenda and Bin Laden’s agenda 
were based on territorial gains, though boundaries were drawn along Westphalian lines in 
the one, and pre-Westphalian religiously defined lines in the other. 
Support from US military aid allowed the Mujahedeen to give Afghan religious 
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leaders power in the conduct of war. Dibb writes, “It gave the Mujahedeen confidence 
that they could beat a superpower. This applies to their attitude to the Soviet Union then 
and to America now.”404 Calvert comments that the skills learned by the Mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan were always envisioned to be used in an extended global battle. He writes: 
For the fighters in Afghanistan, the war was a source of heroism, 
solidarity, and total devotion to Islam as defined in terms of adherence 
to Sharia. Many were already aware that the war against the Soviet 
army was a school in which they might learn the violent techniques 
needed to topple their governments at home.405 
 
The end of the Soviet Afghan war brought a dichotomy in visions of world order that was 
intimately related to Westphalian sovereignty. It was the ummah versus nation state 
system. 
 According to Philpott, Westphalian sovereignty has “three faces”. First, 
Westphalia made the sovereign state the most powerful and legitimate form of political 
unity. Second, it found a government with control over its territory to be the criterion for 
statehood. Third, Westphalia removed previously legitimate restrictions on a state’s 
activities within its territory.406 Philpott defines sovereignty along the lines of legitimacy, 
supremacy and territoriality. He writes, “Legitimate authority is crucially different from 
power... Legitimacy, evoking allegiance and respect, can itself lend force to sovereign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Dibb, “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan,” 507. 
405 Calvert, “The Striving Shaykh,” 345. 
406 Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 7. 
185 
	  
	  
claims.”407 Overall, “Sovereignty is supreme legitimate authority within a territory.”408 
Azzam’s own individual legitimacy as a transnational religious actor and the legitimacy 
of a fundamentalist Islamic state that he advocated for challenged the legitimacy of the 
Communist state. However, this is significant beyond the context of the Soviet-Afghan 
war. First, the case suggests that religion and a religious ideology can be translated into a 
political legitimacy. Second, the case suggests that that an individual can mobilize forces 
across nation-state lines and harness and transnational ideology in questioning existing 
political legitimacy. Azzam viewed Afghanistan as the first in a series of holy wars to 
recapture Islamic lands. There was a vision for world order, a vision for the supremacy of 
an ideology, and a vision for the supreme power in Islamic lands, power unchallenged by 
Christian and foreign forces. His vision for world order was pan-Islamic, with supreme 
power based in an amorphous theological transnational community. 
 Azzam’s challenge to sovereignty based on the notion of territoriality is more 
complicated. According to Philpott, “the Treaty removed all legitimate restrictions on a 
state’s activities within its territory.”409 Perhaps the most fundamental principle of 
Westphalian sovereignty is the right of a nation state to have supreme power and 
legitimacy within the boundaries of its own territory. While Azzam may have held an 
ultimate pan-Islamic vision, the steps to achieve that involved working within the nation 
state system. Although he was mobilizing Afghan Arabs internationally and 
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promulgating a theology of an individual obligation to jihad regardless of country of 
origin, he was still confined to aim to change the regime in Afghanistan, within the 
territorial boundaries of a sovereign state. As a powerful, transnational religious actor, 
Azzam fundamentally rejected the Westphalian nation state, yet he was also forced to 
work within the system of nation-states in his first steps to achieve his pan-Islamic world 
order.  
In his rejection of Westphalian sovereignty, Azzam’s quest harkens back to the 
medieval jihad. Hegghammer finds that: 
Azzam’s ruling that jihad is an individual duty for all in case of 
outside invasion was arguably more similar to the classical medieval 
jihad conception than was the twentieth-century orthodoxy, which 
conceded veto power on the matter to the nation-state, a modern 
innovation.410 
 
Azzam rejected the sovereign state and system of sovereign states as classically defined 
by Westphalia. His aimed to establish an Islamic theocracy in Afghanistan and ultimately 
a universal Caliphate. It was a vision of a world with territorial boundaries drawn upon 
religiously based, pre-Westphalian lines. He offered a theological framework for 
transnational violent action. His “defensive jihad” called on every Muslim to defend 
Muslim lands for infidel invaders or to oust infidel occupiers. This created a global 
jihadist movement that to this day threatens states’ ability to control movement over their 
borders and to be free from outside intervention. In addition to offering the theological 
framework, Azzam’s work in the MAK made the Afghan Arabs possible pragmatically. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,” 76. 
187 
	  
	  
He was involved in international recruitment of Mujahedeen, soliciting of international 
funds and arms, and the training and everyday life of the Afghan Arabs. The Afghan 
Arabs and the international network that supported them became the backbone of the Al 
Qaeda movement shortly after Azzam’s death. Thus Azzam rejected the classic 
Westphalian state sovereignty in his geo-political vision, his theology, and his work on 
the ground in Afghanistan.  
Krasner’s four types of sovereignty – international legal sovereignty, Westphalian 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty – can be applied to 
this case study. Azzam partially undermined the domestic sovereignty of Communist 
Afghanistan, by repelling Soviet forces acting in its defense with foreign fighters. He 
sought to topple the public authority of the state, and to do it with transnational, non-state 
actors. Azzam’s vision beyond Afghanistan was to use this transnational force to aid 
other Muslim lands in the defense against foreign forces. In some of those cases, the 
“Afghan Arabs” would have been used to defend the domestic sovereignty of a nation 
state. At least as an initial step toward reform, Azzam envisioned restoring Islamic rule 
within the boundaries of each nation-state. Azzam violated interdependence sovereignty 
by making it the duty of every Muslim to defend other Muslims in countries rules by 
infidels or under threat of infidel invasion. The transnational ummah was called to jihad 
with global terms. He further undermined interdependence sovereignty by organizing the 
Afghan Arabs on the ground. By contributing to the retreat of the Soviets and the fall of 
the country into civil war, Azzam and his Afghan Arabs weakened the international legal 
sovereignty of the nation state, and they did not replace it with a strong, stable, 
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internationally respected regime. Afghanistan was left in a state of war. The intelligence 
documents reviewed seem to suggest that Azzam lacked the political ability to build the 
domestic consensus necessary to form a new government, and much less the international 
legitimacy to produce positive international opinion in its favor. However, his untimely 
death months after withdrawal leave many of these opinions as mere speculations and 
unanswered questions. The next stable regime to rule in Afghanistan would be the 
Taliban in 1996. 
Azzam was a pioneer in creating a transnational network of fighters and a 
revolutionary jihadist ideology that threatened Krasner’s Westphalian sovereignty on 
several levels. First, he violated separation of church and state by proving that religion 
and religious ideology can be translated into political legitimacy. Second, Azzam violated 
the territorial nature of the state by creating the MAK and organizing men from around 
the globe to fight to overturn the Communist government in Afghanistan. Third, he 
violated the nation state system by accomplishing this as a transnational Islamic leader, as 
an individual who could mobilize forces across nation-state lines and harness a 
transnational ideology to question existing legitimacy. Finally, his vision for a pan-
Islamic world order posed problems for the Westphalian system. He proposed to restore 
Islamic rule to Muslim nations, defined by modern territorial boundaries, but the 
legitimacy of world order would be based in the ummah, an amorphous theological 
transnational community. 
Krasner holds that the norms of sovereignty were never strong, that they have 
always been challenged. His later notion of “shared sovereignty” can be applied to the 
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contemporary situation in Afghanistan, where stability is contributed to by the presence 
of foreign military forces and the acceptance of foreign aid. But during his time, Azzam 
was not involved in diplomatic efforts to involve foreign governments in governing 
Afghanistan. Stacey’s “relational sovereignty” does not apply to this case as the situation 
after Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan and Azzam’s death was too unstable to allow 
opportunity for it. Rudolph argues that transnational activity does not replace or 
superseded political maps of territorial defined states. She imagines them as “transparent 
overlays, alternative meaning systems superimposed upon the meaning system of 
political maps.”411 There were multiple transnational civil societies that overlaid the 
political map of the Soviet Afghan war, and Rudolph’s theory allows them to coexist. Yet 
Azzam himself would not have accepted such a vision. He combined transnational 
movement with a political theology that sought a world based on religiously defined 
boundaries with complete disregard for the borders established after Westphalia.  
Azzam’s actions as theological and military leader did not respect the system of 
sovereign states. Azzam used a mix of hard and soft power to galvanize a transnational 
military force to push back Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. His ability to lay the 
theological and pragmatic groundwork for the modern day jihadist movement challenges 
modern definitions of state sovereignty. 
However there are multiple broader contributions of this case study to the body of 
literature on sovereignty. First, the proposed causal relationships between TRL (enabled 
by TRL and TSM characteristics), regime change goals and contributions, and challenges 
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to conceptions of state sovereignty offer a detailed process of how TRLs impact 
conceptions of sovereignty. Second, in this case, the characteristics of transformational 
leadership, religious soft power, and high levels of mobilization enable him to challenge 
conceptions of state sovereignty more profoundly than other transnational actors. He was 
able to capture a deep, traditional religious identity, revive it and combine it with political 
content, and ultimately to be wildly successful at mobilizing political and military action 
with the aim of reviving a pre-Westphalian world, in which territorial lines are based on 
religion, not a secular treaty. 
Philpott claims that “tumult yields novel orthodoxy in international relations.” 
The unique tumult caused by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam – tumult in the Soviet Afghan war, 
tumult in the philosophy and direction of the global jihadist movement, and the tumult of 
transformed conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty – indeed yields orthodoxy. The role 
of transnational religious actors can no longer be ignored in international relations theory. 
Whether their actions are of good or evil, they exist, and they are changing the rules of 
the game, changing the rules of Westphalia. Perhaps Azzam’s hurricane of virtue has 
indeed come with the tumultuous implications of “jihad and rifle alone” and a newly 
defined, passionately preached jihad fard ayn (individual obligation). It calls for a new 
orthodoxy, a new recognition that the transnational religious actor is transforming 
conceptions of Westphalian and modern state sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
The presence of transnational religious leaders, their characteristics and the 
characteristics of their associated transnational social movements influence political 
revolution and regime change. In both the cases of Pope John Paul II in Poland and 
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam in Afghanistan, a TRL used soft power, based in a transnational 
religious identity and civil society, to contribute to a TSM that altered the domestic 
authority structures in Poland and Afghanistan, respectively, and ultimately challenged 
conceptions of state sovereignty. The cases alter in that Pope John Paul II appealed to 
sovereign states internationally and nonviolently mobilized people domestically to 
peacefully delegitimize the Communist regime in Poland, while Azzam appealed to sub 
state actors in the Muslim world to violently deter Soviet invasion and to drive 
Afghanistan into a prolonged state of civil war. 
In both cases a transnational religious leader was present. A TRL has been 
defined as an individual actor who, as guided by a religious ideology, acts towards 
political ends, benefiting from both material (people, weapons, capital) and immaterial 
(theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world leaders) resources across state lines in 
the achievement of those ends. Pope John Paul II and Azzam were analyzed according to 
four characteristics of the transnational religious leaders (TRL): leadership style, use of 
hard versus soft power, relationship to the secular state, and relationship to modernity. 
The politics of protest associated with each actor was analyzed according to four 
characteristics of the transnational social movements (TSM): political theology, 
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mobilization structures, political opportunity structures, and character of transnational 
activism. These characteristics were tested in each case to find differences and 
similarities in the two historical cases. Differences enable the paper to explore new 
meanings of state sovereignty resulting from TRLs and regime change. Similarities 
enable a discussion of what makes TRL unique and how they pose a distinct challenge to 
sovereignty when compared to other transnational actors. Consequently two aspects of 
regime change were analyzed. With varying amounts of information in each case 
available, the TRL’s goal for regime change was reconstructed and analyzed in terms of 
its compatibility with the Westphalian system. Then, the regime change caused was 
described, and the factors of influence of each individual were identified and placed 
within the context of larger forces at work. Finally, in analyzing the relationship between 
transnational religious leaders and evolving conceptions of sovereignty, traditional and 
modern scholarly definitions of sovereignty were considered. 
Enabling Characteristics of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam 
The following chart presents the findings of the most significant characteristics 
representative of similarities and differences in the two case studies. 
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Figure 6 - Enabling Characteristics of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
 
 
After analyzing the case studies, this paper finds that Pope John Paul II and 
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam share a transformational leadership style, effective religious soft 
power, and highly mobilized social movements. They most differ in terms of their 
relationship to modernity, their political theologies, and the nature of their transnational 
activism. 
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Personal Attributes of TRL 
The first characteristic is leadership style, and it suggests that to be the first 
similarity in the cases. Both individuals were transformational leaders. In both cases their 
theological writing and inspirational speeches gave people a vision of an identity that 
transcended nation state boundaries. In the case of the pope, that vision presented 
individuals with an identity as a Pole and as a child of God that transcended the 
Communist state, and gave a framework to justify nonviolent political protest. In the case 
of Azzam, that vision was one of an individual identity as a Muslim and member of the 
transnational ummah, with a deep responsibility to participate in jihad. Both cases 
exemplify Burn’s ideal leadership which enables followers to accomplish goals that even 
the leader might not have fully realized, pushing both the leader and followers to 
greatness. Both the democratization movement in Eastern Europe and global jihadism 
lived on as movements after the death of Pope John Paul II and Azzam. However the 
Solidarity movement and the Afghan Arab movement still have specific historical and 
domestic contexts. 
The TRLs both held soft power, but Azzam also held traditional hard power. The 
use of religious soft power by both Pope John Paul II and Azzam is the second similarity 
within the enabling characteristics. In the case of Pope John Paul II, his “religious soft 
power”412 was evident in his ability to make states, groups, and individuals want to do 
what he wanted them to do. His strong hold on the popular imagination and the “spirit” of 
the Polish nation was evident in popular response to him during pilgrimages and in their 
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reliance on his diplomacy when Solidarity’s progress was stalled. He offered Solidarity 
as a group a religious language and context through which to justify their goals. He met 
with and corresponded with world leaders, influencing their opinion and shaping the 
discourse on Solidarity and democracy in Poland. Even in relationships with militarily 
powerful world leaders, particularly with US leadership, Pope John Paul II wielded soft 
power in that he was respected and included in US foreign policy discussions. The pope 
did not support violence, except in rare cases of just war, and did not achieve his ends 
transactionally. However, he understood the worth of his allies and leveraged their 
existence in his conversations and relations with Soviet leadership. Although he did not 
fully accept the realist world, in which hard power drove world events, he knew how to 
operate within in it. 
In the case of Azzam, his soft power is what enabled him to be influential in the 
global jihadist movement, even to this day, but he also clearly used hard power in the 
achievement of his goals. He successfully exercised soft power in using his religious 
writings and public statements to inspire Muslims internationally to come to Afghanistan 
to fight for the preservation of Islamic land. He managed to alter the fundamental 
responsibilities of Muslim men and women, among those who accepted his vision, to 
include the duty to defensive jihad on behalf of any Muslim land occupied by infidels. 
However, Azzam managed to not only successfully inspire jihadists with religious soft 
power, but to also provide the pragmatic opportunity to wage jihad in Afghanistan. His 
work with the MAK on the ground was coupled with efforts internationally to recruit 
money, arms, and other materials in support of the war. By effectively leading the 
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Afghan Arabs and coordinating with the existing Afghan forces, Azzam wielded hard 
power, in the most basic sense of military power. Despite his holding both soft and hard 
power, the case study revealed that Azzam was not effective at international diplomacy, 
with non-Muslim or Muslim nations. This absence made it difficult to confer legitimacy 
on the struggle of the Afghan Arabs through support from world powers internationally. 
The US materially supported the effort, supplying weapons and capital through Pakistan, 
but only in the short-term effort to eradicate Soviet influence from the area. There was no 
international consensus built around Azzam’s vision for an Islamic theocracy in 
Afghanistan, nor for an international Caliphate, except amongst a limited, fundamentalist 
transnational Islamic community. 
Thus, both Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam were transformational 
leaders who primarily used religious soft power to achieve their goals of regime change. 
Azzam also held hard power in his leadership of a military force. John Paul did not have 
hard power but understood how to operate in a realist world, leveraging his relationship 
to militarily powerful allies in his messages to the Soviets. They both offered ideological 
and theological language to justify the social movements associated with them, and they 
both worked on the ground (Azzam directly through the MAK, the Pope indirectly 
through Polish church leadership and Vatican diplomats) to create the opportunity for 
political change. The Pope was perhaps more skilled at diplomacy with world leaders; 
though diplomatic efforts, he was able to lend legitimacy to the Solidarity movement and 
eventually to democratic governance in Poland. Azzam may have been less successful at 
a clean transition to a sustainable form of government respected internationally, but he 
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was profoundly successful at changing the language of jihadist literature on the 
individual’s responsibility to jihad. The shift the focus of jihadism as a result of Azzam’s 
life is still evident in global jihadist movements to this day. 
The third and fourth characteristics of the transnational religious leader are his 
relationship to secularization and his relationship to modernity. Their relationships to 
modernity in particular are the first point of significant difference between the leaders. 
Pope John Paul II’s perspective was somewhat paradoxical. He rejected secularism, in the 
sense of the declining significance of religion in the modern world, as often measured by 
a decline in religious belief, a decline in religious participation, and the privatization of 
religion and religious institutions from world affairs. Along with prominent social science 
theories of how the world is secularized, there is also an attached normative statement 
that secularization is a positive effect of modernization. On the most individual level, he 
believed that God’s relationship with man, and the Christian significance of man and 
woman, drove world history and world events. On the institutional level, he led a Roman 
Catholic Church that was very involved in all matters of public life, and in Poland, 
ultimately very vocal even on specific matters of public policy. Although he rejected 
secularism as a movement, he did not reject the secular state. Unlike Azzam, he did not 
advocate for a theocracy, but rather a form of government that would protect religious 
freedom and give man and woman the opportunity to work with dignity. This comfort 
with a secular state, so long as it protects religious freedoms, perhaps harkens back to the 
relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the treaty of Westphalia. One of the 
tenets of the Peace of Westphalia was that all parties would recognize the Peace of 
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Augsburg of 1555, in which each prince would determine the religion of his own state 
under cuis region, eius religio. Other provisions in the treaty included the right of 
religious minorities to religious practice and the right of each nation to exclusive 
sovereignty over its own lands. The Roman Catholic Church accommodated to this 
treaty, and to this day, its vision for the Christian life and even Christian evangelization 
does not involve the establishment of Christian theocracies. Although there is a strong 
transnational Roman Catholic community, it does not seek to have a formalized, and 
certainly not, universalized territory to enable productive Christian life. Thus, Pope John 
Paul rejected the thesis that modern man should evolve into a secular man, but he did 
recognize the usefulness of the secular state and an international system of secular states 
in protecting man ability to worship and to live with dignity. 
 Azzam’s relationship to secularization and modernization was very different. He 
ultimately envisioned a return to a pre-Westphalian world order in which all lands that 
were once Muslim would return to Muslim rule. He adopted a slow strategy towards the 
ultimate establishment of a universal Caliphate. Deeming Palestine and Afghanistan the 
most important territories for regime change, Azzam focused on the “near enemy,”413 any 
regional or international player preventing the establishment of Islamic rule in those 
territories. He rejected secularism as a positive process and sought the establishment of 
Islamic theocracies, in which religion would rule all aspects of private and public life. On 
a broader level, he seemed to reject the Westphalian system of secular states, seeking 
instead for territorial lines and boundaries of authority to be determined by religious 
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affiliation. Like the case of Pope John Paul II, this brings into question the fundamental 
relationship between Azzam’s denomination, Islam, and the Treaty of Westphalia. One 
could argue that his rejection of the secular state is mostly a factor of his religious 
denomination, yet that would deny examples of modern, democratic Islamic states. His 
vision of world order was almost medieval in nature. Hegghammer views this iteration of 
pan-Islamism as a “macro-nationalism centered on the imagined community of the 
ummah, which is defined by religion.”414 Although the Muslim nation and community is 
a-territorial, pan-Islamists have a territorial vision of Muslim community – “all lands 
once ruled by Muslims, from Andalucía in the West to Indonesia in the East.”415 For 
Azzam, Afghanistan was a productive theater to give voice to his pan-Islamist ideas.416 
Azzam envisioned the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan as the first step in an 
international Islamist movement, towards an ultimate war against international 
Communism, what he called “a war between the Ummahs (collective peoples of Islam) 
versus Communism.”417 This is evocative of the cosmic images conjured by other 
religious terrorist groups – the war is larger than life, relates to a metaphysical conflict 
between good and evil, and transcends human experience.418 Azzam sought for the 
transnational Islamic community to be represented on the world stage by an Islamic 
Caliphate. In that sense, secularity and religion could not coexist for Azzam. He also 
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sought for Muslim culture to be dominant globally and for sharia law to order Muslim 
societies. In that sense, modernity and religion could not co-exist for him either. 
Thus, both men rejected secularization as a process necessary to modernity and 
did not acknowledge it as a something positive. For both men, human history and world 
history were driven by man’s relationship with God and by cultural identity. They both 
wanted their communities to practice religion faithfully, to demonstrate their beliefs in 
the public square, and to follow the teachings of the denomination. Yet John Paul 
believed this was possible within the system of modern, sovereign states, while Azzam 
sought to gradually overhaul world order, replacing it with a pre-Westphalian order of 
territories drawn along religious lines. Herein lies the important difference exposed by 
this category. 
Community Characteristics of TSM 
Pope John Paul II and Azzam’s transnational social movements were analyzed 
through the categories of political theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity 
structures, and the character of activism. The second point of difference between the 
leaders is political theology. Political theology refers to how transnational religious 
leaders frame their struggle and what concepts they use to create mobilization. Pope John 
Paul II’s message was one of human dignity and of a theological purpose for man that 
transcended the state. He believed that there was a central purpose, rooted in Jesus Christ, 
for all human activity. Yet these lofty words translated into very pragmatic political 
goals. Namely, he sought an end to Communism in his native Poland and elsewhere, and 
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the rise of secular, stable governments that protected religious freedom. Azzam’s 
message was less clearly delineated along line of theology versus politics. His central 
message was also theological, that man’s life is defined by how he fulfills his duties to 
Allah. He slightly changed a fundamental precept of Islam, duty to jihad, to make it a 
duty incumbent on all Muslims to defend Islamic lands threatened anywhere in the world. 
His goal- the establishment of a Caliphate- was both political and theological. Thus, the 
theological messages of both men were used to define and mobilize people towards 
political ends. 
The second characteristic of the transnational social movement, “mobilizing 
structures”, presents differently in the two case studies. The high levels of mobilization in 
both cases poses the third point of similarity. Pope John Paul II’s social movement, the 
“Solidarity” movement, includes both the network of activists on the ground in Poland, 
and the broad base of support for the movement that existed internationally and 
transnationally. Solidarity had both domestic and international mobilizing structures. On 
the ground it used strikes and public protest activities to change the policies of the 
Communist regime. Individual churches in Poland provided varying levels of support to 
the movement, including the use of church property for meetings and the participation of 
clergy in planning events. On a higher level, Church leadership led negotiations between 
the Solidarity and PZPR regime. As the ideological polarization on the ground 
heightened, Solidarity gained an increasingly transnational support base, creating new 
mobilizing opportunities within the state. In other words, Solidarity became both a 
domestic power struggle and a subject of world power conflict.  
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Azzam’s social movement can be defined both in terms of the struggle of the 
Afghan Arabs in Afghanistan and as the beginning of a refined global jihadist movement 
to liberate Islamic lands from non-Islamic rulers. The mobilizing structures existed on 
several levels. Consider coordination with Afghan freedom fighters on the ground, the 
establishment of the MAK and training of international recruits, the international 
recruitment process, and the coordination with individuals, groups, and states who 
donated arms and money to the cause internationally. Unlike the case of Poland, Islamic 
leadership did not provide channels to negotiate with the Soviets. Armed conflict was 
quickly escalated on the domestic level, which translated to the polarization of great 
powers on the international level. 
Thus both Solidarity and the Afghan Arab jihadist movement had mobilizing 
structures within the context of their domestic regimes, Poland and Afghanistan. A 
formalized church played a peace-keeping role in Poland; this was absent in Afghanistan. 
Recruitment was enabled through church structures in Poland and through the MAK in 
Afghanistan. Domestic protest activities in Poland drew primarily from domestic recruits. 
In Afghanistan, the recruits were primarily drawn from other countries, within the 
transnational fundamentalist Islamic community. In both cases, the domestic conflict 
escalated into an international contest between great powers and galvanized individuals 
along transnational ideological lines around the globe. 
The third characteristic of the transnational social movement is “political 
opportunity structures”, a term used to capture the relationship between the state and the 
social movement. In the case of Poland, the Soviet institutional political system was 
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closed and elite arrangements within the system difficult to impact. The state had a great 
capacity and propensity for repression. However there was a strong presence of 
international elite allies external to the state, namely in the leaders of Western world 
powers. The case in Poland follows Owen’s causal path. As the state gained more 
aggregate power and resources, the social movement became stronger. As the state 
authority and state meaning became more internationally significant, the social 
movement became more transnational in scope. The more repressive the state became on 
the ground, the more international sympathy went to the Solidarity movement. Domestic 
political opportunities for Solidarity were often the result of the international struggle for 
the fate of Poland. 
In the case of Afghanistan, the institutionalized political system of the young 
Soviet government was closed and elite allies were not easily accessed. As the future of 
Afghanistan’s political future became an increasingly international topic, with great 
powers invested on either side, the opportunity of the Afghan Arabs to achieve regime 
change increased. As the conflict gained more international attention, the Afghan Arabs 
received transnational support in the form of arms, money, and supportive political 
dialogue from around the Middle East, and even from individuals in the West. Soviet 
support, however, was still centralized in the Soviet Union and did not take on this 
transnational character. The Soviets were surprised by the strength and transnational 
nature of the resistance in Afghanistan. Domestic political opportunities for the 
Mujahedeen did not open up until the Soviets withdrew from the territory. 
In both cases the international ideological struggle played an important role in the 
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outcome of the contested regime. In Poland, political opportunities resulted from 
nonviolent resistance and the mediation of church officials on the ground, but were 
mostly enhanced when the struggle for Poland’s nationhood became a subject of 
international debate. As a result of the internationalization of the conflict, the Solidarity 
movement took on an air of legitimacy, much rooted in the strength of its allies. 
Diplomatic discourse impacted the Communist regime’s reactions to nonviolent 
resistance on the ground. In Afghanistan, the Afghan Arabs did not enjoy such a cloak of 
international legitimacy, but the movement was internationalized. Transnational support 
for the Afghan Arabs took the pragmatic form of arms, recruits, and money, which 
contributed to the moment of Soviet defeat, and subsequent opening of the political 
system to change. 
The fourth category through which to analyze each social movement is the 
character of activism. This characteristic comprises the third difference in the two case 
studies. The Solidarity movement was a labor movement that used nonviolent strikes and 
political protest to attain peaceful regime change in Poland. Pope John Paul II’s activism 
was also nonviolent in nature. His contribution was both inspirational and practical. His 
encyclicals, public homilies and speeches, and pilgrimages to Poland gave a theological 
justification and lent theological symbolism to the Solidarity movement, thus 
contributing to its success. Practically, he exchanged written correspondence with and 
held private meetings with leaders on both sides of the iron curtain, and he was involved 
through his ambassadors and the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland in 
negotiations between Solidarity and the Communist state. 
205 
	  
	  
In stark contrast, Azzam led the Afghan Arabs in a violent uprising against Soviet 
invasion. He not only extolled the virtues and necessity of violence in his theological 
tracts, he also accompanied his recruits to the battlefield. One of his most famous lines 
encapsulated the high regard for violence: “Jihad and rifle alone: no negotiations, no 
conferences, no dialogue.”419 For Azzam, violent jihad was the responsibility of every 
able-bodied Muslim man and woman until all lands formerly Islamic had been returned 
to Islamic rule. Azzam was effective at mobilizing recruits and mobilizing financial 
support for them internationally, however, he was not a diplomat like John Paul. He did 
not correspond with world leaders or seek the approval of world opinion. He was 
primarily focused on the short-term goal of eradicating Afghanistan of the Soviets, and 
not his long-term goal of the establishment of a functioning state.  
Pope John Paul II persuaded the international community to identify with the 
Poles in their protest of the Communist regime. He sought for his fellow Poles to have 
national self-determination and to enter the world as a modern state with religious 
freedoms and sovereign borders. Azzam’s activism was perhaps more revolutionary. He 
called on Muslims internationally to identify with the plight of the Afghans and to fight 
on their behalf, but he framed it as part of a broader war, which if won, would recreate 
world order to be based on religiously defined territorial lines, abandoning the current 
system as defined by Westphalia. John Paul II acted on behalf of Poles seeking political 
liberation by allowing church officials on the ground to negotiate with the regime, allying 
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with the United States, and inspiring non-violent protest through Solidarity in Poland. In 
his mind, Azzam acted on behalf of Muslims everywhere by organizing jihad in what was 
to be the first of many states to be turned into a theocracy and liberated from secularism. 
He was less successful than the pope at high-level diplomacy, but perhaps more 
successful at inspiring ongoing, transnational political activism towards a common cause 
based on theological identity. 
Identified Relationship of TRL to Challenges to Modern Sovereignty 
The investigation of these eight characteristics depicts two very different men. 
John Paul II accommodated to modernity, supported a secular state that provided 
religious freedom, and mobilized through non-violent activism. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam 
rejected modernity, supported theocracy as the best form of state, and worked through 
violent activism. And yet both men were transformational leaders who successfully 
wielded soft power to mobilize their communities at high levels. What implications can 
we draw from these findings about the TRL’s impact upon regime change and 
conceptions of sovereignty? 
After applying the hypothesized relationship of TRL to challenges to conceptions 
of sovereignty to the case studies, the following relationships were identified: 
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Figure 7 - Identified Relationships of Case Subjects to Challenges to Conceptions of 
Modern State Sovereignty 
 
This relationship extends from TRLs moved by different combinations of 
enabling characteristics, to TRL goals, and based on these goals, their level of 
accommodating with Westphalian sovereignty. Each TRL then contributes to regime 
change, and ultimately challenges to conceptions of modern state sovereignty in different 
ways. They both offer a challenge to the dominance of the sovereign state as the most 
important actor in the world system. However, Azzam offers a further challenge, in that 
his theological writings and operations in Afghanistan built the basis for modern 
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iterations of jihad around the world, a movement which rejects the system of sovereign 
states as we know it today. 
Political Goals and Contributions to Regime Change 
Despite their similarities, Pope John Paul II and Azzam had different political 
goals, reflecting different levels of accommodation to Westphalian sovereignty. It is 
difficult to assess to what extent the pope intended regime change. But his goals can be 
understood through his theological ones. Weigel writes: “In his (Wojtyla’s) Christian-
Polish view, history was best read through the prism of moral analysis, and viewed 
through that prism, the subjugation of the nations within Stalin’s external and internal 
empires was a moral catastrophe.”420 And though the evidence shows that the church on 
the ground alternately supported Solidarity and the Communist regime at different times, 
it is clear that John Paul’s public statements and public and private correspondence with 
world leaders shows his support of the Solidarity movement. He supported this non-
violent movement, which originally aimed to reform the government, not to replace it 
(though it eventually come to power under a newly democratic state.) Thus, though it is 
difficult to ascribe political calculation to a figure with as much theological gravitas as 
Pope John Paul II, it is safe to say that he supported a change in Communist Poland, a 
change which would give Poles back their religious freedom, a change which would 
happen nonviolently and not threaten the Westphalian system. 
The case of Azzam presents different difficulties. His goal for political order was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 Weigel, 296 
209 
	  
	  
in some ways more clear than Pope John Paul II’s. He aimed for Afghanistan to be a 
roadmap for other formerly-Muslim controlled countries to be freed from infidels, and 
ultimately, he supported a global Islamic Caliphate. That being said, he only lived to see 
the withdrawal of the Soviets, and his life’s work was based in the context of a violent 
revolution to repel their invasion of Afghanistan. After Azzam died and the Soviets 
withdrew, the Communist government survived another, albeit unstable year, before the 
country fell into a prolonged period of civil war. The intelligence documents gathered 
from Afghanistan relating to the Soviet Afghan war question Azzam’s diplomatic and 
political abilities. In other words, he was a brilliant theologian and charismatic leader, but 
his goals were based in ideology, not political reality. His goal was initially the 
transformation of Afghanistan to a theocracy, and ultimately, state dissolution and 
geopolitical restructuring when the Caliphate was established. These goals did not respect 
the system of sovereign states as established by Westphalia. 
Analyzing the goals of these TRLs and the level of accommodation of their goals 
with Westphalia lays the groundwork for understanding the actual regime change that 
occurs in each case. In both cases a transnational religious leader and a transnational 
social movement caused a response from nation states, resulting in regime change. 
Krasner argues that the strength of regime change as an intervening variable can be 
evaluated in terms of a structural, modified structural or Grotian perspective. 
Conventional structural arguments do not view regimes as very significant, holding that if 
basic causal variables change, regimes will also change with not independent impact on 
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behavior.421 Modified structural arguments find regimes to be important only when 
“independent decision making leads to undesired outcomes.”422 Grotian perspectives find 
regimes to be very important, and fundamental to all human behavior in the international 
system.423 A critical question to understanding the strength of the regime change as an 
indicator of challenged conceptions of sovereignty in these cases poses: Could the 
independent variables (presence of transnational religious leader, characteristics of 
transnational religious leader, and characteristics of social movement) could have 
impacted sovereignty without effecting regime change? If so, to what extent? 
 In the case of Pope John Paul II and the democratization of Poland, regime 
change was important to his impact on state sovereignty. John Paul II’s speeches, 
writings, and meetings did not undermine conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty, and 
he operated comfortably in a system of secular states. He primarily changed the 
dependent variable of conceptions of sovereignty through specific regime change in 
Poland, strengthening it through the birth of an internationally respected, internally robust 
democracy. Also, his strength as an individual leader of multiple transnational 
communities (ex. Roman Catholic community, the democratization movement), his 
ability to influence heads of state internationally, and his cult of personality in Poland, 
contributed to the instigation of political protest and mobilization of a social movement in 
Poland. The ability of a transnational religious leader to contribute to any form of regime 
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change is threatening to traditional state sovereignty, and speaks to the import of regime 
change as an intervening variable. Considering these factors, the variable of regime 
change in this case study falls within a Grotian perspective. John Paul may not have 
viewed political regimes or hard power as the major driver of human history, but he did 
aim to enable man’s religious freedoms and dignity through a specific political objective, 
namely the reform of or nonviolent fall of the Communist regime in Poland. 
 Of course, Pope John Paul II presents only one factor in the fall of Communism in 
Poland. There were many long-standing factors that contributed to the moment. Long-
term reasons included a generalized hatred of Russia that existed long before the Cold 
War and an antagonism between the Catholic Church and the regime.424 The Church 
symbolized national identity so government abuse of the Church antagonized people. 
Short-term reasons included problems with Russian authority created by the Cold War 
and economic grievances.425 The state was unable to provide for the people, and the 
standard of living declined dramatically in Poland during the Cold War. They system was 
elite, not egalitarian, in practice. Immediate reasons for the call of Communism in Poland 
were Solidarity and a change in Russia’s foreign policy.426 When Brezhnev died in 1982, 
the Soviets cracked down on corruption in satellite states. Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and 
“perestroika” exposed Communist corruption. It is within this context that the pope’s 
contributions can be understood. He contributed to regime change through two roles. As 
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someone who was simultaneously pastor of a transnational religious community (the 
Roman Catholic Church) and a native to Poland, a land under Communism, he was able 
to reach into Poland’s history and provide Poles with a new way of viewing themselves, 
with an identity older, and perhaps more profound, than that of communism. As a leader 
of an international organization (the Roman Catholic Church) and a natural consensus 
builder, the pope was able to present the plight of the Polish people and their desire for 
democracy to world leaders, thus mobilizing international opinion in support of 
Solidarity. 
 In the case of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the importance of regime change as an 
intervening variable is more mixed. Azzam was perhaps most influential in his 
revolutionary worldview, not his specific contribution to regime change in Afghanistan. 
His speeches and writings redefine “defensive jihad” and call for Muslims everywhere to 
rise up in the violent defense of Muslim lands. He aimed to establish an Islamic theocracy 
in Afghanistan, and ultimately, a universal Caliphate and world order based on pre-
Westphalian, religiously defined, territorial boundaries. Though the efforts of the Afghan 
Arabs contributed to the withdrawal of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the “regime change” 
in this case refers to the change from a short-lived Soviet supported Communist 
government to a long period of civil war, during which the government changed control 
multiple times, due to assassinations and violent uprisings. In Azzam’s case, the actual 
regime change was less impactful upon sovereignty than the worldview and vision that 
created it. The presence of Azzam, characteristics of Azzam, and characteristics of the 
global jihadist movement impacted sovereignty regardless of the regime change in 
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Afghanistan, thus placing the regime change as an indicator of challenged conceptions of 
state sovereignty. 
 There are other major factors that contributed to “regime change” in this case 
besides Azzam. Soviet withdrawal would have perhaps been impossible, for example, 
had the US not given the Mujahedeen funding and weapons, particularly the shoulder-
launched antiaircraft missiles in 1987. The context of the Cold War was also at play, 
driving the USSR’s need to control an embarrassing situation. When Najibullah finally 
fell in 1992, the Mujahedeen’s role (and Azzam’s postmortem role) are complicated by 
other factors. In 1992, Russia refused to sell oil products to Afghanistan, triggering an 
embargo. Furthermore, General Abdul Rashid Dostam and his Uzbek militia defected in 
March, 1992, weakening the army. But Azzam did something that made Soviet 
withdrawal, the fall of Najibullah, and the harboring of Al Qaeda by the Taliban in 1996 
possible indirectly. He most impacted sovereignty not through the dissolution of the state 
(although he contributed to that), but by creating a new Muslim identity, based in old 
theological texts and interpreted in a new way. His vision of defensive jihad made Al 
Qaeda and a new class of global jihadists possible. In this way he exported terror and a 
new vision of state identity to the West postmortem. 
 In sum, regime change is a stronger intervening variable in the Pope John Paul II 
case than in the Azzam case. In both cases, the individual’s strengths as transnational 
religious leaders pose a challenge to a system in which states are the only variable of 
analysis. Though the pope’s vision was less extreme than Azzam’s, its actualization was 
more successful domestically. Azzam was more successful in inspiring an international 
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movement. In comparing the two, one impacted sovereignty through regime change, the 
other, though a vision that influences global jihadism to this day. The Pope’s overall 
vision did not threaten the traditional system of Westphalian states, but the regime change 
in Poland left a profound impact upon the modern international system. Azzam’s vision 
of a world based on pre-Westphalian, religiously based borders, gave birth to a newly 
defined global jihadist movement, while his impact upon regime change in Afghanistan 
was short-lived. The regime change variable hypothesized is not equally strong in both 
cases as an indicator of challenged conceptions of state sovereignty. 
Both TRLs acted on a stage in which other factors impacting the fall of 
Communism were at play. Though the macro-level, mainstream explanations of regime 
change in Poland and Afghanistan have validity, Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf 
Azzam were uniquely important, and surprisingly similar, in their contributions. They 
both looked to an older, profound theological identity to answer the challenge of a 
secular, Communist one. The Pope looked to the Gospel and to a time when being 
Catholic meant being Polish. He leveraged that historical identity and used theological 
rhetoric to inspire people to action. Azzam looked to older Islamic theological texts and 
reinterpreted them to create a new individual duty to jihad in a modern context. Both 
TRLs used old theological identities to shape a new political reality, ultimately creating a 
unique challenge to state sovereignty. 
 Another lens through which the regime change in each case can be analyzed is 
provided by Owen, in The Clash of Ideas in World Politics. According to Owen, a macro-
level transnational regime contest causes micro-level events that polarize elites, which in 
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turn causes a macro-level, transnational regime contest. Owen’s hypotheses center on 
transnational ideological polarization, which he defines as “the progressive segregation of 
elites and mass public across states along an ideological axis, so that political preferences 
among elites across states are simplified and intensified.”427 His micro-level hypotheses 
include regime instability and great-power war as causes of transnational ideological 
polarization.428 His macro-level hypothesis revolves around long waves of regimes. A 
transnational ideological contest will always endure until one regime type suggest that 
vastly superior on terms all elites accept.429 These concepts and terms are applicable to 
both cases of regime change. 
 In the case of John Paul II, there were arguably multiple levels of international 
and transnational contributions to the Solidarity movement, including the Roman 
Catholic community and the global community who supported democratic transition in 
Eastern Europe. These communities were reflections of a macro-level warring ideologies, 
including the West versus Communism, and religious freedom versus the secular, 
Communist state. As the macro-level ideological axis became weightier and 
transnational, political preferences on the ground in Poland became more simplified and 
intensified. The on-the-ground burgeoning Solidarity movement in turn became 
increasingly transnational. Transnational support, coupled with protest activities on the 
ground, opened up political opportunities, as exemplified by 1989 Round Table talks and 
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the 1989 elections. The efforts of the US and of Pope John Paul II exacerbated the 
instability of the Soviet regime. Poland was a microcosm of the Cold War. The Pope was 
successful in contributing to democratization in part because his role as pope enabled him 
to reach behind the iron curtain (both in appeals to the public and in systemic support of 
Solidarity) while simultaneously pleading the case of the Polish nation to the rest of the 
world. 
 The complex story of governance and regime change in Soviet Afghanistan can in 
a sense be simplified by examining the transnational warring ideologies at play. There 
were multiple, macro-level struggles going on: Islam versus secularism, Islam versus 
West, Communism versus the West, Islam versus Communism. On the micro-level, 
ideological polarization occurred, and on the macro level, there was a transnational 
regime contest. Like in Poland, Afghanistan was a small theater in which the broader 
Cold War was played out.  Azzam was an author how the struggle in Afghanistan was 
framed for the transnational Islamic community both domestically and internationally. 
His theology universalized the Afghan story and he contributed to the transnational 
ideological contest. However, he was also used by the United States as a player on the 
ground to advance its game of great power politics. Regime instability and great power 
politics contributed to transnational ideological polarization on the ground in 
Afghanistan, placing this case study squarely within Owen’s framework. 
 In comparing the cases in terms of the interplay between state and social 
movement, they pose many similarities. Both Communist Poland and Communist 
Afghanistan were small theaters for larger, ideological and transnational wars. In both 
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cases, the transnational religious leader’s theology universalized the story on the ground 
and contributed to the transnational ideological contest on the macro level. The escalating 
conflict on the macro level contributed to polarization on the micro-level. Parts of the 
framework of Owen’s work on warring ideas in world politics can be applied to the cases 
of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. Around the periphery of both cases, 
there were warring ideologies. In Azzam’s case, a transnational Islamic army, partially 
funded by the US, gathered in Afghanistan to fight Soviet invaders. It involved a strange 
convergence of warring ideologies. On the one hand, there was the classic Cold War 
conflict between Western democracy and Soviet Communism. On the other hand, Azzam 
led an ideological war between fundamentalist Islam and the secularized state. In the 
second case, Pope John Paul II, leader of an international organization and overlapping 
transnational communities, supported a Polish labor organization in nonviolently bringing 
giving birth to democracy. In this case as well, there were multiple fronts of transnational 
ideological contests. On the one hand, again, was the classic Cold War confrontation of 
the West and the Communists, in their different visions for the ideal state. On the other 
hand, Pope John Paul II stood for a society which allowed for the expression of faith and 
religious belief, versus the more secularized Communist state. Both conflicts involved 
overlapping social movements and transnational civil societies with boundaries drawn 
along lines of both theological and political identities. These meta-narratives give context 
to the regime change taking place on the domestic level. 
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Sovereignty 
 The third research objective was to explore the impact of transnational religious 
leaders upon state sovereignty and the Westphalian system of sovereign states through 
explanatory description and theory creation. According to thinkers like Gross, 
Morgenthau, and Philpott, the primary legacy of Westphalia is that the sovereign state, 
with supreme authority within its bordered territory, became the dominant actor in the 
international system. How have Azzam and Pope John Paul II, as arbiters of religious 
regimes, accepted, rejected or transformed the Westphalian system? By impacting the 
domestic politics and regime type of Poland and Afghanistan, how did these individuals 
impact the sovereignty of the nation state, and in turn, of the world order of sovereign 
states? More contemporary definitions of sovereignty also give context to these case 
studies. Consider Krasner’s four categories of sovereignty- international legal 
sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence 
sovereignty – and his claim that sovereignty is “organized hypocrisy”. The cases can also 
be measured by Krasner’s “shared sovereignty”, Stacey’s “relational sovereignty”, and 
Rudolph’s work on sovereignty and transnational civil society. Each case study can relate 
to Philpott’s central claim about the role of ideas in sparking revolution, and about 
understanding ideas as identities and social power.430  
Ultimately, however, this paper suggest that that TRLs with transformational 
leadership, religious soft power, and highly mobilized communities can challenge 
conceptions of modern state sovereignty in a unique way, particularly the notion that 
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states are the only dominant actor in the international system. The paper contributes to 
sovereignty literature by proposing a process through which TRLs impact conceptions of 
sovereignty, namely through their political goals and contributions to regime change. It 
finds that both TRLs studied were transformational leaders with religious soft power and 
a highly mobilized community. However, the TRLs had different relationships with 
modernity, political theology, and transnational activism, which qualified their challenges 
to conceptions of state sovereignty. Finally, on a deeper level it finds that the challenge of 
the TRL to sovereignty is more profound than that of other transnational actors in that 
TRLs appeal to deep theological identities in order to mobilize people to political ends. It 
is the strength of these transnational identities that predate states, that of Roman 
Catholicism in Poland and Islam in Afghanistan, that compels successful mobilization of 
people to impact regimes, and ultimately challenge traditional and modern conceptions of 
state sovereignty. The TRLs in this study both called upon these theological identities, 
older than the state, to mobilize people towards political ends. With brilliant prose and 
rhetoric, Azzam filled the battlefields of Afghanistan and John Paul II, the shipyards of 
Gdansk. But more importantly, they changed how a generation understood God, state, 
and world – a question unanswered today by many, a question that haunts the Muslim 
and the Catholic alike. 
 According to classic definitions of Westphalian sovereignty, Pope John Paul II 
both accepted and challenged the Westphalian system. He contributed to the development 
of a democratic Poland through nonviolent, internal regime change. He accepted and 
operated within the Westphalian world order of secular states. A sustainable, democratic 
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Poland, accountable to the Polish people and respected by states internationally, only 
served to strengthen the Westphalian system as a whole. However, as a transnational 
religious leader, the weight of his individual influence and his ability to impact the 
domestic politics of Poland posed a challenge to the classic Westphalian world in which 
states control the affairs within their borders and are the dominant actors in international 
affairs. 
The pope offered his dual acceptance of and challenge to the Westphalian system 
through two roles – pastor and head of an international organization. In his role as pastor, 
Pope John Paul used his personality and moral authority to develop a soft power. He 
mobilized millions of Poles to create a new national consciousness and identity that was 
not reliant upon communism. His teachings and public messages indirectly encouraged 
their participation in Solidarity. In this sense, he gave moral legitimacy to the Solidarity 
movement, thus ultimately contributing to the fall of Communism in Poland. In his role 
of head of the institution of the church, he had a positive, close relationship with US 
leaders. He was useful to their goals, and they, to his. These relationships created 
international opinion in Solidarity’s favor. In this sense, the Pope directed the approval of 
the international community and the Western world towards the Solidarity movement. He 
comfortably operated within a Westphalian international order with respect for state 
sovereignty, and he worked toward a more peaceful system. 
Azzam rejected the sovereign state and system of sovereign states as classically 
defined by Westphalia. He aimed to establish an Islamic theocracy in Afghanistan and 
ultimately a universal Caliphate. It was a vision of a world with territorial boundaries 
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drawn upon religiously based, pre-Westphalian lines. He offered a theological framework 
for transnational violent action. His “defensive jihad” called on every Muslim to defend 
Muslim lands from infidel invaders or to oust infidel occupiers. This created a global 
jihadist movement that to this day threatens states’ ability to control movement over their 
borders and to be free from outside intervention. In addition to offering the theological 
framework, Azzam’s work in the MAK made the Afghan Arabs possible pragmatically. 
He was involved in the international recruitment of Mujahedeen, the soliciting of 
international funds and arms, and the training and everyday life of the Afghan Arabs. The 
Afghan Arabs and the international network that supported them became the backbone of 
the Al Qaeda movement shortly after Azzam’s death. Thus Azzam rejected the classic 
Westphalian state sovereignty in his geo-political vision, his theology, and his work on 
the ground in Afghanistan. 
If one considers the primary legacy of Westphalia to be that the sovereign state, 
with supreme authority within its bordered territory, became the dominant actor in the 
international system, then the transnational religious leaders studied here both challenge 
it. Pope John Paul II’s actions as pastor and his creation of a strong transnational 
community that impacted the political outcomes of a nation state challenged the 
dominance of states as international actors in the Westphalian system. Azzam’s use of 
hard and soft power to galvanize a transnational military force to push back Soviet 
invasion, and his ability to lay the theological and pragmatic groundwork for the modern 
day jihadist movement, challenged traditional notions of state dominance as well. 
222 
	  
	  
Yet, there are further complexities to the legacy of Westphalia and the modern 
sovereignty state, and the two leaders differ in their response. Pope John Paul II’s 
theological worldview was compatible with the Westphalian system. He contributed to 
the creation of a stable, democratic Poland with authority within its borders and full 
sovereignty. The Pope’s actions as head of the institutional church respected the system 
of sovereign states. Pope used primarily soft power to gain international support for the 
Solidarity movement and to lend it legitimacy, thus contributing to the birth of 
democracy in Poland. Azzam’s theological worldview was incompatible with the 
Westphalian system, and he envisioned an alternate world order altogether. Azzam’s 
actions as theological and military leader did not respect the system of sovereign states.  
Krasner’s four types of sovereignty – international legal sovereignty, Westphalian 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty – can be applied to 
this case study. The pope did not accept Communist authority in Poland as legitimate. He 
viewed the Polish nation as something that predated communism, and the role of the 
Church was to protect and preserve Polish nationhood during the Communist era. He 
took actions to support a democratic Poland with all four types of sovereignty. We 
wanted Poland to have the full benefits of a modern, secular state, including control over 
its territorial borders and recognition from other countries with juridical independence. 
The international recognition of Poland’s juridical independence would give it 
international legal sovereignty. A strong, democratic government with supreme authority 
within its borders would give it domestic and Westphalian sovereignty. A measure of 
control over what flowed over its borders would give Poland interdependence 
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sovereignty. Yet, in his achievement of this sovereign Poland, he built a strong, 
transnational network in support of the Solidarity movement and he mobilized people 
based on Catholic principles, thus making interdependence sovereignty impossible, even 
in the newly democratic state. Perhaps the impossibility of interdependence sovereignty 
for Poland simply reflects Krasner’s belief that these four categories rarely occur 
together, and his willingness to go so far as to call sovereignty “organized hypocrisy.”431  
 Azzam’s case fits these categories differently. He partially undermined the 
domestic sovereignty of Communist Afghanistan, by contributing to a civil war with 
foreign fighters. He sought to topple the public authority of the state, and to do it with 
transnational, non-state actors. Azzam’s vision beyond Afghanistan was to use this 
transnational force to aid other Muslim lands in the defense against foreign forces. In 
some of those cases, the Afghan Arabs (many of which went on to join Al Qaeda), would 
have been used to defend the domestic sovereignty of a nation state. At least as an initial 
step toward reform, Azzam envisioned restoring Islamic rule within the boundaries of 
each nation state. Azzam violated interdependence sovereignty by making it the duty of 
every Muslim to defend other Muslims in countries rules by infidels or under threat of 
infidel invasion. The transnational ummah was called to jihad according to global terms. 
He further undermined interdependence sovereignty by organizing the Afghan Arabs on 
the ground. By contributing to the retreat of the Soviets and by not preventing the fall of 
the country into civil war, Azzam and his Afghan Arabs weakened the international legal 
sovereignty of the nation state. The international community could not recognize 
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Afghanistan as a stable, sovereign state while it underwent civil war.  
Azzam was a pioneer in creating a transnational network of fighters and a 
revolutionary jihadist ideology that threatened Krasner’s Westphalian sovereignty on 
several levels. First, he violated separation of church and state by proving that religion 
and religious ideology can be translated into political legitimacy. Second, Azzam violated 
the territorial nature of the state by creating the MAK and organizing men from around 
the globe to fight to overturn the Communist government in Afghanistan. Third, he 
violated the nation state system by accomplishing this as a transnational Islamic leader, as 
an individual who could mobilize forces across nation-state lines and harness a 
transnational ideology to question existing legitimacy. Finally, his vision for a pan-
Islamic world order posed problems for the Westphalian system. He proposed to restore 
Islamic rule to Muslim nations, defined by modern territorial boundaries, but the 
legitimacy of world order would be based in the ummah, an amorphous theological 
transnational community. 
Krasner’s “shared sovereignty” refers to developed countries promoting better 
governance in “failed, failing, and post conflict countries.”432 This principle is similar to 
Pope John Paul II’s work in mobilizing Western leadership to support the creation of a 
stable democracy in Poland. The US also supported the fledgling democracy through 
foreign aid. This concept could apply to the contemporary situation in Afghanistan, 
where stability is contributed to by the presence of foreign military forces and the 
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acceptance of foreign aid. But during his time, Azzam was not involved in diplomatic 
efforts to involve foreign governments in governing Afghanistan. Stacey argues for 
“relational sovereignty” as a “measure of care by government for its citizens whereby 
external actors ascribe the level of the standard that another government must reach in 
servicing the needs of that government’s citizens.”433 This concept relates to the 
interaction between the Solidarity movement on the ground in Poland and the 
international community’s expectations of what a stable, democratic Poland would look 
like. Poles and members of Solidarity pushed for a government that would serve its 
citizens according to the same standard provided by the US and other Western 
democracies. Yet the situation after Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan and Azzam’s death 
was so unstable that there was little opportunity for relational sovereignty. 
Even with his updated definitions, Krasner still presents a world in which certain 
types of sovereignty infringe upon others. In the case of John Paul II, did the 
transnational communities supporting Solidarity really make interdependence 
sovereignty, or any form of sovereignty, impossible for the newly democratic Poland? 
What conceptions of sovereignty were plausible, if any, in the Afghanistan after the 
Soviets withdrew? Perhaps Rudolph captures sovereignty best in describing the space for 
transnational civil in global politics, finding that “transnational activity is guided by 
imaginary maps whose boundaries do not approximate the spaces depicted on political 
maps.” Such arenas do not replace or supersede political maps showing territorially 
defined states. She writes: 
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“We can imagine them as transparent plastic overlays, alternative 
meaning systems superimposed upon the meaning system of political 
maps. They do not replace state-defined space; they provide 
alternatives to it… What this suggests is less a waning of states than a 
more complex set of interrelations in which rival identities and 
structures jostle the state. New alliances and goals become possible as 
domestic civil society joins up with transnational civil society to 
challenge states and as states in concert employ elements in 
transnational civil society to limit particular states’ sovereignty.”434 
 
The transnational civil societies associated with the social movement Solidarity could be 
described as such transparent overlays. The Roman Catholic community compelled by 
the theological principles behind Solidarity overlaid the pro-democracy in Eastern Europe 
movement, which overlaid Solidarity itself. These did not infringe upon the possibility of 
a democratic, sovereign state, but nor did any of these identity borders line up perfectly. 
Similarly, there were multiple transnational civil societies that overlaid the political map 
of the Soviet Afghan war. In the case of Azzam, the threat to sovereignty was in the 
political theology that motivated the Afghan Arabs, which sought a world based on 
religiously defined boundaries with complete disregard for the borders established after 
Westphalia. This theology partially formed the basis for Al Qaeda, as it inspired his 
pupil, Osama Bin Laden, and many others to a new global jihad. 
 Though Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Azzam differed in their response to 
modernity, their political theologies, and the nature of their transnational activism, they 
held three characteristics in common: transformational leadership, religious soft power, 
and high levels of mobilization. These characteristics give insight into what makes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Rudolph and Piscatori, Transnational Religion, 12. 
227 
	  
	  
TRL challenge to state sovereignty through regime change unique from the challenge of 
transnational actors. The value of this paper is to not only lay out a casual process which 
can contribute to literature on sovereignty, but also to expose the what was so profound 
about these TRLs challenge – they were concerned with the relationship between God 
and man. They tapped into traditional theological identities that existed long before 
Westphalia. They revived profound, ancient theological ideas to mobilize their followers 
transnationally to achieve political goals. The ideas they used had cultural, theological, 
and historical power over the psyche of the Poles and the Afghans. This is what 
transnational religious leaders are able to do that secular transnational actors cannot. 
Sovereignty evolves through revolution. According to Philpott, “tumult yields 
novel orthodoxy.”435 Revolutions which have led to a change in sovereignty in the past 
have been based upon transnational ideas adopted by domestic social movements and 
their leaders, including Napoleon’s failed attempt at empire, 19th century minority rights 
and national self-determination, the end of colonialism, and the creation of the European 
Community, now the European Union. Because of these revolutions, “the Westphalian 
paradigm is being weakened and (the sovereignty of) the state is again… problematic.”436 
These revolutions laid the foundation for modern day social movements based on 
transnational religious ideals. Philpott finds that “norms of sovereignty are… (matters of) 
basic authority.”437 They are not solely matters of power but also of legitimate authority. 
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Revolutions in these norms are rare, but they are revolutions of the most basic sort.”438 
The Solidarity movement was certainly a revolution about legitimate authority in 
Poland. However, for Pope John Paul II, Poland’s liberation was part of a meta-narrative 
about the spiritual redemption of Europe. He believed Europe to be a Christian 
civilization, and Poland to be “the indispensable heart of that continental identity.”439 The 
Polish Church was “the essential foundation of Europe’s true and authentic unity.”440 
Philpott says that the ideas that cause revolution create identity and social power. In his 
pilgrimages and role as pastor to the people of Poland, the pope presented them with an 
identity rooted in Christianity and old Polish nationalism that transcended their everyday 
reality in Communist Poland. This identity, in turn, gave structure to the social movement 
of Solidarity. Although he was specifically concerned with the establishment of a 
democracy in Poland, the pope’s vision was also theological. His life was dedicated to the 
Christian evangelization of the world. He viewed Poland, a strong Catholic country with 
a believing population, as a means to influence the spirituality of the rest of Europe. This 
case gives evidence to the notion that big ideas, even theological in nature, do inspire 
revolutions in sovereignty, as suggested by Philpott. 
Azzam also created a revolution in sovereignty based on theological ideas. He 
envisioned a world with pre-Westphalian religiously defined boundaries. His ideas 
created a new Muslim identity, in that he made it an individual duty for every Muslim to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Ibid. 
439 Brynes, “The Catholic Church,” 433–48. 
440 Ibid., 35. 
229 
	  
	  
participate in jihad, across state lines. This identity caused a social movement, or in this 
case, a violent uprising against Soviet invaders. The Soviet Afghan war was about 
legitimate authority in Afghanistan. But for Azzam the Soviet Afghan war was only one 
battlefield in the global war for the reestablishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Azzam 
believed that the non-Muslim infringement of Muslim territory demands the immediate 
military involvement of all able Muslim men in defense of the said territory, wherever its 
location. Azzam’s ultimate aim was that political boundaries reflect the boundaries of the 
ummah, the transnational community of Islam, and the territorial lines of all countries 
that were once Islamic, “From Andalucía in the West to Indonesia in the East.”441 For 
Azzam, Afghanistan was a productive theater to give voice to his pan-Islamist ideas.442 
Azzam envisioned the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan as the first step in an 
international Islamist movement, towards an ultimate war against international 
communism, what he called “a war between the Ummahs (collective peoples of Islam) 
versus Communism.”443 Azzam’s theological and operational work laid the groundwork 
for Al Qaeda and other strands of global jihadism. Al Qaeda’s war is also framed in terms 
of a macro-level was between the ummah and the United States. In their transnationally 
organized acts of terror, Al Qaeda and associated jihadist networks to this day disregard 
state sovereignty. The US and other Western democracies have had to adjust foreign 
policy to deal with threats from non-state actors whose vision of world order pre-dates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Ibid. 
442 Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 68. 
443 Azzam, referenced by Aboul-Enein, Militant Islamist Ideology, 153. 
230 
	  
	  
the treaty of Westphalia. 
We are living in a world in which sovereignty is no longer wholly defined by the 
ideals of Westphalia. Transnational religious leaders and their transnational social 
movements pose a challenge to conceptions of traditional Westphalian sovereignty and 
modern sovereignty that is systemic and weighty. As policymakers encounter 
contemporary transnational religious leaders in global politics, they can choose to remain 
in the mainstream secularization narrative, which claims that religious identity and 
religious actors are no longer relevant to global politics. Or they can acknowledge that 
religion is once again driving major world events. They can harness opportunities to 
partner with transnational religious leaders in making world order more stable and state 
sovereignty more secure. They can develop strategies for dealing with leaders who 
fundamentally reject the Westphalian system, based on an understanding of the 
theological worldview motivating that rejection. Acknowledgement of the real power of 
religion in shaping geopolitics, whether for good or for ill, serves world leaders in 
crafting sound foreign policy and political scientists in dissecting the dynamics of 
international relations and religion in the twenty first century. 
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